House in war for political supremacy

House in war for political supremacy

Ridwan Max Sijabat & Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, The Jakarta Post/Jakarta

We all knew this would happen. A political impasse pitting the
majority opposition coalition against the minority coalition
aligned with the President. But few would have predicted it would
happen this soon. Even fewer thought it would erupt over an issue
so seemingly trivial.

Apart from the immediate policy paralysis, the deadlock in the
House of Representatives is marking the battle lines between the
House and the executive body.

Whoever blinks first in this standoff is likely to have the
psychological initiative in the power struggle over the next five
years.

The crisis revolves around a subject that at the outset seemed
inconsequential -- the election of the chairs of the House's 11
commissions and five other auxiliary bodies. The House's standing
orders, particularly articles 36 and 37, are ambiguous on the
selection of commission heads.

No institutional or constitutional recourse is on the horizon
to resolve this impasse.

In an apparent desire not to get caught in the cross fire, the
Constitutional Court has avoided becoming embroiled in the
controversy, saying it has no right to intervene in the internal
matters of another state institution.

But underneath the surface tension of a fight over commission
heads, the impasse signifies a bigger power struggle over
domination of the now powerful House. What's at stake is a battle
to shape the balance of power in the House.

The Nationhood Coalition's 275 seats, combined with the
National Awakening Party (PKB)'s 52 seats, have a clear advantage
over the 233 seats of the People's Coalition. A vote on
commission heads would favor the former. An earlier agreement to
divide the commission heads based on the proportion of the
parties' seats was scrubbed, causing an uproar from the People's
Coalition.

The People's Coalition recognizes that if it gives in easily
at this juncture it will only reinforce the domination of the
Nationhood Coalition, which is already in the majority.

It also knows that by determining the agenda of commission
meetings, the more experienced parties in the Nationhood
Coalition -- Golkar and the Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle (PDI-P) -- could easily outmaneuver the few People's
Coalition legislators in key commission decisions. Relatively
inexperienced People's Coalition legislators are more susceptible
to being picked off and swayed one at a time.

A "victory" for the Nationhood Coalition would affirm the
combative nature of the House that President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono will have to face. Furthermore, it would help dent the
spirit of the novice politicians in the People's Coalition.

Susilo -- who draws support from the People's Coalition --
would be left with two uncomfortable options: Either prepare for
a permanent joust over crucial bills or begin a conciliatory
approach toward the Nationhood Coalition, which would only lead
to more presidential compromise.

The People's Coalition has been growing in confidence since it
surprisingly won the speakership of the People's Consultative
Assembly in late October. The coalition has since been on an
emotional high, which encouraged them to face off directly
against the more experienced Golkar and PDI-P.

If the People's Coalition can stare down Golkar and the PDI-P,
the balance of power in the House in the coming year will be
tipped more evenly despite the disparity of seats. In other
words, victory now would provide the momentum for future success.

While he officially remains neutral, Susilo would welcome a
more evenly balanced House. He would not have to acquiesce as
much in pursuing initiatives through the House if the Nationhood
Coalition was less politically strong.

The President's latest decision "suggesting" that ministers
not attend House commission briefings is a gamble. Though he has
to in some way show support for the People's Coalition, he also
risks the political ire of the Nationhood Coalition.

The most immediate and practical consequence of the
legislative inertia is a backlog of bills and delays in the
House's approval of urgent policy matters.

A number of long-awaited draft laws, including on human
trafficking and on health, will remain in limbo while newly
endorsed contentious bills -- on regional administrations, on the
protection of migrant workers, on the Indonesian Military and on
the Criminal Code -- cannot be reviewed.

Most notable is the inability of President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono to revise the 2005 state budget amid soaring oil
prices. No less important, albeit a lesser priority, is the delay
in consultations for new envoys.

Having been directly elected by the people, Susilo can still
exercise power despite the impasse without loss of legitimacy.
However, how effective can the executive branch be when the
second branch of government is dysfunctional?

One way past the deadlock would be for the President himself
to engage in mediation. Such open diplomacy would increase the
President's standing in the eye's of the general public, and
would force the conflicting coalitions to respond with some show
of positivity. Failure to do so would weaken the reputation of
the coalition regarded as intractable in the face of the
President's good offices.