How the Iraq war would affect Indonesia

How the Iraq war would affect Indonesia

Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Former Governor,
National Resilience Institute, (Lemhanas), Jakarta

War in Iraq seems to be inevitable now and it is only a matter of
days, or even hours, before the U.S. military machine starts to
roll. The Azores summit and, in particular, statements by
President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, which
stressed the need for maintaining credibility, are clear and
strong indications of the inevitability of war. The important
question for us in Indonesia is how that war could affect us and
our country.

The duration of the war and performance of the U.S. military
will significantly determine how the war will affect the world,
including Indonesia. The duration of the war includes military
operations to defeat the Iraq military resistance but also the
consolidation of this military success to achieve its political
objectives.

With its military-technological superiority, the U.S. will be
able to defeat Iraqi regular military resistance very quickly.
That does not mean, however, that consolidation of the military
success for political purposes will also be short. The U.S. has
propagated that it would make the new Iraq an example for the
whole Middle East in terms of democracy, peaceful attitude toward
neighbors and good governance.

That political objective is very lofty but not easy to achieve
considering the social, psychological and political conditions
within the Iraqi nation and community. And although it is almost
certain that military operations will be short, there is always a
possibility that even a technologically weak army can make a
drawn-out defense. It very much depends on the performance of
U.S. military and political personnel to achieve that end as soon
as possible.

In general, the influence of the war on the world, including
Indonesia, will have three main consequences: economic,
political-psychological and security. The longer the war and its
consolidation aftermath, the more negatively it will affect the
world. A few days ago this newspaper published a prediction by
top world economists that a quick victory would cost the U.S.
half a trillion dollars by 2010, while a long war could cost
US$1.9 trillion for the next decade. They add however, that the
bill does not assume a nightmare scenario.

A wounded U.S. economy would have bad consequences for other
nations, even for China, which is demonstrating growth of more
than 7 percent, let alone for Indonesia, which has not yet fully
recovered from the economic crisis of 1997. Even now, before the
war in Iraq, the Indonesian economy faces grave problems.
Investments have been decreasing since 2001, which has caused
unemployment to grow alarmingly.

It is reported that exports stagnated in 2002 and there was
negative export growth during the first semester of 2003. Private
consumption, which has been a strong factor for growth, is now
also decreasing. If this weak economy has to bear the
consequences of war in Iraq, including the troubled U.S. economy
and a high probability of increased oil prices, we must assume
that Indonesia will experience very difficult problems.

The political-psychological consequences of war in Iraq on
Indonesia will be no less difficult for President Megawati
Soekarnoputri and her government. Irrespective of whether the
U.S. attack is based on a UN mandate or not, the reaction among
the Indonesian people, Muslims in particular, will be very
fierce. People cannot accept that the Iraqi people should become
victims of a U.S.-led illegitimate and unjust war. People do not
object that Saddam Hussein should go, but they cannot agree that
this objective should be achieved by sacrificing the Iraqi
people, who have already suffered so much since Saddam's war
against Iran (ironically supported by the U.S. and its weapons)
and the first Gulf War in 1991.

People's reaction could take the form of a strengthening of
anti-Americanism that Indonesia could ill afford. Its economic
dependency on the U.S. is a fact that cannot be changed within a
short time. More dangerous is a strengthening of radicalization
among younger Muslims. That would make it difficult for moderate
Muslim leaders to control their organizations. It would also make
it easier for them to be infiltrated by terrorist elements. It is
not impossible that solidarity with the Iraqi people might take
the form of retaliation against U.S. interests within Indonesia.
Since Prime Minister John Howard has also shown support for a
U.S. war against Iraq, Australian interests would not be free
from danger either.

A combination of economic and psychological-political problems
would further weaken security. This could take the form of
increased terrorist attacks also targeting Indonesian government
and non-Muslim facilities. In reaction, non-Muslim people,
particularly outside Java, could take up arms, perhaps even with
foreign support. Separatist moves in the East Indonesian region
could aggravate.

In Java, worsening economic conditions could increase
criminality, in quality as well as quantity. The police would
face great difficulty in tackling all these security problems on
Java and outside. The limited strength of the police could make
it impossible for them to face all these troubles simultaneously,
yet effectively.

The political climate would also darken because political
parties are preparing for the 2004 general election. Fanatic
members of each party would defend their party's political
targets and physical exchanges between competing parties could
occur at any time. Party leaders, supported by sympathetic
student organizations, who had been planning to topple Megawati
before 2004, would have a better opportunity and a more suitable
climate in which to achieve their aims. The Megawati government
would be in a very weak position, as it would not be capable of
creating a situation that was acceptable to the majority of the
population. Ordinary people simply wish to be able to support
their families and feel secure in their everyday lives.

The big question is how strong people's dissatisfaction would
be and whether they would be willing to accept that Megawati
remain in power. On the other hand, how would Megawati and her
ministers be able to mobilize support for their remaining time in
office before the elections? Could she and her assistants
convince people that a change before the elections would not
satisfy the public's aspirations, apart from the fact that it
would also harm the democratic process?

All in all, it would be a very difficult time for Indonesia:
How the situation will resolve itself is far from clear.