How to sell TNI on democratic controls

How does one go about taming a once excessively powerful military? Kusnanto Anggoro, senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and lecturer in the postgraduate studies program of the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, discusses what may be in order.

JAKARTA (JP): President Abdurrahman Wahid has achieved reasonable supremacy over the armed forces. The latest reshuffle of 74 high-ranking officers weakens "conservative" elements within the military. A new phalanx of reform-minded top brass is on the rise, and a tradition of civil supremacy seems to be in the making. It remains to be seen, however, whether this will create a working civilian-military relationship and/or a stable democracy.

Resentment is breeding against growing presidential interference in military affairs. Many regard the reshuffle as a new form of control, through political interference that undermines the military's institutional integrity and autonomy. The reformers may have to balance loyalty to the institution of the president with that to an organization that would expect some of its vested interests to be protected.

Civilian-military relations are too complex an issue to be identified as civil supremacy. Instead, it should be understood to encompass all aspects of the relationship between the armed forces (as a political, social, and economic institution) and the society (and state) of which they are part.

As the military understands it, civilian-military relations consist of three levels: relations between the civilian, democratically elected leadership and that of the military, that between the military and civil institutions and, last but not least, between military personnel and the rest of the population. Given the hierarchic character of the military, the support of the military headquarters for the President should stabilize the relations at the first level.

Indeed, the struggle for establishing civil supremacy is not over yet. At the second level of relations, cultural differences remain intact. The armed forces are predestined to be the manager of violence; they are at the vanguard of stability and order. They understand power in terms of the capability of force, coercion and perhaps violence.

Hierarchy, discipline and command are embedded in their decision-making practices. Civilians, meanwhile, are inclined to a peaceful resolution of disputes. They are managers of dialog and negotiations. Therefore, civilian-military relations would continue to be fraught with tension.

It could be more so in post-Soeharto Indonesia, as civil society and the military represent groups which were previously in conflict. Stability in civilian-military relations requires a deliberate effort to build mutual trust. In this sense, the term "confidence-building measures", which usually applies to interstate relations, also has a domestic application in emerging democracies.

The military leadership has agreed to withdraw from the legislative body in 2004. Yet, after years of authoritarian rule, the civilians appointed to the Ministry of Defense and the members of the defense (and foreign policy) committee at the House of Representatives lack expertise in military matters.

This generates frustration among Army officers, while the civilians shy away from the military out of ignorance or fear. An exclusive emphasis on civil control and military subordination in these situations is likely to be resented and resisted by senior officers.

But the statement of chief of the Indonesian Military (TNI) Adm. Widodo on the need for clearly defined presidential powers, or that of Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman following his dismissal as commander of the Army's Strategic Reserves Command, may be considered a pebble in the shoe of Abdurrahman.

At least in the foreseeable future, the military will be depoliticized. Yet, it is still the most important state institution and has the capacity to exercise substantial force. The armed forces may be the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty and liberty if a country is confronted by external aggression.

It also has the potential to overthrow civil authority and destroy democracy, as was recently the case in Pakistan. Continuing social upheaval of Chiapas was instrumental to increasing the influence of the Mexican military, contradictory to general trends of Caribbean and Latin American countries.

In post-Soviet Balkan states, the armed forces remain involved in domestic politics. Even in the United States, the issue of "legitimate civilian control" and "unwarranted political interference" have become periodic controversies.

To build and maintain stable civilian-military relations which are consistent with democracy, the more fundamental questions would be how to manage the power of the armed forces so that they do not threaten newfound democracy.

The conventional answer to this question lies in the principle of "civil supremacy over the armed forces". The military should accept that it is subordinate to civil authority, and appropriate mechanisms should be established to ensure civil control.

In the Indonesian case, however, this cardinal principle does not guarantee democracy. First, the president is equipped with the powerful Article 10 of the Constitution, and may use it to crush political rivals. Second, supremacy is indeed a subjective norm.

In practice, it is imperative to understand the relationship between the civil authority and the armed forces as a partnership. Perhaps, a stable democracy requires civilian- military relations to be based not only on control, but also on dynamic interaction and cooperation between the military and civil leadership. Needless to say, the relations should be established firmly on, among other aspects, the state's Constitution, defense act and a defense white paper.