History points to dialog as approach to restoring Aceh

History points to dialog as approach to restoring Aceh

Aguswandi, Post Graduate Student, London Metropolitan University

The conflict in Aceh does not run straight along the line of
the rise of Acehnese nationalism. The Acehnese have long devoted
their energy to ending the abusive acts of the Indonesian
government and its armed forces. The new rise of contemporary
nationalism in Aceh is a reaction to the resulting unending
feeling of oppression.

It would thus be misleading and ahistorical to say that the
conflict in Aceh was simply a product of the rise of ethnic
nationalism provoked by, among others, Hasan Di Tiro, as has been
claimed by some people. And it would also be a mistake if the
present war in Aceh aimed to reestablish Indonesian nationalism
in Aceh, or to eliminate Acehnese nationalism through the heavy
deployment of troops.

During the country's revolution in the 1940s, far from taking
the opportunity to declare an independent Aceh, the Acehnese made
huge contributions to the revolution -- both in terms of manpower
and economic resources. But despite their strong republican
tendencies -- soon after the full sovereignty of the new nation-
state of Indonesia was handed over from the Dutch to the Sukarno
regime -- their province was absorbed into the territory of North
Sumatra.

This was the main reason for Daud Bereueh's 1953 rebellion,
essentially a revolt against the centralistic tendencies of the
Jakarta government.

The Bereueh rebellion did not aim for the separation of Aceh
from Indonesia. Rather, the unjust policies of the central
government, which had not only broken the promise of autonomy,
abolished the very existence of the province of Aceh. Thus, the
way the Indonesian nation state was being built in the post-
colonial era was criticized.

Even so, the rebellion was met with the heavy deployment of
troops to the region. Several massacres took place during this
period, such as in March 1954 when 148 people from two fishing
villages in Jeumpa were executed.

The rebellion was later settled through a non-militaristic
approach, and the government promised that Aceh would be allowed
a degree of autonomy through its status as a special region.

However, the broken promise of the Sukarno administration, and
the brutality of the response to the Bereueh movement, caused
disappointment with the Jakarta regime and spread the seeds of
Acehnese nationalism among ordinary people.

But again, the status of special region became virtually
meaningless and the promised benefits of the autonomy deal were
largely unrealized. This was further exasperated by the rise of
the New Order regime, whose nation-building was based on state
terror and the massive exploitation of natural resources.

This could explain the Hassan Di Tiro movement that arose in
reaction to the way the Indonesian nation-state was being built,
but was also a reaction to the New Order regime. As historians
note, it was probably not by chance that Di Tiro's declaration
coincided with the New Order's alienation of Acehnese.

This is also illustrated by the fact that Di Tiro, in 1958,
published a book entitled Democracy for Indonesia, in which he
argued in favor of an "ethno federal" Indonesia.

The popular support for the Di Tiro movement (in contrast to
its previously small number) was the result of New Order
practices. The extreme face of the militaristic element of the
New Order was most evident in Aceh, where military brutality was
profound.

According to Indonesianist Ben Anderson, the New Order
practices resulted in more and more Acehnese losing hope and
confidence in their share in a common Indonesian project.

Therefore, the collapse of Indonesian nationalism in Aceh and
the rise of Acehnese nationalism did not "just happen". Rather,
it emerged, in reaction to the continued maintenance of an unjust
system by the Indonesian government's oppressive regime, and the
brutality of its armed forces.

The increasing alienation of the Acehnese from the New Order
vision of Indonesia resulted in a search for other sources of
belonging and recognition. Aceh was imagined to be a final stage
of the nation, given that it held out longest against Dutch
occupation.

Thus, Acehnese nationalism resulted from the unhappy
historical relationship of two entities and the accumulation of
disappointment, fueled by state violence in the region. This was
nurtured by the continuous policy taken to address the conflict
in Aceh.

To say that the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is the group most
responsible for producing Acehnese nationalism is misleading.
Judging this complex phenomenon through GAM's rhetoric is not
enough without the objective conditions to support it.

In fact, what the Indonesian government and the military are
doing only corresponds to what GAM has been arguing -- that
Indonesia is a kind of new colonial state. The government
justifies this claim by continuing its unjust system in Aceh. GAM
has said that Jakarta is not interested in the aspirations of the
Acehnese. Indeed, Jakarta consistently acts in accordance with
GAM's claims.

The domination of GAM's discourse, and of its organization to
gain popularity, is a consequence of this continued
correspondence. Thus, the government's own policies have
contributed to the collapse of (Indonesian) nationalism in Aceh.
The Indonesian Military has become the co-author, if not the main
author, of this collapse.

If the present operation is intended to reestablish Indonesian
nationalism and legitimacy in Aceh, it seems destined to failure.
This is compounded by the fact that the present operation has
turned out to be a war against all Acehnese, including those who
support, and oppose Jakarta.

It has also resulted in the killing of more and more people
who have differing political ideas from the central government in
Jakarta. But killing people does not kill their ideas because
these are proliferated by other factors.

The operation is even more dangerous for the genuine hope of
solving the problem of Indonesian nationalism in Aceh when the
very group that has contributed most to the collapse of
nationalism in Aceh -- the Indonesian Military -- has been put in
charge. The same people who destroyed Indonesian nationalism in
Aceh are now believed to be the ones who can repair it.

Since the military operation will surely not restore
nationalism, the present war in Aceh should be stopped. If
Jakarta is serious about such a restoration then stopping the
military operation and starting a new and genuine dialog with the
Acehnese would be the best step for reestablishing nationalism in
Aceh.

The writer, an Acehnese human rights activist, is preparing
his Masters thesis on international politics and the rise of
Acehnese nationalism.