How to become maritime nation

How to become maritime nation

JAKARTA (JP): President Abdurrahman Wahid has urged that the
country become a seafaring nation in view of its geography and
history. Historian Merle Ricklefs, a professor at the University
of Melbourne and director of Asian Studies at its Melbourne
Institute of Asian Languages and Societies, recently agreed to an
e-mail interview with The Jakarta Post on the subject, on which
he has conducted extensive research.

Question: What is your understanding of President
Abdurrahman's concept of Indonesia as a maritime or seafaring
nation?

Answer: The Indonesian archipelago is the largest archipelago
in the world. Over its recorded history the seas have been the
"highways" which have connected one part of the archipelago with
another. In Western geopolitical thought, seas are things which
divide states, peoples and cultures. But in the circumstances of
the Indonesian archipelago, it is the seas which have brought
peoples and cultures together, making possible the modern state
of the Republic of Indonesia.

What are the consequences of the concept when turned into
reality?

The principal consequence is that great attention must be
given to sea-lanes, maritime commerce and communications as being
among the main sinews which hold the nation together. The Dutch
understood this, for the KPM shipping line was a major element in
the way they held Indonesia together when it was the Netherlands
East Indies. But it is probably true that the governments of
independent Indonesia have tended to give priority to the major
populations centers -- that is, to land areas -- and particularly
to Java, rather than to the waterways which connect those
population centers with each other.

Some experts have blamed the Dutch colonial government for
cornering a number of strong maritime kingdoms in the mountains,
thereby losing their control of the sea and with them their
culture -- seen as being open-minded, dynamic, having an
internationalist outlook, entrepreneurship, etc. Do you agree
with this view?

There is some evidence to support this, but also evidence to
the contrary. Two major cases of entrepreneurial maritime trading
states being destroyed come immediately to mind. One took place
on the Java coast in the early 17th century. Those trading states
were destroyed, not by the Dutch, but by Sultan Agung (1613-
1646). The second was Makassar/Ujungpandang, which was indeed
seriously damaged by the VOC in the late 17th century.

The VOC was, among other things, a trading company. While it
was sometimes in competition with indigenous trading centers and
did do damage to local traders, at other times it worked in
alliance with maritime traders to their mutual advantage. In the
early 18th century, the Javanese coastal states preferred to be
under Dutch control rather than under that of the Javanese state,
and their shared interest in trade was probably the
reason.

In the 19th century, the development of trade in such items as
rubber and tobacco in fact offered many opportunities which were
taken up enthusiastically by Indonesian smallholders. So the
historical record is in fact quite a complicated one.

Past Indonesian leaders Sukarno and Soeharto tried without
success to turn Indonesia into a maritime nation. What was done
in the past and why did the efforts fail?

This is a complex question, requiring serious research of a
kind not yet done. My own belief is that inadequate attention was
given to the appropriate technology for Indonesia's shipping
fleet. For example, there is no reason why some bulk items can't
continue to be shipped by sailing boats, lowering the cost and
saving on fuel and pollution and to the port facilities, etc.
which that fleet requires. In fact, this was just a part of a
general pattern at most times of neglect of the needs and
priorities of the islands outside of Java.

One of the more obvious obstacles is the mental switch from an
agrarian society into a maritime society. What does it take to
make such a transformation a success?

In this as in all things, a combined approach is needed.
Education, legal frameworks, infrastructure projects and the
general distribution of resources between the center and regions
all need to be addressed. And the ideas and experience of
Indonesia's sailors need to be utilized. The present
political circumstances of Indonesia may encourage fresh thinking about
what holds the nation together and about the role of the islands outside of
Java in the nation.

Given the vast sectors involved in the concept of a noted
maritime nation which dictates a standard of excellence in, among
other areas, shipping, fishery, mining, telecommunication, nature
preservation, tourism -- how should the government approach this
transformation? Do you have a rough time frame on when all this
could be achieved?

The time frame can only be defined in terms of the resources
available to carry out the strategies. Again, a combined
strategy is needed. A multisectoral task force will probably be
needed to mobilize resources. I would suggest, modestly, that
such a task force might do well to engage the advice of one or
more of Indonesia's historians who have worked on the maritime
history of the archipelago and who understand the
longer term dynamics.

It seems strange now that the present government is uneasy
with the concept of regional autonomy while former coastal
sultanates like Tuban, Pasuruan and Gresik practiced autonomy
with considerable success. How do you see this issue?

The precolonial Javanese state was one which recognized much
regional autonomy -- largely because it had to. Given scattered
population groups divided by uninhabited and dangerous country,
poor communications, limited infrastructure, a poorly developed
bureaucratic structure and a generally low level of
institutionalization, these states had to acknowledge regional
autonomy, so long as those regions in turn recognized the
overlordship of the central state, paid some taxes and provided
men to fight when required.

It may be that states -- especially those which lack well-
established democratic traditions -- will normally seek to
centralize power if they can, and that the New Order state of
Soeharto was able to do so because it had the means to do so:
better communications, higher levels of institutionalization, a
better bureaucracy, the military, etc. But circumstances in
Indonesia now are quite different, at least for the time
being, so the possibility of reconsidering this issue certainly
exists. (hbk)