Helsinki talks essential for Aceh and Indonesia

Aboeprijadi Santoso, Helsinki

The Helsinki peace talks on Aceh may have to find a way to respect the Acehnese right to their own political parties, which the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) apparently is asking for as a compromise for dropping its independence demands. If this key factor is not agreed upon, the talks may be in jeopardy.

But leading legislators and military people in Jakarta have lately begun to question the "international" aspect of the talks and now demand termination of the peace process.

Just as the tsunami, five months on, is about to reveal its silver lining (the disaster provided impetus for the talks) with the fourth round of talks between the Indonesian government (RI) and GAM in Helsinki, a bloc of politicians have sparked controversy on the process. The talks, they say, have "crossed the line" by "internationalizing" the issue, which, they imply, may endanger the unitary state of Indonesia. The specter of East Timor has thus arisen again.

Ironically, quite the opposite may be the case. Of the items discussed, none seems to potentially threaten the prospect of the unitary state so anxiously feared in Jakarta. Rather than introducing the political weight of the international community, the Helsinki process, if successful, is likely to serve Indonesia's interests by bringing a peaceful, democratic and permanent settlement, which could strengthen the democratization and economic potential of both Aceh and Indonesia. Instead of offering "either democracy or unity", it may bring home both more firmly.

Many important issues, though not formally agreed upon yet, have found "common ground", ranging from amnesty and reintegration of GAM members and various aspects of local government, from the division of authority and equitable economic distribution to security issues and the need for monitoring the implementation of the peace pact on the ground. The very substance of the autonomy package has thus been agreed to, which according to the RI's chief delegate Hamid Awaluddin, is compatible with Indonesia's own Law on Special Autonomy No. 32/2004. Whether it is called "special autonomy" or "self- government" is merely semantics.

If this can be settled by amending Indonesia's Constitution, it could end the war and reintegrate GAM, unarmed and under whatever name, back into Acehnese society. But the problem of political participation remains.

Meanwhile, at issue in Jakarta is actually whether the United Nations (UN) or other countries may be involved, whose authority and interests, along with the public opinion, may impinge upon Indonesia's sovereignty, as with the East Timor issue. This is not the case. UN's target on East Timor was typically defined as "a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable" solution -- which in many respects is quite the opposite of "a comprehensive, permanent solution with dignity for all parties involved" sought for Aceh in Helsinki. Peace facilitator Martti Ahtisaari of the CMI (Crisis Management Initiative) said recently that, from the outset the issue was going to be kept outside the UN. And he informed Kofi Annan of that.

It has also been agreed that the strength of the Indonesian armed units should be adapted to the real local needs and GAM forces and pro-Jakarta militias should be de-commissioned. The euphemism here is to "rationalize" the military presence. As with the Cessation of Hostility Agreement in 2002/2003, though, the devil will likely be in the details of the implementation. For, this has to be monitored, "not by a peacekeeping force," Ahtisaari stressed, but by the European Union and Asean teams of "about 150-200 unarmed officers, police and civilians", according to RI delegate Sofyan Djalil.

That may not be adequate for Aceh's complex geographic and political map, but it has been agreed that monitoring is a must to guarantee the implementation, and the teams will only come at the invitation of Jakarta. So, what is the big fuss about "foreign interference"?

With the proposed self-government, security arrangement and GAM's willingness to participate in local politics, Helsinki process should take the guns out of the politics. Since the conflict should be resolved democratically, any deal reached should enable local political parties to exist and accommodate local views.

Ahtisaari, who is aware of the complications to realize this principle under Indonesia's present legislation, has urged the parties "to find a way so that anyone who wants to participate in political life will have a chance to do that."

The roots of Jakarta's problem, however, may lie elsewhere. Historically, the Indonesian military has always had great difficulty accepting a negotiated settlement -- good examples were in the 1940s and during East Timor conflict. Jakarta's nationalist elite, too, find it hard to accept the complex problem of Aceh as a product of the decades-long injustice and the brutal, politically devastating war.

Jakarta's predisposition about Acehnese aspirations, therefore, becomes part of Indonesia's problem of nationalism-in- disarray. A number of serious missteps and xenophobic outbursts -- Timor violence (1999), the traumatic loss of Sipadan -- Ligitan (2002), the reckless division of Papua (2003) and the Ambalat frenzy this past March -- demonstrate similar responses to that very same problem.

With "Indonesian nationalism" thus facing real,existing local nationalism (Aceh, Papua), it is essential for Jakarta to save the Helsinki process and achieve peace: first, in order to facilitate the tsunami relief and reconstruction; second, to save resources wasted in warfare for rebuilding the economy.

Finally, a solid deal on Aceh may help inspire efforts to reconstruct a new Indonesia, one that is truly united and truly democratic. None of these, however, can be achieved without the local civil societies.

The writer is journalist with Radio Netherlands.