Helsinki talks essential for Aceh and Indonesia

Helsinki talks essential for Aceh and Indonesia

Aboeprijadi Santoso, Helsinki

The Helsinki peace talks on Aceh may have to find a way to
respect the Acehnese right to their own political parties, which
the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) apparently is asking for as a
compromise for dropping its independence demands. If this key
factor is not agreed upon, the talks may be in jeopardy.

But leading legislators and military people in Jakarta have
lately begun to question the "international" aspect of the talks
and now demand termination of the peace process.

Just as the tsunami, five months on, is about to reveal its
silver lining (the disaster provided impetus for the talks) with
the fourth round of talks between the Indonesian government (RI)
and GAM in Helsinki, a bloc of politicians have sparked
controversy on the process. The talks, they say, have "crossed
the line" by "internationalizing" the issue, which, they imply,
may endanger the unitary state of Indonesia. The specter of East
Timor has thus arisen again.

Ironically, quite the opposite may be the case. Of the items
discussed, none seems to potentially threaten the prospect of the
unitary state so anxiously feared in Jakarta. Rather than
introducing the political weight of the international community,
the Helsinki process, if successful, is likely to serve
Indonesia's interests by bringing a peaceful, democratic and
permanent settlement, which could strengthen the democratization
and economic potential of both Aceh and Indonesia. Instead of
offering "either democracy or unity", it may bring home both more
firmly.

Many important issues, though not formally agreed upon yet,
have found "common ground", ranging from amnesty and
reintegration of GAM members and various aspects of local
government, from the division of authority and equitable economic
distribution to security issues and the need for monitoring the
implementation of the peace pact on the ground. The very
substance of the autonomy package has thus been agreed to, which
according to the RI's chief delegate Hamid Awaluddin, is
compatible with Indonesia's own Law on Special Autonomy No.
32/2004. Whether it is called "special autonomy" or "self-
government" is merely semantics.

If this can be settled by amending Indonesia's Constitution,
it could end the war and reintegrate GAM, unarmed and under
whatever name, back into Acehnese society. But the problem of
political participation remains.

Meanwhile, at issue in Jakarta is actually whether the United
Nations (UN) or other countries may be involved, whose authority
and interests, along with the public opinion, may impinge upon
Indonesia's sovereignty, as with the East Timor issue. This is
not the case. UN's target on East Timor was typically defined as
"a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable" solution
-- which in many respects is quite the opposite of "a
comprehensive, permanent solution with dignity for all parties
involved" sought for Aceh in Helsinki. Peace facilitator Martti
Ahtisaari of the CMI (Crisis Management Initiative) said recently
that, from the outset the issue was going to be kept outside the
UN. And he informed Kofi Annan of that.

It has also been agreed that the strength of the Indonesian
armed units should be adapted to the real local needs and GAM
forces and pro-Jakarta militias should be de-commissioned. The
euphemism here is to "rationalize" the military presence. As with
the Cessation of Hostility Agreement in 2002/2003, though, the
devil will likely be in the details of the implementation. For,
this has to be monitored, "not by a peacekeeping force,"
Ahtisaari stressed, but by the European Union and Asean teams of
"about 150-200 unarmed officers, police and civilians", according
to RI delegate Sofyan Djalil.

That may not be adequate for Aceh's complex geographic and
political map, but it has been agreed that monitoring is a must
to guarantee the implementation, and the teams will only come at
the invitation of Jakarta. So, what is the big fuss about
"foreign interference"?

With the proposed self-government, security arrangement and
GAM's willingness to participate in local politics, Helsinki
process should take the guns out of the politics. Since the
conflict should be resolved democratically, any deal reached
should enable local political parties to exist and accommodate
local views.

Ahtisaari, who is aware of the complications to realize this
principle under Indonesia's present legislation, has urged the
parties "to find a way so that anyone who wants to participate in
political life will have a chance to do that."

The roots of Jakarta's problem, however, may lie elsewhere.
Historically, the Indonesian military has always had great
difficulty accepting a negotiated settlement -- good examples
were in the 1940s and during East Timor conflict. Jakarta's
nationalist elite, too, find it hard to accept the complex
problem of Aceh as a product of the decades-long injustice and
the brutal, politically devastating war.

Jakarta's predisposition about Acehnese aspirations,
therefore, becomes part of Indonesia's problem of nationalism-in-
disarray. A number of serious missteps and xenophobic outbursts
-- Timor violence (1999), the traumatic loss of Sipadan --
Ligitan (2002), the reckless division of Papua (2003) and the
Ambalat frenzy this past March -- demonstrate similar responses
to that very same problem.

With "Indonesian nationalism" thus facing real,existing local
nationalism (Aceh, Papua), it is essential for Jakarta to save
the Helsinki process and achieve peace: first, in order to
facilitate the tsunami relief and reconstruction; second, to save
resources wasted in warfare for rebuilding the economy.

Finally, a solid deal on Aceh may help inspire efforts to
reconstruct a new Indonesia, one that is truly united and truly
democratic. None of these, however, can be achieved without the
local civil societies.

The writer is journalist with Radio Netherlands.