How long will Indonesian political uncertainties last?

By Yulius P. Hermawan

This is the second of two articles on political transition in Indonesia.

BANDUNG (JP): Indonesian political actors probably need to learn from South Korea's lessons of the transition to democracy. The transition really depends on the role of pro-true democracy parties. The political games which were played by both reform and conservative parties in Korea made democratization difficult in a short time. Koreans have needed at least a decade to adopt democratic government.

The uncertainties have lasted longer than many Koreans ever expected. Widespread optimism for the birth of a democratic political system under a civilian leadership in 1987 did not guarantee that democracy would come soon. Political leaders' vested interests and efforts to achieve political careers were variables which made consensus on the unity of reform forces difficult to build.

The transition to democracy in South Korea took place after Roh Tae-woo -- the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) presidential candidate -- announced his democratization package on June 29, 1987. The opposition, dissidents and students contributed to the announcement of the so-called June 29 declaration.

However, it is unfortunate that the opposition forces failed to continue their alliance just a few months before the December 1987 presidential elections. Two prominent opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung failed to agree on the single presidential candidate. This disagreement led the two to compete with each other in a public competition and fragmented the proreform forces into two groups of supporters.

This opened a better chance for Roh to win in the direct presidential election. Many Koreans were disappointed with the disintegration. If the two leaders had continued their alliance, the proreform groups, jointly, would have collected 55 percent of 33 millions votes cast. This number would have been enough to outperform Roh, who gained only 36 percent.

Yet the 1988 National Assembly elections reshaped Korean politics in ways which created further obstacles for a reunion, and, furthermore, lengthened political uncertainties. The ruling DJP failed to retain a majority of seats in the Assembly, taking only 125 of 299 seats.

Meanwhile the opposition parties together held a majority of seats. The election result created so-called politics of Yoso Yadae, in which the ruling party held a minority of seats, compared with the opposition with a majority of seats. The ruling DJP could face difficulties in passing its bills if it failed to cooperate with elements of the opposition or to take advantage of the ongoing competition among the three major opposition parties.

In fact, the politics of Yoso Yadae sophisticated Korean politics. It often sharpened the difference between the ruling party and the opposition camp, while it also often led to fierce competition among the three Kims' parties. President Roh soon found that his political leadership ability was weak. The three Kims and opposition lawmakers frequently blocked the government's proposed bills in the National Assembly. They continuously attempted to dominate the Assembly, forcing the DJP to accept some opposition demands and to act on opposition motions. The opposition also criticized often Roh's Cabinet for various failures in conducting state affairs. This criticism often forced Roh to reshuffle his Cabinet and to form a new Cabinet as demanded by the opposition. Overall, the opposition-controlled legislature put the Executive in disarray.

Beside the sharp confrontation, the fierce competition among the three Kims were also salient. Due to their different interests, each Kim seemed not reluctant to break agreements with one or both of the other Kims. Each Kim attempted to outperform the others, to improve his image and his party in order to win the 1992 general election.

The controversial phenomenon occurred in early 1990 when Kim Young-sam and his Reunification Democratic Party decided to form a coalition with the ruling DJP and another opposition party, the New Democratic Republican Party, headed by Kim Jong-pil, the architect of 1961 military coup d'etat and that of Park's authoritarianism.

There were some questions regarding the unusual alignment. Why did Kim Young-sam, who had fought all his life against past dictators, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, and who, until a few months before, had struggled to undermine President Roh, decide to join the forces of his past enemies and become part of the establishment? Many people denounced his political ambition to be the next president.

The ruling grand coalition then led him to reach power in 1992. Yet Kim Young-sam's leadership did not bring political certainty. The ruling party, with a majority of legislative seats, lessened the role of minor opposition camp.

Meanwhile, the ruling coalition experienced constant internal conflicts due to the different stands of three factions. Two factions were conservative in nature, while another faction was reformist. Whenever party policies were being decided, acute conflicts between reformists and conservatives seemed inevitable.

In 1995, internal conflicts caused Kim Jong-pil and his faction to bolt from the grand coalition and establish a separate party. In early 1997, Kim Jong-pil formed an alliance with Kim Dae-jung to enter the presidential and National Assembly elections. This alliance contributed to the victory of Kim Dae- jung in the 1997 presidential election.

Korea's experience shows how conflicts and alliances among parties can affect political stability for more than a decade of the transition process. Koreans probably still need some years to establish and secure their democracy. The main cause of this is the failure of pro-true democracy forces to build an alliance in the early stages of the transition.

There are some similarities as well as differences between the Indonesian and South Korean cases in their early stages of democratization. The two experienced a strongly authoritarian military regime, which established serious obstacles for democracy. The collapse of the authoritarian regime in both cases was a result of students' massive demonstrations.

In some respects, Indonesia is likely to have a better chance to establish democracy quicker. The failure to unify reform forces in Indonesia did not cause the worst impact on the general election result. Reform-oriented parties could outperform the ruling party in the most free and fair general election. It may bring better prospects in the near future if reformists' parties can set a conditional accord before the upcoming general session of the People's Consultative Assembly (See Parties need conditional accord in the June 16 and June 17 editions by the same author). In South Korea, the failure to do so let the military regime stay in power after Roh outperformed reformists in the first free and fair direct presidential election.

Yet the Indonesian case is different from the Korean case with regard to its national economy. The Korean economy was in its best shape when the democratization started in 1987. Indonesia's economy was in deep crises when the transition to democracy began in 1998. This calls for reform forces to work together to restore national economy and to bring welfare for the whole nation.

Besides, there are some obvious differences regarding ethnicity and religion. Korean society is relatively homogeneous, while Indonesia is very pluralistic. The political actors' necessary task is now more complicated: how to realize ideas for democracy which could protect ethnic and religious issues.

Of course, it is a challenge for everyone: to respect any achievement of the transition as shown in the recent polls, or to fall into a long-time classical debate about vested interests which may benefit the persistence of the old regime. The response to this challenge will determine how long the ongoing uncertainty will last.

The writer is a lecturer on International Relations at the Catholic University of Parahyangan and a researcher at the Parahyangan Center for International Studies, Bandung. The article is based on research on Korean politics, completed at the Department of Politics, Monash University, in 1997.