How the `transparent war' in Aceh has gone so far

How the `transparent war' in Aceh has gone so far

Aboeprijadi Santoso, Radio 68-H, Lhoksemauwe, Aceh

The claim that the military operation in Aceh is a
"transparent war" assumes that the war has been conducted in a
civilized way. It should be possible, that is, for the public to
monitor the conduct of the war through the media. However, it did
not work that way. A transparent war" has become both a foreign
policy claim and a rhetoric to cover up whatever atrocities that
may have occurred during the operation.

As the Indonesian Military (TNI) has taken efforts to serve
the media, its Media Center in Lhoksemauwe, Aceh, however,
offered few fresh items. Instead, the Vine Vira Hotel, where most
media representatives stayed, has become the center for exchanges
of information and discussion that led them to choose what, where
and how to cover the war day by day. SMS messages, sometimes even
calls by locals at hot spots, could become useful sources. The
TNI media campaign -- like the Qatar Media Center for the U.S.
war in Iraq -- has largely failed to convince the media that the
war is being conducted "transparently".

"Transparent war" has been in vogue since the U.s. war on Iraq
is seen as successful i.e. victorious, short, with much less
death tolls than expected. Jakarta clearly uses the concept to
project the war in Aceh as being politically legitimate,
militarily correct, clean and open to the media, in addition to
being legal.

The handling of the German tourists shot in West Aceh recently
was clearly set to prove that claim. It was quickly said that the
soldiers acted according to the rules. In the case of the U.S.
journalist William "Abu Billy" Nessen, who was with the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM) fighters, he finally came out safely after some
arrangement between the authorities and the U.S. embassy.

Since the failure of the Tokyo talks, the war has been closely
watched by the Tokyo donor countries. The U.S. key defense
official, Paul Wolfowitz, recently expressed doubts whether the
war in Aceh could be concluded in six months and he urged Jakarta
to conduct it in a "transparent way".

Journalists are generally critical on how the war proceeds and
whatever may happen to non-combatant civilians. A South-Korean
colleague who had covered Aceh for years said he admires the
patience and persistence way local journalists did their job and
studied their findings. By contrast, severe restrictions imposed
by the martial law authorities on the media reflect paranoia
toward anything that may attract the interest of foreign
countries. Not only were GAM's views banned, but foreign
journalists, including locals working for foreign media, were
banned or restricted.

Embedded journalists of the "Sanggabuana team" (named after
their location of training) are privileged. But some, who felt
uneasy, have joined the "free" press operating from the Vine Vira
"headquarters" and have combined knowledge from the Sanggabuana
training about the structure of the military operation and used
their personal relationships built with local commanders, to
acquire greater insight once they "deserted" from the embedded
team.

It is now feared that the war process will only be accessible
for the embedded reporters only.

Already, most important parts of the war have so far been
conducted out of the sight of the journalists.

Take the air strike as monitored from the highland of Buket
Hagu, Bireuen, on June 17. The commander of the special forces
Capt. Fajar was very friendly and answered all questions as we
watched the assaults on a GAM stronghold near Lhok Sukon, North
Aceh.

But what we saw was just a small part of the action: Two F-16
jetfighters flying too high to hit any target and two OV-10
Bronco's firing eight heavy missiles resulting in thick smokes on
the other side of the hill. "A shock therapy," said Capt. Fajar,
indicating that it was part of a "shock and awe" campaign.

The one-hour air show only hit three of the 11 targets. It had
to be followed by much more as TNI units on the ground started to
sweep the area where GAM fighters and villagers were presumed to
have built some 5 kilometer-long base camps. So this must have
been a big operation, yet little was known about it. Clearly, the
bigger and most crucial operations are not accessible for the
media.

It is precisely this first stage of attack and sweep on the
ground that is most critical in terms of possible casualties on
the civilian population. Local commanders could easily leave the
journalists unaware of the potentially tragic war scenes
elsewhere. Journalists should be given a chance to watch or be
fully informed on what happen as the soldiers enter villages with
GAM bases now identified as "black spots".

Past experience (1989-1998) has showed that the Army punished
the "black spot" villagers by selecting men aged between 18 to 45
and instructed them to lay down only to be tortured until they
reveal the names of GAM members. According to villagers of Blang
Seupang, Bireuen-Jeumpa, this method has recently been repeated.
Worse excesses with extra judicial killings have been reported
earlier in Cot Ijeuh, Cot Batee, Mapang Mamplang, Lawang and
Peudada.

In fact, the pattern has been so widespread and resented for
years that villagers have developed a habit of collectively
giving the same answer, "hom!" ("don't know!") whenever the TNI
soldiers inquire about GAM. A new song called "Hom" by Teungku
Rafli's artist group Kande has become very popular today as
Acehnese generally feel depressed about the war.

The reality of the war and its excesses cannot be hidden. The
Acehnese simply want peace, but since peace is the anathema of
war, in particular the anti-guerrilla warfare that disrupts
village life, even a simple wish to have peace may be viewed as
being sympathetic to the GAM.

Surely the GAM or its clandestine networks, GAM cantoi, have
also been involved in terrorist and propaganda acts like
shootings at public transport vehicles, forcing the village
chiefs (keuchik) to resign and disseminating SMS-disinformation
messages.

But the biggest victims of the war are the Acehnese villagers
-- also the ones with the least media attention. They desperately
want peace because the war disrupts their life and the trauma of
the recent past is still running deep.

If Jakarta's "integrated operation" is to restore peace and
security, why is it that no rejoice has been noticed among
villagers one month since the war? Even most anti-American Iraqis
showed apparent relief when the U.S. force launched the war
against Saddam's army.

Instead, in talks with Acehnese villagers, even their faces
reveal fear and resentment. With Aceh exclusively put under a
military regime, winning villagers' hearts and minds seems even
more elusive. Jakarta has lost the propaganda war.

"A transparent war" thus becomes a self-contradictory term for
Aceh. For if the war is to be transparent it has to be conducted
in civilized way, yet nothing is more civilized than to stop the
war and assure peace for a people that is being sandwiched
between two deadly enemies -- which is why they hate the two
warring parties.