Hasty conclusions

Indonesia, as a large, nascent democratic country, is facing a series of elections this year. The legislative election with some 16,000 candidates to choose from will take place on April 5. Those who are elected will become members of the House of Representatives (DPR), the national legislature, and of a new body (the DPD) that could be dubbed an embryo senate. Also to be elected at the same time will be legislative members for the provinces and regencies.

The first round of a direct presidential election will be held on July 5, the first time for such an election here. That will likely be followed by a second round presidential vote on Sept. 20, since it is expected that in the first round no presidential/vice-presidential pair will garner enough votes to win outright.

Meanwhile, a flurry of analytical forecasts have been published on the possible outcome of the elections, both legislative and presidential. Even more are likely to follow. Surprisingly, however, several of these predictions, although well written, seem to be based on assumptions about Indonesia's political sociology and the political behavior of Indonesians that are not quite in accordance with the existing realities.

As an example we could mention a recently published report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group entitled Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections. The report clearly states in conclusion that "the 2004 elections cannot be expected to produce fundamental change. The elections will likely bring a result similar to 1999, when PDI-P and Golkar were the largest parties, though they may change places." That pessimistic statement seems to ignore the vast changes that have taken place in Indonesian society during the last five years in terms of political understanding, and also the shifts in the social psychological make-up of Indonesian voters.

For one thing, during the last five years, technology has made it possible for information to be more widespread, practically reaching every corner of Indonesia, either through the print media, electronic media, Internet or personal messages. A simple household in a remote location in North Sumatra, for example, may have little access to clean water, yet find it easy to follow political developments throughout the country by means of television and radio broadcasts. If this phenomenon is coupled with the dynamic growth of the media -- aggressive is perhaps a better word, although the quality may be questionable -- then it can be said that tens of millions of Indonesian voters are by now quite accustomed to being presented with a range of political views.

All this is particularly true with regard to the large amount of new voters this year, whose numbers are estimated to total about 27 million. This figure reflects a 23 percent increase from the 118.5 million voters in the 1999 ballot. These first-time voters may very well be indifferent to the question of which parties dominated the 1999 elections. Another factor why we expect that the political preferences of voters in 2004 will be different is the impact of expanding regional autonomy. A growing number of government officials in the various regions of Indonesia at present are inclined to take an independent attitude and do not feel it necessary to constantly bow to the will of Jakarta. All these developments obviously do not benefit Golkar, whose performance in every general election in the past depended very much on the rigidity and the hierarchical structure of the state bureaucracy.

In other words, the entire political situation in Indonesia in terms of ideological preferences and political loyalties are quite fluid. Although primordial affinities are, of course, still a factor to be reckoned with, even this phenomenon is undergoing a process of erosion. Needless to say, the conclusion reached by ICG is indeed premature, and the assumptions on which it is based are questionable.

Moreover, the report contains a number of contradictions, specifically in the executive summary. On the one hand the report states that "public disillusionment with the performance of democratic government since the first post-authoritarian election in 1999 has been spreading rapidly. The elected government is widely seen as having failed to cope with the massive challenges that the nation is facing." That elected government consists primarily of PDI-P and Golkar.

Public disillusionment with the two parties is indeed spreading. Significant changes have been taking place in the traditional bases of PDI-P, such as Bali. The loyalty of Golkar functionaries is no longer as it was in 1999 as it now depends very much on the performance of local government officials, many of whom are Golkar party functionaries. And yet, the report's executive summary states that "public opinion surveys indicate that the two leading parties in 1999 -- President Megawati's PDI- P and Golkar, the party of the Soeharto government -- are again likely to occupy the top positions."

A small concession made by the author of the ICG report concedes that the Indonesian electorate is in fact not entirely rigid as, it says, "many who voted for the underdog PDI-P in 1999 have been alienated by its (the party's) behavior and are returning to Golkar." It seems that the shift of political preferences among the 2004 electorate that could have an impact on the coming April 5 elections are more multi-faceted and qualitatively significant than being merely a shift between PDI-P and Golkar.

The ICG is not the only one inclined to draw hasty conclusions about Indonesia's future political development because of the failure to apply a rigorous analysis.

Although a news analysis cannot be expected to be too academic in nature, nevertheless a rather lengthy news analysis on the possible outcome of the April 5 elections, published in the Asia section of the Singapore newspaper The Straits Times (Monday, Jan.10, 2004), showed the same superficiality we referred to before. One would expect that the newspaper's seasoned Jakarta correspondent, Derwin Pereira, who has observed Indonesian political developments for quite some time, would have been more thorough and applied a more sensitive touch to the vagaries of Indonesian political dynamics.

Instead, his analysis puts too much of the focus on just two political parties, PDI-P and Golkar, as if no changes and shifts have taken place in the political landscape of Indonesia during the five years since the 1999 elections.

With only three months to go until the April 5 general elections, 24 political parties participating and a potential 27 million first-time voters of almost 146 million registered, it would be prudent for any political observer to follow and observe the Indonesian political trends. That also means, of course, that it would be wise to refrain from drawing hasty political conclusions, given the vast changes that have happened and are happening in the Indonesian society.