How the Indonesian Military made a role in politics

How the Indonesian Military made a role in politics

Militer Indonesia dan Politik -- Dulu, Kini dan Kelak
(Indonesian Military and Politics -- Past, Present and Future);
Salim Said; Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2001; xxi + 378; Rp 45,000

JAKARTA (JP): Salim Said is one of the few Indonesian experts
well versed in Indonesian Military affairs; understandably, the
publication of this book, a collection of 44 articles he wrote
over a span of close to 20 years, is a must-read of sorts for
those interested in defining the role the Indonesian Military has
played in the country's political scene.

The Indonesian Military has had its ups and downs, especially
after its dominant role during the New Order era, in which the
military, justified under the dual-function principle, not only
propped up the New Order regime but also took over many civilian
posts. In the context of the military's present reform and
repositioning, the book is interesting to read as it sheds light
on the military's participation in civilian affairs since the
early days of this republic.

In Salim's view, the Indonesian Military is unique in that
" ... it created itself. ... it was created neither by the
government nor any political party. The Indonesian Army was
formed and armed as well as organized itself by cashing in on,
among other things, youths trained by the Japanese and the
weapons seized from the Japanese after proclamation" of
independence.

He writes in the opening article, that bears the same title as
the book, that these young people took the initiative to arm
themselves to defend the new republic, while the central
government, led by politicians of the older generation, with
their own reasons, did not seem enthusiastic about the
establishment of an Indonesian army.

On Oct. 5, 1945, the government issued a decree on the
establishment of the Indonesian Army under the name of the Army
of the Republic of Indonesia (TRI), but then it was military
commanders themselves who gathered in Yogyakarta in November 1945
to elect their commander in chief. This meeting resulted in the
election of Soedirman, a former battalion commander of the
Japanese-trained Defenders of the Motherland (PETA), a former
Muhammadiyah youth leader and a former teacher, as the Indonesian
Army's supreme commander. His election was later confirmed by the
government.

The process of Soedirman's election as the military chief
commander explains how he and the Army always considered
themselves more than just a government's army. As a chief
commander, Salim writes, Soedirman always attempted to maintain
the autonomy of the military. Hence, the frequent differences in
policy between the government and the military leadership.

A good example is the capitulation of the government leaders
to the Dutch colonial army after the republic's territory was
attacked and then occupied. It was at this point that the Army
demonstrated its autonomy by waging guerrilla warfare in 1948-
1949.

Another interesting aspect of the Indonesian Military is the
"middle way" doctrine that Nasution introduced in November 1958.
Under this doctrine, the Army would not be just an onlooker but
would tap its nonmilitary capacities. This was to be the
justification of the Army's participation in civilian affairs. In
fact, this doctrine was introduced because the Army felt
disgusted by the continued bickering among political parties
during the liberal democracy period in 1950s.

Salim writes that Nasution called for the abandonment of the
liberal democracy system and a return to the 1945 Constitution
because he sought to find a legal and permanent sociopolitical
role for the Army. Under the 1945 Constitution, there are three
categories of political representation, one of which is the
functional category. The Army obviously belonged to this category
and the return to the 1945 Constitution would certainly have
justified the Army's participation in civilian affairs.

When Soeharto came to power after the failed coup allegedly
committed by the now-defunct Indonesian Communist Party (PKI),
known as G30S/PKI, the Army was given much greater opportunities
to do civilian jobs under the doctrine of the dual function of
the Army, in which the sociopolitical role of the Army is
regulated. This doctrine is based on the belief that the
Indonesian Army has from its earliest days been a combination of
soldiers and freedom fighters, the reason why it is justifiable
for the Army to take over civilian positions. In the post-
G30S/PKI, when the country was in chaos, the only solid force was
the Army, and it was forced by circumstances to take the lead,
Salim writes.

Unfortunately, as time went by, the Army slowly but surely
shifted its position from an apparatus of the state to an
apparatus of the powers-that-be. Hence the strong resistance it
faced in the last decade of the 20th century and the necessity to
reform and reposition itself to suit the changes of the times as
civilian supremacy became the catchword.

This collection of articles is also interesting as it dwells
especially on what military figures have done in response to the
political situation of the country. It shows, as noted
Indonesianist R. William Liddle writes in the introduction, what
each of them did in the context of history. Reading Salim's
articles, we can soberly learn how these figures have responded
to invariably changing constraints and opportunities in
Indonesia's political arena.

The book fittingly ends with an article on Abdurrahman Wahid
and how he dealt with the military. It shows how Abdurrahman went
wrong in his treatment of the Army and what the Army could have
done to him that eventually led to his fall. Had Abdurrahman
better understood the military and been better informed about the
Army, he would have a better relationship with them -- and
presumably things would have ended differently for him.
Abdurrahman's fall shows the political role of the Army in the
present reform era and, perhaps, in many years to come.

If there is any criticism of the book, it is about how the
pieces are organized. As the main theme is the political role of
the Indonesian Military, it is only to be expected that the
pieces would be arranged chronologically, which they are not. As
the political role of the military has gone through different
political eras in the country, a chronological arrangement of the
articles would give a better insight into how the military became
involved in the country's political affairs. In the absence of
chronological order, the reader will find the book a jarring
experience because not infrequently will he have to go back, in
terms of substance, to what he has read earlier.

-- Lie Hua

The reviewer is a lecturer in the Department of English,
School of Literature, UNAS.