How the `transparent war' in Aceh has gone so far

Aboeprijadi Santoso, Radio 68-H, Lhoksemauwe, Aceh

The claim that the military operation in Aceh is a "transparent war" assumes that the war has been conducted in a civilized way. It should be possible, that is, for the public to monitor the conduct of the war through the media. However, it did not work that way. A transparent war" has become both a foreign policy claim and a rhetoric to cover up whatever atrocities that may have occurred during the operation.

As the Indonesian Military (TNI) has taken efforts to serve the media, its Media Center in Lhoksemauwe, Aceh, however, offered few fresh items. Instead, the Vine Vira Hotel, where most media representatives stayed, has become the center for exchanges of information and discussion that led them to choose what, where and how to cover the war day by day. SMS messages, sometimes even calls by locals at hot spots, could become useful sources. The TNI media campaign -- like the Qatar Media Center for the U.S. war in Iraq -- has largely failed to convince the media that the war is being conducted "transparently".

"Transparent war" has been in vogue since the U.s. war on Iraq is seen as successful i.e. victorious, short, with much less death tolls than expected. Jakarta clearly uses the concept to project the war in Aceh as being politically legitimate, militarily correct, clean and open to the media, in addition to being legal.

The handling of the German tourists shot in West Aceh recently was clearly set to prove that claim. It was quickly said that the soldiers acted according to the rules. In the case of the U.S. journalist William "Abu Billy" Nessen, who was with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) fighters, he finally came out safely after some arrangement between the authorities and the U.S. embassy.

Since the failure of the Tokyo talks, the war has been closely watched by the Tokyo donor countries. The U.S. key defense official, Paul Wolfowitz, recently expressed doubts whether the war in Aceh could be concluded in six months and he urged Jakarta to conduct it in a "transparent way".

Journalists are generally critical on how the war proceeds and whatever may happen to non-combatant civilians. A South-Korean colleague who had covered Aceh for years said he admires the patience and persistence way local journalists did their job and studied their findings. By contrast, severe restrictions imposed by the martial law authorities on the media reflect paranoia toward anything that may attract the interest of foreign countries. Not only were GAM's views banned, but foreign journalists, including locals working for foreign media, were banned or restricted.

Embedded journalists of the "Sanggabuana team" (named after their location of training) are privileged. But some, who felt uneasy, have joined the "free" press operating from the Vine Vira "headquarters" and have combined knowledge from the Sanggabuana training about the structure of the military operation and used their personal relationships built with local commanders, to acquire greater insight once they "deserted" from the embedded team.

It is now feared that the war process will only be accessible for the embedded reporters only.

Already, most important parts of the war have so far been conducted out of the sight of the journalists.

Take the air strike as monitored from the highland of Buket Hagu, Bireuen, on June 17. The commander of the special forces Capt. Fajar was very friendly and answered all questions as we watched the assaults on a GAM stronghold near Lhok Sukon, North Aceh.

But what we saw was just a small part of the action: Two F-16 jetfighters flying too high to hit any target and two OV-10 Bronco's firing eight heavy missiles resulting in thick smokes on the other side of the hill. "A shock therapy," said Capt. Fajar, indicating that it was part of a "shock and awe" campaign.

The one-hour air show only hit three of the 11 targets. It had to be followed by much more as TNI units on the ground started to sweep the area where GAM fighters and villagers were presumed to have built some 5 kilometer-long base camps. So this must have been a big operation, yet little was known about it. Clearly, the bigger and most crucial operations are not accessible for the media.

It is precisely this first stage of attack and sweep on the ground that is most critical in terms of possible casualties on the civilian population. Local commanders could easily leave the journalists unaware of the potentially tragic war scenes elsewhere. Journalists should be given a chance to watch or be fully informed on what happen as the soldiers enter villages with GAM bases now identified as "black spots".

Past experience (1989-1998) has showed that the Army punished the "black spot" villagers by selecting men aged between 18 to 45 and instructed them to lay down only to be tortured until they reveal the names of GAM members. According to villagers of Blang Seupang, Bireuen-Jeumpa, this method has recently been repeated. Worse excesses with extra judicial killings have been reported earlier in Cot Ijeuh, Cot Batee, Mapang Mamplang, Lawang and Peudada.

In fact, the pattern has been so widespread and resented for years that villagers have developed a habit of collectively giving the same answer, "hom!" ("don't know!") whenever the TNI soldiers inquire about GAM. A new song called "Hom" by Teungku Rafli's artist group Kande has become very popular today as Acehnese generally feel depressed about the war.

The reality of the war and its excesses cannot be hidden. The Acehnese simply want peace, but since peace is the anathema of war, in particular the anti-guerrilla warfare that disrupts village life, even a simple wish to have peace may be viewed as being sympathetic to the GAM.

Surely the GAM or its clandestine networks, GAM cantoi, have also been involved in terrorist and propaganda acts like shootings at public transport vehicles, forcing the village chiefs (keuchik) to resign and disseminating SMS-disinformation messages.

But the biggest victims of the war are the Acehnese villagers -- also the ones with the least media attention. They desperately want peace because the war disrupts their life and the trauma of the recent past is still running deep.

If Jakarta's "integrated operation" is to restore peace and security, why is it that no rejoice has been noticed among villagers one month since the war? Even most anti-American Iraqis showed apparent relief when the U.S. force launched the war against Saddam's army.

Instead, in talks with Acehnese villagers, even their faces reveal fear and resentment. With Aceh exclusively put under a military regime, winning villagers' hearts and minds seems even more elusive. Jakarta has lost the propaganda war.

"A transparent war" thus becomes a self-contradictory term for Aceh. For if the war is to be transparent it has to be conducted in civilized way, yet nothing is more civilized than to stop the war and assure peace for a people that is being sandwiched between two deadly enemies -- which is why they hate the two warring parties.