How sacred is the unitary state of Indonesia?

How sacred is the unitary state of Indonesia?

J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Political Analyst, Jakarta

By definition the Aceh crisis is a case of conflict in its
pure form: It is one in which the interests of the parties
involved are completely incompatible and mutually exclusive. The
are a number of other conflicts of a similar nature: The Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the Indian-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir
and one between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil ethnic
group.

There are only two alternatives by which such a conflict may
be solved: By a mutually agreed compromise or by force, in which
one party will win and the other will lose. However, even a
compromise is only possible if there is mutual understanding of
each other's interest.

In the case of Aceh, that mutual understanding has been
reached only recently. For long, the government has pretended not
to understand the demand of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) for
freedom, regarding it as making no sense on the ground that Aceh
has been free and independent in the framework of the Unitary
State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

Hence the government's offer of a special autonomy for the
region as a compromise. It has refused to recognize that GAM
demanded precisely independence or freedom from the rule of the
central government of NKRI. Instead it has all along regarded
GAM's demand as an act of separatism. And as such, in the face of
its rejection of that kind of compromise and its insistence on
independence from NKRI, while Jakarta would let it set up an
independent state separate from NKRI, GAM as a separatist has to
be crushed by force, hence the ongoing "integrated operation".

In fact, a fair and just compromise would be some form of a
referendum for the people of Aceh by which they could exercise
their right to choose between remaining part of the NKRI or to be
an independent state, separate from NKRI. One can note the
experience of Quebec, which has remained a province of Canada
after the majority of the people of Quebec opted through some
form of a referendum by parliamentary vote to remain part of the
federation of Canada.

Indeed, the government may have to get approval from the House
of Representatives (DPR) to hold a referendum for that purpose.
But it would be its own problem, not the concern of the people of
Aceh. This option, however, has never been considered by Jakarta.
The question to be raised regarding the use of force to put down
GAM as a separatist movement is whether it would be worth the
price, especially because it is difficult to speculate how long
such an action would last.

What would be the price in terms of the loss of human lives?

In the light of the history of the region since the colonial
times, instead of winning the hearts and minds of the Acehnese,
wouldn't a military action instead aggravate the vengeance and
bitterness of generations of Acehnese against Jakarta, and thus
even help to make GAM more popular among them?

In the offer of a special autonomy for Aceh by the government
there is no mention of what it will do to make amends for the
gross violations of human rights that occurred during the years
of the military operation period (DOM) under the Soeharto era.

In fact, at the beginning of independence, like Yogyakarta, in
recognition of the significant contribution of the Acehnese to
the struggle of Indonesian independence, Aceh was granted a
status of a "special region". Yet it was then dissolved and
simply made part of the province of North Sumatra.

Apart from the well-known tension in the history of the
Acehnese between a group of religious leaders (ulema) and the
traditional leaders (hulubalang), the people are well known also
in their revolts against foreign domination. This explains why
the region was under Dutch colonialism in the shortest period of
time among the rest of what constitutes Indonesia.

The "rebellion" by Darul Islam (DI) and Indonesian Islamic
Army (TII) that started in 1953 was not a separatist movement,
but part of a struggle to establish an Islamic Indonesian State
(NII) as a substitute for the Indonesian Republic. It was
preceded by and formed part of the DI/TII rebellion led by
Kartosuwiryo in West Java and Kahar Muzakar in South Sulawesi.

The experience of DOM, perhaps also the crushing of the Darul
Islam revolt, revived and encouraged the age-old aspirations of
the Acehnese for independence. Fear that the independence of East
Timor may serve as a precedent for the freedom movement of Aceh,
Papua, and elsewhere such as Riau seems to be of little
relevance.

Many here continue to cry over the "loss" of East Timor. But
the majority of the international community did not recognize
what amounted to "annexation" of the territory by Indonesia in
the mid 1970s. We cannot lose what we never had.

Should the military action against GAM last long, it is likely
that the loss of human lives, especially civilians, will be high.
The country would likely face a situation similar to Sri Lanka,
which has been beset by years of a civil war without a clear
prospect of a solution in the near future.

The question now is, how sacred is the unitary state (NKRI)?
Is it more sacrosanct than human lives? Would it not strengthen
the case of GAM and thereby increase its influence and popular
support?

Moreover, the "integrated operation" with the military action
being the most prominent element, may form a real obstacle to
efforts at the slow and clearly misled reform process and an
additional burden to the country's multidimensional crisis.

And while some great powers, particularly the U.S., Japan and
the European Union have continued to respect the integrity of
NKRI in advocating a peaceful dialog for Aceh's solution, a
change in their attitude is not inconceivable in the face of
likely cases of gross violations of human rights, which may
subject Indonesia to humanitarian intervention by the
international community.