History binds Indonesia and Australia

History binds Indonesia and Australia

By Nova Poerwadi

JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia and Australia share a unique history.
Both nations evolved their national identity early in the 20th
century, Indonesia during the birth of the nationalist movement
in the early 1900s, and Australia in 1901 (albeit still within
the framework of a "White Australia" policy).

In the late 1940s, instead of siding with their Dutch
"European brothers", Australians supported the Indonesian cause
during the struggle for independence. Australia boycotted Dutch
shipments and served as an active mediator in talks to finally
sever Indonesian ties with the Netherlands. (Sound familiar? But
then again, 20 years later a Liberal Party government opposed
Indonesia on the question of West Irian until compelled to
support the policy in 1962 by the U.S. How familiar is that
foreign policy turnaround?)

Now, as the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) prepares to
decide on Indonesia's future, Australians are also bracing for a
November referendum on the proposed Republic. It seems that as
Indonesia stands poised to choose between the old ways and
democracy, so too will Australia decide whether it remains an
archaic demi-nation under British semi-sovereignty, or finally
becomes a self-ruling people with an Australian-chosen head of
state.

Ironically, as both nations undergo these momentous changes
relations are at their lowest point. While the two governments
are involved in a heated row over the East Timor issue,
people-to-people relations could not be any worse. Australian
public opinion, urged on by the distorted three-minute television
time slots of a "report first, verify later" international media
-- only starting now to be denounced by more responsible local
and Western media -- has come to view 200 million Indonesians
based on the alleged actions of a handful of its people. Talk in
some public arenas is focusing on whether East Timor marks the
"end of the Javanese imperium", or "the beginning of the end for
Indonesia" (brave words for foreigners who neither understand
Indonesia, nor have to even live here).

Although Canberra has insisted that their quarrel has never
been with the Indonesian people, conditions on the ground are
much different. The widespread vandalizing of Indonesian missions
and symbols (especially the flag) in the country, as well as the
trade boycotts enforced by labor unions in the country, were
certainly viewed in many quarters as an affront to the Indonesian
people as a whole.

Meanwhile, a fierce nationalist backlash is brewing in
Indonesia over what is perceived as Australia's excessive
intervention in Indonesian affairs, and Canberra's "betrayal" of
its role as a mediator between Indonesia and the West. Anti-
Australian sentiments are being openly expressed on the streets
with almost daily demonstrations; in the country's legislature
with condemnation leveled at what is viewed as a lack of respect
for Indonesian sovereignty; and in the media where Australia-
bashing has become a staple.

The rising nationalist sentiment in Indonesia can best be
described as terrifying to outsiders. For the 32 years of
Soeharto's rule, outsiders were accustomed to a soft-spoken
obedient nation which was determined to serve American strategic
and commercial interests in the Asia-Pacific region in a low-key
manner.

It brings back memories of the last years of the Soekarno
years, when the founding president accused Australia and Malaysia
of being in league with Western "neo-imperialist" forces to
"encircle Indonesia", then a leading voice in the Third World.

The often daily displays of nationalist bravado, which at its
most violent sent Australian expatriates packing in Kalimantan
and other outlying cities, only goes to show how the focus has
shifted. For many Indonesians, the emphasis has turned away from
the atrocities allegedly committed in East Timor, to how the
nation was humiliated, because Australia has chosen to lead the
international chorus to isolate Indonesia into submission.

Of course just as Indonesians have found a convenient
scapegoat in its southern neighbor, so too have Westerners found
a convenient scapegoat for the nationalist backlash in the form
of the Indonesian Military (TNI). TNI has been blamed for
diverting attention from human rights violations in East Timor by
fanning the flames of nationalism.

But such a simplistic analysis is inherently racist as much as
it is flawed.

Racist, because it implies that Indonesians cannot think for
themselves, and have to be "provoked" by its stereotypically
sinister military into taking offense at Canberra's unfriendly
attitude. It is a typical position of many Westerners to view the
rest of the world as a caricature of backwardness, and its people
as ignorant stooges until "enlightened" by foreigners bearing
"facts".

Flawed, because it underestimates the deep-seated mistrust of
Westerners among many Indonesians, a mistrust Australian (and
other Western) politicians and reporters have yet to understand,
due to their own history (i.e. they have never been at the
receiving end of racially-based oppression).

Even without TNI's urging, the nation has a collective cache
of memories of its colonial past, while some Muslim elements in
Indonesian society have never fully trusted the predominantly
Christian Western nations, who are seen as hostile to Islam. To
more well-read Aussie-bashers, the Australian furor over East
Timor also smacks of "do as we say, not as we did". These
analysts say that Australia (like much of the Americas) was borne
out of the subjugation and forced relocation of indigenous
populations by white settlers.

Although it is reasonable to suppose that the military is
funding a handful of the recent anti-Australian activities, it
would be giving them too much credit to suggest they have the
capability to rally Indonesian public opinion to such a high
chorus of condemnation.

Just ask the casual person on the street (or in offices, where
many Western-educated people work) and find out how they feel
about Canberra's involvement in dictating domestic policy.

Even if the military are later proved to be the instigator,
then Canberra is pushing all the right buttons. Australian Prime
Minister John Howard, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, and
Defense Minister John Moore are a propagandist's dream come true.
Not only are they unapologetic for setting back bilateral
relations by decades, they are also putting fuel on the fire by
virtue of their statements alone.

What these political leaders have yet to learn is that gone
are the old days, when you could rally public opinion at home,
while appeasing foreign ears with a toned-down version. What
Howard, Moore and Downer say in the comfort zone of their home
media filters through to Indonesian ears.

Recent reported statements by Moore that Australian troops
could chase suspected prointegration militia members into
Indonesian territory (and unsubstantiated reports that Australian
helicopters are making regular incursions into Indonesian
airspace) has caused Jakarta to issue its strongest words against
a foreign power since probably the Soekarno years. The government
has warned that it may take action over the alleged violation of
Indonesian airspace.

Howard's earlier response to the annulment of a 1995 Security
Pact, in a tone implying it was of little consequence to
Australia, also set off a reaction in Jakarta, which expected
Canberra to at least say "Ouch!"

And last but not least, the furor over the so-called "Howard
Doctrine" outlining the administration's delusions of grandeur in
making Australia the enforcer of Asia-Pacific security, has also
undermined Australia's long-term foreign policy goals. After
painstakingly trying to convince Asia, especially Indonesia, that
Australia is Asian (although its people are not of the same
race), the Howard administration has revived suspicions that it
remains a "foreign power in our midst".

It is noteworthy that official responses to the anti-
Australian backlash in Indonesia seem to have been belated. The
common mood on the ground seems to have taken time to affect
policy-makers and the business community, who only came to
realize the level of popular resentment toward Australia about a
month after it all began.

One of the reasons for the delay may be caused by the fact
that the Indonesian elite understand better than to blame East
Timor squarely on Australia. Canberra's only fault (no matter how
just the cause was) was that by interfering in a highly emotional
issue it neglected to treat Indonesia as an equal.

The delay can also be attributed to the transitional nature of
Indonesian society, which has yet to form a fully fledged
democracy where individual initiative moves society. For example,
reaction from the legislature, including harsh criticism from the
likes of outspoken veteran legislator Aisyah Amini, received a
limited reaction from the B.J. Habibie administration.

The annulment of the 1995 treaty, and a token slap on the
wrist from Habibie during his last legislature address, have been
the only concrete official action taken by the government.

But in the fully fledged democracy Indonesians are determined
to have after the General Session, the legislature will have a
bigger say, and the executive branch will have less power to
resist. The biggest obstacle to restoring Australia's good
standing among Indonesian politicians is the fact that unlike
Washington, which presents itself as a friendly (if also pushy)
partner in Indonesia's transition to democracy, the Howard
administration has yet to prove itself sympathetic to Indonesia,
democratic or not.

In light of the long love-hate relationship between the two
nations, future ties between a democratic Indonesia and a
possible Australian Republic appear uncertain. Based on the
events during Indonesia's struggle for independence, the two
nations proved capable of extraordinary cooperation in the
pursuit of a common interest.

But the question for the post-Timor era is: do the interests
of both nations still converge, or do they differ too much, with
Australia wanting to play the role of a "moral leader" and
Indonesia wishing to take its rightful, upright role in the
region?

In looking ahead to Australia's engagement with Indonesia, the
last thing Canberra needs is to follow up the suggestion in the
widely panned "Howard Doctrine" of beefing up its military
presence. This move would only antagonize its northern neighbor
further. Australia only needs to muzzle its short-sighted
politicians, or at least have them show more constraint beyond
the token "we understand this is a sensitive issue" proclamation,
which often comes too little, too late.

Meanwhile, whether Australia benefits from the converging
values on human rights that Indonesian democracy will usher in,
or is buried by the public hostility it has inadvertently sewn,
we in Indonesia must proceed in creating a just and lasting
democracy. Now that Indonesia is in the process of removing the
"splinter in its own eye" (i.e. that of military abuses and
civilian corruption), perhaps the nation will find itself in a
stronger position to (in the words of protesters) "crush
Australia", but only in a diplomatic and economic sense. Or at
least if Canberra again oversteps the limits of cordial relations
based on mutual respect, Indonesia will be able to cut its
neighbor down to size.