How long will Indonesian political uncertainties last?

How long will Indonesian political uncertainties last?

By Yulius P. Hermawan

This is the second of two articles on political transition in
Indonesia.

BANDUNG (JP): Indonesian political actors probably need to
learn from South Korea's lessons of the transition to democracy.
The transition really depends on the role of pro-true democracy
parties. The political games which were played by both reform and
conservative parties in Korea made democratization difficult in a
short time. Koreans have needed at least a decade to adopt
democratic government.

The uncertainties have lasted longer than many Koreans ever
expected. Widespread optimism for the birth of a democratic
political system under a civilian leadership in 1987 did not
guarantee that democracy would come soon. Political leaders'
vested interests and efforts to achieve political careers were
variables which made consensus on the unity of reform forces
difficult to build.

The transition to democracy in South Korea took place after
Roh Tae-woo -- the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP)
presidential candidate -- announced his democratization package
on June 29, 1987. The opposition, dissidents and students
contributed to the announcement of the so-called June 29
declaration.

However, it is unfortunate that the opposition forces failed
to continue their alliance just a few months before the December
1987 presidential elections. Two prominent opposition leaders,
Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung failed to agree on the single
presidential candidate. This disagreement led the two to compete
with each other in a public competition and fragmented the
proreform forces into two groups of supporters.

This opened a better chance for Roh to win in the direct
presidential election. Many Koreans were disappointed with the
disintegration. If the two leaders had continued their alliance,
the proreform groups, jointly, would have collected 55 percent of
33 millions votes cast. This number would have been enough to
outperform Roh, who gained only 36 percent.

Yet the 1988 National Assembly elections reshaped Korean
politics in ways which created further obstacles for a reunion,
and, furthermore, lengthened political uncertainties. The ruling
DJP failed to retain a majority of seats in the Assembly, taking
only 125 of 299 seats.

Meanwhile the opposition parties together held a majority of
seats. The election result created so-called politics of Yoso
Yadae, in which the ruling party held a minority of seats,
compared with the opposition with a majority of seats. The ruling
DJP could face difficulties in passing its bills if it failed to
cooperate with elements of the opposition or to take advantage of
the ongoing competition among the three major opposition parties.

In fact, the politics of Yoso Yadae sophisticated Korean
politics. It often sharpened the difference between the ruling
party and the opposition camp, while it also often led to fierce
competition among the three Kims' parties. President Roh soon
found that his political leadership ability was weak. The three
Kims and opposition lawmakers frequently blocked the government's
proposed bills in the National Assembly. They continuously
attempted to dominate the Assembly, forcing the DJP to accept
some opposition demands and to act on opposition motions. The
opposition also criticized often Roh's Cabinet for various
failures in conducting state affairs. This criticism often forced
Roh to reshuffle his Cabinet and to form a new Cabinet as
demanded by the opposition. Overall, the opposition-controlled
legislature put the Executive in disarray.

Beside the sharp confrontation, the fierce competition among
the three Kims were also salient. Due to their different
interests, each Kim seemed not reluctant to break agreements with
one or both of the other Kims. Each Kim attempted to outperform
the others, to improve his image and his party in order to win
the 1992 general election.

The controversial phenomenon occurred in early 1990 when Kim
Young-sam and his Reunification Democratic Party decided to form
a coalition with the ruling DJP and another opposition party, the
New Democratic Republican Party, headed by Kim Jong-pil, the
architect of 1961 military coup d'etat and that of Park's
authoritarianism.

There were some questions regarding the unusual alignment. Why
did Kim Young-sam, who had fought all his life against past
dictators, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, and who, until a few
months before, had struggled to undermine President Roh, decide
to join the forces of his past enemies and become part of the
establishment? Many people denounced his political ambition to be
the next president.

The ruling grand coalition then led him to reach power in
1992. Yet Kim Young-sam's leadership did not bring political
certainty. The ruling party, with a majority of legislative
seats, lessened the role of minor opposition camp.

Meanwhile, the ruling coalition experienced constant internal
conflicts due to the different stands of three factions. Two
factions were conservative in nature, while another faction was
reformist. Whenever party policies were being decided, acute
conflicts between reformists and conservatives seemed inevitable.

In 1995, internal conflicts caused Kim Jong-pil and his
faction to bolt from the grand coalition and establish a separate
party. In early 1997, Kim Jong-pil formed an alliance with Kim
Dae-jung to enter the presidential and National Assembly
elections. This alliance contributed to the victory of Kim Dae-
jung in the 1997 presidential election.

Korea's experience shows how conflicts and alliances among
parties can affect political stability for more than a decade of
the transition process. Koreans probably still need some years to
establish and secure their democracy. The main cause of this is
the failure of pro-true democracy forces to build an alliance in
the early stages of the transition.

There are some similarities as well as differences between the
Indonesian and South Korean cases in their early stages of
democratization. The two experienced a strongly authoritarian
military regime, which established serious obstacles for
democracy. The collapse of the authoritarian regime in both cases
was a result of students' massive demonstrations.

In some respects, Indonesia is likely to have a better chance
to establish democracy quicker. The failure to unify reform
forces in Indonesia did not cause the worst impact on the general
election result. Reform-oriented parties could outperform the
ruling party in the most free and fair general election. It may
bring better prospects in the near future if reformists' parties
can set a conditional accord before the upcoming general session
of the People's Consultative Assembly (See Parties need
conditional accord in the June 16 and June 17 editions by the
same author). In South Korea, the failure to do so let the
military regime stay in power after Roh outperformed reformists
in the first free and fair direct presidential election.

Yet the Indonesian case is different from the Korean case with
regard to its national economy. The Korean economy was in its
best shape when the democratization started in 1987. Indonesia's
economy was in deep crises when the transition to democracy began
in 1998. This calls for reform forces to work together to restore
national economy and to bring welfare for the whole nation.

Besides, there are some obvious differences regarding
ethnicity and religion. Korean society is relatively homogeneous,
while Indonesia is very pluralistic. The political actors'
necessary task is now more complicated: how to realize ideas for
democracy which could protect ethnic and religious issues.

Of course, it is a challenge for everyone: to respect any
achievement of the transition as shown in the recent polls, or to
fall into a long-time classical debate about vested interests
which may benefit the persistence of the old regime. The response
to this challenge will determine how long the ongoing uncertainty
will last.

The writer is a lecturer on International Relations at the
Catholic University of Parahyangan and a researcher at the
Parahyangan Center for International Studies, Bandung. The
article is based on research on Korean politics, completed at the
Department of Politics, Monash University, in 1997.