How Kashmir gave Musharraf a nasty surprise

Isabel Hilton, Guardia News Service, London

Elections, as Pakistan's Gen. Pervez Musharraf knows, can be unpredictable things. That is why he took such pains to ensure that yesterday's elections in Pakistan -- the first since he seized power three years ago -- produced no unpleasant surprises. He has spared no effort to ensure that no civilian leader could be elected to challenge his power. Both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's two most popular politicians, despite their dubious records, were banned from standing. And just in case, he has sewn up power in Pakistan so completely that it hardly matters who wins at the polls. So far so good.

But the election result that has given Musharraf a nasty surprise is not in Pakistan but in Kashmir. There the Indian government also had something to prove -- that after more than 50 years of rigging the polls, they were prepared, at last, to conduct an honest election in that part of Kashmir it controls. And this was borne out by the astonishing news that Omar Abdullah, leader of Kashmir's pro-India ruling party the National Congress, has lost his seat.

Abdullah is not only Delhi's man in Kashmir. He is the third generation of Kashmir's foremost political dynasty, grandson of the legendary Lion of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, imprisoned for many years for challenging India's rule, and son of Farouk Abdullah, who has cheerfully done Delhi's bidding as chief minister in Kashmir. That Delhi should have permitted the suffering Kashmiris to unseat such a crown prince wins them propaganda points.

Abdullah's defeat does not render the Kashmir elections perfect: The parties most likely to win in the disputed Kashmir Valley -- the members of the All-Party Hurriyat Conference -- refused to stand on the not unreasonable grounds that they had been cheated once too often. But the Abdullah result will add much-needed credibility to India's offer to negotiate both with the Hurriyat and with the militants.

Why should Gen. Musharraf care about the defeat of a man he sees as Delhi's poodle? Because it will both weaken Pakistan's case on Kashmir and point up the flaws in Musharraf's own electoral exercise.

When Musharraf took power three years ago -- with the user- friendly title of chief executive -- he promised an end to corruption and a swift return to democracy. It was hardly the first time an incoming military dictator had made those promises, but people seemed willing to give him the benefit of the doubt.

The anti-corruption campaign, though, ran into the sand after barely a year when it came too close to the inflated bank accounts of the military. As for the swift return to democracy, suspicions that Musharraf was afflicted by a creeping sense of destiny were confirmed when he assumed the title of president, then staged a referendum to give himself five more years in the post. Despite the manifest indifference of the electorate, the referendum result was declared a resounding victory. It only needed a new constitution to complete the window dressing.

The last military dictator in Pakistan to stage a similar exercise was the late Gen. Zia ul Haq, a man more adept in many ways at managing Pakistan's competing power centers than Musharraf. Zia's grip on power was assisted by the fact that he was useful to the U.S. in mounting and running the jihad in Afghanistan. Musharraf is useful to the U.S. in his willingness to address the legacy of that misconceived exercise.

But at home, outside the armed forces, he is now almost friendless. In an attempt to bring stability to a country plagued by military coups he gave the army so much constitutional power that coups were no longer necessary. Gen. Musharraf can dismiss any government that is elected in Pakistan this week, through his control of the new -- and permanent -- national security council. There is no sign of him loosening his grip on the armed forces, or of vacating the presidential chair. But whether this will add up to stability is another question.

When Gen. Musharraf was a much younger man, he wrote a thesis in London on the arms race on the sub-continent. In it, he pointed out that development in both India and Pakistan was hopelessly impeded by the huge sums spent on defense, justified by their continuing hostility over Kashmir. History, sadly, suggests that those tensions have been much worse whenever there has been military rule in Pakistan. Only a civilian can change Pakistan's policy on Kashmir -- and only a civilian whose power is unchallenged by the military.

Long-term stability in Pakistan will not be achieved by military rule, however it is disguised. It might be achieved by a credible democracy that was prepared to divert funds from the military to education, health and development. The young Musharraf knew that. It is a lesson that today's Musharraf has forgotten.