How to indict a regime

How to indict a regime

Catatan atas Gagalnya Politik Order Baru
(Note on the Failure of New Order Politics)
Eep Saifulloh Fatah;
Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta, May 1998;
312 pp + index;
Rp 22,500

YOGYAKARTA (JP): A strong movement is shaking down the
establishment in this country. The movement manifests itself in
various forms, including rioting.

Some quarters believe rioting is triggered by the social gap,
but others contend the root cause is the monopoly of power. All
are convinced, however, the outbreak of a riot is but an
expression of the community's indictment of those in power.

The result is the demand for rapid political change, which
compels us to alter, improve and reformulate our interpretation
of power. Soeharto's stepping down as president has opened up new
possibilities for our future political life.

This book discusses a number of reform scenarios which have
developed in the political discourse of the New Order and
significantly contributed to this wave of change.

First, a division in the New Order strategic alliance has
paved the way for the reform movement. O'Donnel and his
colleagues provide the frame of thought for this scenario when
they state "there is no transition whose beginning is not the
consequence -- direct or indirect -- of important divisions
within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the
fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners".

The division broke up the solidity and cohesion in New Order
politics, reducing the power of the state and simultaneously
making the split more serious. It opens up the way for new
political negotiations toward the implementation of reform.

Second, reform as the consequence of political regeneration in
the state power side. The basis of the assumption used for this
scenario is that the New Order has been able to maintain the
status quo -- with only ad hoc and artificial policy adjustments
here and there -- because there has not been a change in
political leadership and regeneration in a wider sense.

Third, reform as a further result of popular radicalization
which has brought down power legitimacy. This is marked, among
others, by frequent outbreaks of rioting and mass banditry.

Fourth, reform as the result of a social movement -- initiated
particularly by the (political) middle class -- which has
become stronger and stronger. In the past seven or eight years,
the middle class has shown a tendency to politicization and has
become more articulate, evident by their participation in non-
governmental organizations.

Fifth, reform prompted by international pressure which is
impossible to block. According to this scenario, international
powers have a stake in the expansion of democracy and in this
context urge every country, which is yet to be democratic, to
adjust itself to this demand.

Sixth, reform as the only solution to a serious and
unmanageable economic crisis. The argument is that a protracted
economic crisis has manifested itself in latent problems in
political systems. There is a growing awareness that this
economic crisis is actually rooted in an erroneous political
strategy or an error in developmental approach.

Indeed, not all dimensions of reform are covered in this book.
Despite its shortcomings, the book is intended to stimulate
further elaboration on reforms not only at the level of
discussions, but also more concretely at the level of strategy
and tactical preparation.

-- Binhad Nurrohmat