How the Indonesian Military made a role in politics

Militer Indonesia dan Politik -- Dulu, Kini dan Kelak (Indonesian Military and Politics -- Past, Present and Future); Salim Said; Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2001; xxi + 378; Rp 45,000

JAKARTA (JP): Salim Said is one of the few Indonesian experts well versed in Indonesian Military affairs; understandably, the publication of this book, a collection of 44 articles he wrote over a span of close to 20 years, is a must-read of sorts for those interested in defining the role the Indonesian Military has played in the country's political scene.

The Indonesian Military has had its ups and downs, especially after its dominant role during the New Order era, in which the military, justified under the dual-function principle, not only propped up the New Order regime but also took over many civilian posts. In the context of the military's present reform and repositioning, the book is interesting to read as it sheds light on the military's participation in civilian affairs since the early days of this republic.

In Salim's view, the Indonesian Military is unique in that " ... it created itself. ... it was created neither by the government nor any political party. The Indonesian Army was formed and armed as well as organized itself by cashing in on, among other things, youths trained by the Japanese and the weapons seized from the Japanese after proclamation" of independence.

He writes in the opening article, that bears the same title as the book, that these young people took the initiative to arm themselves to defend the new republic, while the central government, led by politicians of the older generation, with their own reasons, did not seem enthusiastic about the establishment of an Indonesian army.

On Oct. 5, 1945, the government issued a decree on the establishment of the Indonesian Army under the name of the Army of the Republic of Indonesia (TRI), but then it was military commanders themselves who gathered in Yogyakarta in November 1945 to elect their commander in chief. This meeting resulted in the election of Soedirman, a former battalion commander of the Japanese-trained Defenders of the Motherland (PETA), a former Muhammadiyah youth leader and a former teacher, as the Indonesian Army's supreme commander. His election was later confirmed by the government.

The process of Soedirman's election as the military chief commander explains how he and the Army always considered themselves more than just a government's army. As a chief commander, Salim writes, Soedirman always attempted to maintain the autonomy of the military. Hence, the frequent differences in policy between the government and the military leadership.

A good example is the capitulation of the government leaders to the Dutch colonial army after the republic's territory was attacked and then occupied. It was at this point that the Army demonstrated its autonomy by waging guerrilla warfare in 1948- 1949.

Another interesting aspect of the Indonesian Military is the "middle way" doctrine that Nasution introduced in November 1958. Under this doctrine, the Army would not be just an onlooker but would tap its nonmilitary capacities. This was to be the justification of the Army's participation in civilian affairs. In fact, this doctrine was introduced because the Army felt disgusted by the continued bickering among political parties during the liberal democracy period in 1950s.

Salim writes that Nasution called for the abandonment of the liberal democracy system and a return to the 1945 Constitution because he sought to find a legal and permanent sociopolitical role for the Army. Under the 1945 Constitution, there are three categories of political representation, one of which is the functional category. The Army obviously belonged to this category and the return to the 1945 Constitution would certainly have justified the Army's participation in civilian affairs.

When Soeharto came to power after the failed coup allegedly committed by the now-defunct Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), known as G30S/PKI, the Army was given much greater opportunities to do civilian jobs under the doctrine of the dual function of the Army, in which the sociopolitical role of the Army is regulated. This doctrine is based on the belief that the Indonesian Army has from its earliest days been a combination of soldiers and freedom fighters, the reason why it is justifiable for the Army to take over civilian positions. In the post- G30S/PKI, when the country was in chaos, the only solid force was the Army, and it was forced by circumstances to take the lead, Salim writes.

Unfortunately, as time went by, the Army slowly but surely shifted its position from an apparatus of the state to an apparatus of the powers-that-be. Hence the strong resistance it faced in the last decade of the 20th century and the necessity to reform and reposition itself to suit the changes of the times as civilian supremacy became the catchword.

This collection of articles is also interesting as it dwells especially on what military figures have done in response to the political situation of the country. It shows, as noted Indonesianist R. William Liddle writes in the introduction, what each of them did in the context of history. Reading Salim's articles, we can soberly learn how these figures have responded to invariably changing constraints and opportunities in Indonesia's political arena.

The book fittingly ends with an article on Abdurrahman Wahid and how he dealt with the military. It shows how Abdurrahman went wrong in his treatment of the Army and what the Army could have done to him that eventually led to his fall. Had Abdurrahman better understood the military and been better informed about the Army, he would have a better relationship with them -- and presumably things would have ended differently for him. Abdurrahman's fall shows the political role of the Army in the present reform era and, perhaps, in many years to come.

If there is any criticism of the book, it is about how the pieces are organized. As the main theme is the political role of the Indonesian Military, it is only to be expected that the pieces would be arranged chronologically, which they are not. As the political role of the military has gone through different political eras in the country, a chronological arrangement of the articles would give a better insight into how the military became involved in the country's political affairs. In the absence of chronological order, the reader will find the book a jarring experience because not infrequently will he have to go back, in terms of substance, to what he has read earlier.

-- Lie Hua

The reviewer is a lecturer in the Department of English, School of Literature, UNAS.