Wed, 03 Nov 2004

House in war for political supremacy

Ridwan Max Sijabat & Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, The Jakarta Post/Jakarta

We all knew this would happen. A political impasse pitting the majority opposition coalition against the minority coalition aligned with the President. But few would have predicted it would happen this soon. Even fewer thought it would erupt over an issue so seemingly trivial.

Apart from the immediate policy paralysis, the deadlock in the House of Representatives is marking the battle lines between the House and the executive body.

Whoever blinks first in this standoff is likely to have the psychological initiative in the power struggle over the next five years.

The crisis revolves around a subject that at the outset seemed inconsequential -- the election of the chairs of the House's 11 commissions and five other auxiliary bodies. The House's standing orders, particularly articles 36 and 37, are ambiguous on the selection of commission heads.

No institutional or constitutional recourse is on the horizon to resolve this impasse.

In an apparent desire not to get caught in the cross fire, the Constitutional Court has avoided becoming embroiled in the controversy, saying it has no right to intervene in the internal matters of another state institution.

But underneath the surface tension of a fight over commission heads, the impasse signifies a bigger power struggle over domination of the now powerful House. What's at stake is a battle to shape the balance of power in the House.

The Nationhood Coalition's 275 seats, combined with the National Awakening Party (PKB)'s 52 seats, have a clear advantage over the 233 seats of the People's Coalition. A vote on commission heads would favor the former. An earlier agreement to divide the commission heads based on the proportion of the parties' seats was scrubbed, causing an uproar from the People's Coalition.

The People's Coalition recognizes that if it gives in easily at this juncture it will only reinforce the domination of the Nationhood Coalition, which is already in the majority.

It also knows that by determining the agenda of commission meetings, the more experienced parties in the Nationhood Coalition -- Golkar and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) -- could easily outmaneuver the few People's Coalition legislators in key commission decisions. Relatively inexperienced People's Coalition legislators are more susceptible to being picked off and swayed one at a time.

A "victory" for the Nationhood Coalition would affirm the combative nature of the House that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will have to face. Furthermore, it would help dent the spirit of the novice politicians in the People's Coalition.

Susilo -- who draws support from the People's Coalition -- would be left with two uncomfortable options: Either prepare for a permanent joust over crucial bills or begin a conciliatory approach toward the Nationhood Coalition, which would only lead to more presidential compromise.

The People's Coalition has been growing in confidence since it surprisingly won the speakership of the People's Consultative Assembly in late October. The coalition has since been on an emotional high, which encouraged them to face off directly against the more experienced Golkar and PDI-P.

If the People's Coalition can stare down Golkar and the PDI-P, the balance of power in the House in the coming year will be tipped more evenly despite the disparity of seats. In other words, victory now would provide the momentum for future success.

While he officially remains neutral, Susilo would welcome a more evenly balanced House. He would not have to acquiesce as much in pursuing initiatives through the House if the Nationhood Coalition was less politically strong.

The President's latest decision "suggesting" that ministers not attend House commission briefings is a gamble. Though he has to in some way show support for the People's Coalition, he also risks the political ire of the Nationhood Coalition.

The most immediate and practical consequence of the legislative inertia is a backlog of bills and delays in the House's approval of urgent policy matters.

A number of long-awaited draft laws, including on human trafficking and on health, will remain in limbo while newly endorsed contentious bills -- on regional administrations, on the protection of migrant workers, on the Indonesian Military and on the Criminal Code -- cannot be reviewed.

Most notable is the inability of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to revise the 2005 state budget amid soaring oil prices. No less important, albeit a lesser priority, is the delay in consultations for new envoys.

Having been directly elected by the people, Susilo can still exercise power despite the impasse without loss of legitimacy. However, how effective can the executive branch be when the second branch of government is dysfunctional?

One way past the deadlock would be for the President himself to engage in mediation. Such open diplomacy would increase the President's standing in the eye's of the general public, and would force the conflicting coalitions to respond with some show of positivity. Failure to do so would weaken the reputation of the coalition regarded as intractable in the face of the President's good offices.