How to sell TNI on democratic controls

How to sell TNI on democratic controls

How does one go about taming a once excessively powerful
military? Kusnanto Anggoro, senior researcher at the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies and lecturer in the
postgraduate studies program of the University of Indonesia in
Jakarta, discusses what may be in order.

JAKARTA (JP): President Abdurrahman Wahid has achieved
reasonable supremacy over the armed forces. The latest reshuffle
of 74 high-ranking officers weakens "conservative" elements
within the military. A new phalanx of reform-minded top brass is
on the rise, and a tradition of civil supremacy seems to be in
the making. It remains to be seen, however, whether this will
create a working civilian-military relationship and/or a stable
democracy.

Resentment is breeding against growing presidential
interference in military affairs. Many regard the reshuffle as a
new form of control, through political interference that
undermines the military's institutional integrity and autonomy.
The reformers may have to balance loyalty to the institution of
the president with that to an organization that would expect some
of its vested interests to be protected.

Civilian-military relations are too complex an issue to be
identified as civil supremacy. Instead, it should be understood
to encompass all aspects of the relationship between the armed
forces (as a political, social, and economic institution) and the
society (and state) of which they are part.

As the military understands it, civilian-military relations
consist of three levels: relations between the civilian,
democratically elected leadership and that of the military, that
between the military and civil institutions and, last but not
least, between military personnel and the rest of the population.
Given the hierarchic character of the military, the support of
the military headquarters for the President should stabilize the
relations at the first level.

Indeed, the struggle for establishing civil supremacy is not
over yet. At the second level of relations, cultural differences
remain intact. The armed forces are predestined to be the manager
of violence; they are at the vanguard of stability and order.
They understand power in terms of the capability of force,
coercion and perhaps violence.

Hierarchy, discipline and command are embedded in their
decision-making practices. Civilians, meanwhile, are inclined to
a peaceful resolution of disputes. They are managers of dialog
and negotiations. Therefore, civilian-military relations would
continue to be fraught with tension.

It could be more so in post-Soeharto Indonesia, as civil
society and the military represent groups which were previously
in conflict. Stability in civilian-military relations requires a
deliberate effort to build mutual trust. In this sense, the term
"confidence-building measures", which usually applies to
interstate relations, also has a domestic application in emerging
democracies.

The military leadership has agreed to withdraw from the
legislative body in 2004. Yet, after years of authoritarian rule,
the civilians appointed to the Ministry of Defense and the
members of the defense (and foreign policy) committee at the
House of Representatives lack expertise in military matters.

This generates frustration among Army officers, while the
civilians shy away from the military out of ignorance or fear. An
exclusive emphasis on civil control and military subordination in
these situations is likely to be resented and resisted by senior
officers.

But the statement of chief of the Indonesian Military (TNI)
Adm. Widodo on the need for clearly defined presidential powers,
or that of Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman following his dismissal as
commander of the Army's Strategic Reserves Command, may be
considered a pebble in the shoe of Abdurrahman.

At least in the foreseeable future, the military will be
depoliticized. Yet, it is still the most important state
institution and has the capacity to exercise substantial force.
The armed forces may be the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty and
liberty if a country is confronted by external aggression.

It also has the potential to overthrow civil authority and
destroy democracy, as was recently the case in Pakistan.
Continuing social upheaval of Chiapas was instrumental to
increasing the influence of the Mexican military, contradictory
to general trends of Caribbean and Latin American countries.

In post-Soviet Balkan states, the armed forces remain involved
in domestic politics. Even in the United States, the issue of
"legitimate civilian control" and "unwarranted political
interference" have become periodic controversies.

To build and maintain stable civilian-military relations which
are consistent with democracy, the more fundamental questions
would be how to manage the power of the armed forces so that they
do not threaten newfound democracy.

The conventional answer to this question lies in the principle
of "civil supremacy over the armed forces". The military should
accept that it is subordinate to civil authority, and appropriate
mechanisms should be established to ensure civil control.

In the Indonesian case, however, this cardinal principle does
not guarantee democracy. First, the president is equipped with
the powerful Article 10 of the Constitution, and may use it to
crush political rivals. Second, supremacy is indeed a subjective
norm.

In practice, it is imperative to understand the relationship
between the civil authority and the armed forces as a
partnership. Perhaps, a stable democracy requires civilian-
military relations to be based not only on control, but also on
dynamic interaction and cooperation between the military and
civil leadership. Needless to say, the relations should be
established firmly on, among other aspects, the state's
Constitution, defense act and a defense white paper.