History binds Indonesia and Australia

By Nova Poerwadi

JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia and Australia share a unique history. Both nations evolved their national identity early in the 20th century, Indonesia during the birth of the nationalist movement in the early 1900s, and Australia in 1901 (albeit still within the framework of a "White Australia" policy).

In the late 1940s, instead of siding with their Dutch "European brothers", Australians supported the Indonesian cause during the struggle for independence. Australia boycotted Dutch shipments and served as an active mediator in talks to finally sever Indonesian ties with the Netherlands. (Sound familiar? But then again, 20 years later a Liberal Party government opposed Indonesia on the question of West Irian until compelled to support the policy in 1962 by the U.S. How familiar is that foreign policy turnaround?)

Now, as the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) prepares to decide on Indonesia's future, Australians are also bracing for a November referendum on the proposed Republic. It seems that as Indonesia stands poised to choose between the old ways and democracy, so too will Australia decide whether it remains an archaic demi-nation under British semi-sovereignty, or finally becomes a self-ruling people with an Australian-chosen head of state.

Ironically, as both nations undergo these momentous changes relations are at their lowest point. While the two governments are involved in a heated row over the East Timor issue, people-to-people relations could not be any worse. Australian public opinion, urged on by the distorted three-minute television time slots of a "report first, verify later" international media -- only starting now to be denounced by more responsible local and Western media -- has come to view 200 million Indonesians based on the alleged actions of a handful of its people. Talk in some public arenas is focusing on whether East Timor marks the "end of the Javanese imperium", or "the beginning of the end for Indonesia" (brave words for foreigners who neither understand Indonesia, nor have to even live here).

Although Canberra has insisted that their quarrel has never been with the Indonesian people, conditions on the ground are much different. The widespread vandalizing of Indonesian missions and symbols (especially the flag) in the country, as well as the trade boycotts enforced by labor unions in the country, were certainly viewed in many quarters as an affront to the Indonesian people as a whole.

Meanwhile, a fierce nationalist backlash is brewing in Indonesia over what is perceived as Australia's excessive intervention in Indonesian affairs, and Canberra's "betrayal" of its role as a mediator between Indonesia and the West. Anti- Australian sentiments are being openly expressed on the streets with almost daily demonstrations; in the country's legislature with condemnation leveled at what is viewed as a lack of respect for Indonesian sovereignty; and in the media where Australia- bashing has become a staple.

The rising nationalist sentiment in Indonesia can best be described as terrifying to outsiders. For the 32 years of Soeharto's rule, outsiders were accustomed to a soft-spoken obedient nation which was determined to serve American strategic and commercial interests in the Asia-Pacific region in a low-key manner.

It brings back memories of the last years of the Soekarno years, when the founding president accused Australia and Malaysia of being in league with Western "neo-imperialist" forces to "encircle Indonesia", then a leading voice in the Third World.

The often daily displays of nationalist bravado, which at its most violent sent Australian expatriates packing in Kalimantan and other outlying cities, only goes to show how the focus has shifted. For many Indonesians, the emphasis has turned away from the atrocities allegedly committed in East Timor, to how the nation was humiliated, because Australia has chosen to lead the international chorus to isolate Indonesia into submission.

Of course just as Indonesians have found a convenient scapegoat in its southern neighbor, so too have Westerners found a convenient scapegoat for the nationalist backlash in the form of the Indonesian Military (TNI). TNI has been blamed for diverting attention from human rights violations in East Timor by fanning the flames of nationalism.

But such a simplistic analysis is inherently racist as much as it is flawed.

Racist, because it implies that Indonesians cannot think for themselves, and have to be "provoked" by its stereotypically sinister military into taking offense at Canberra's unfriendly attitude. It is a typical position of many Westerners to view the rest of the world as a caricature of backwardness, and its people as ignorant stooges until "enlightened" by foreigners bearing "facts".

Flawed, because it underestimates the deep-seated mistrust of Westerners among many Indonesians, a mistrust Australian (and other Western) politicians and reporters have yet to understand, due to their own history (i.e. they have never been at the receiving end of racially-based oppression).

Even without TNI's urging, the nation has a collective cache of memories of its colonial past, while some Muslim elements in Indonesian society have never fully trusted the predominantly Christian Western nations, who are seen as hostile to Islam. To more well-read Aussie-bashers, the Australian furor over East Timor also smacks of "do as we say, not as we did". These analysts say that Australia (like much of the Americas) was borne out of the subjugation and forced relocation of indigenous populations by white settlers.

Although it is reasonable to suppose that the military is funding a handful of the recent anti-Australian activities, it would be giving them too much credit to suggest they have the capability to rally Indonesian public opinion to such a high chorus of condemnation.

Just ask the casual person on the street (or in offices, where many Western-educated people work) and find out how they feel about Canberra's involvement in dictating domestic policy.

Even if the military are later proved to be the instigator, then Canberra is pushing all the right buttons. Australian Prime Minister John Howard, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, and Defense Minister John Moore are a propagandist's dream come true. Not only are they unapologetic for setting back bilateral relations by decades, they are also putting fuel on the fire by virtue of their statements alone.

What these political leaders have yet to learn is that gone are the old days, when you could rally public opinion at home, while appeasing foreign ears with a toned-down version. What Howard, Moore and Downer say in the comfort zone of their home media filters through to Indonesian ears.

Recent reported statements by Moore that Australian troops could chase suspected prointegration militia members into Indonesian territory (and unsubstantiated reports that Australian helicopters are making regular incursions into Indonesian airspace) has caused Jakarta to issue its strongest words against a foreign power since probably the Soekarno years. The government has warned that it may take action over the alleged violation of Indonesian airspace.

Howard's earlier response to the annulment of a 1995 Security Pact, in a tone implying it was of little consequence to Australia, also set off a reaction in Jakarta, which expected Canberra to at least say "Ouch!"

And last but not least, the furor over the so-called "Howard Doctrine" outlining the administration's delusions of grandeur in making Australia the enforcer of Asia-Pacific security, has also undermined Australia's long-term foreign policy goals. After painstakingly trying to convince Asia, especially Indonesia, that Australia is Asian (although its people are not of the same race), the Howard administration has revived suspicions that it remains a "foreign power in our midst".

It is noteworthy that official responses to the anti- Australian backlash in Indonesia seem to have been belated. The common mood on the ground seems to have taken time to affect policy-makers and the business community, who only came to realize the level of popular resentment toward Australia about a month after it all began.

One of the reasons for the delay may be caused by the fact that the Indonesian elite understand better than to blame East Timor squarely on Australia. Canberra's only fault (no matter how just the cause was) was that by interfering in a highly emotional issue it neglected to treat Indonesia as an equal.

The delay can also be attributed to the transitional nature of Indonesian society, which has yet to form a fully fledged democracy where individual initiative moves society. For example, reaction from the legislature, including harsh criticism from the likes of outspoken veteran legislator Aisyah Amini, received a limited reaction from the B.J. Habibie administration.

The annulment of the 1995 treaty, and a token slap on the wrist from Habibie during his last legislature address, have been the only concrete official action taken by the government.

But in the fully fledged democracy Indonesians are determined to have after the General Session, the legislature will have a bigger say, and the executive branch will have less power to resist. The biggest obstacle to restoring Australia's good standing among Indonesian politicians is the fact that unlike Washington, which presents itself as a friendly (if also pushy) partner in Indonesia's transition to democracy, the Howard administration has yet to prove itself sympathetic to Indonesia, democratic or not.

In light of the long love-hate relationship between the two nations, future ties between a democratic Indonesia and a possible Australian Republic appear uncertain. Based on the events during Indonesia's struggle for independence, the two nations proved capable of extraordinary cooperation in the pursuit of a common interest.

But the question for the post-Timor era is: do the interests of both nations still converge, or do they differ too much, with Australia wanting to play the role of a "moral leader" and Indonesia wishing to take its rightful, upright role in the region?

In looking ahead to Australia's engagement with Indonesia, the last thing Canberra needs is to follow up the suggestion in the widely panned "Howard Doctrine" of beefing up its military presence. This move would only antagonize its northern neighbor further. Australia only needs to muzzle its short-sighted politicians, or at least have them show more constraint beyond the token "we understand this is a sensitive issue" proclamation, which often comes too little, too late.

Meanwhile, whether Australia benefits from the converging values on human rights that Indonesian democracy will usher in, or is buried by the public hostility it has inadvertently sewn, we in Indonesia must proceed in creating a just and lasting democracy. Now that Indonesia is in the process of removing the "splinter in its own eye" (i.e. that of military abuses and civilian corruption), perhaps the nation will find itself in a stronger position to (in the words of protesters) "crush Australia", but only in a diplomatic and economic sense. Or at least if Canberra again oversteps the limits of cordial relations based on mutual respect, Indonesia will be able to cut its neighbor down to size.