Hasty conclusions

Hasty conclusions

Indonesia, as a large, nascent democratic country, is facing a
series of elections this year. The legislative election with some
16,000 candidates to choose from will take place on April 5.
Those who are elected will become members of the House of
Representatives (DPR), the national legislature, and of a new
body (the DPD) that could be dubbed an embryo senate. Also to be
elected at the same time will be legislative members for the
provinces and regencies.

The first round of a direct presidential election will be held
on July 5, the first time for such an election here. That will
likely be followed by a second round presidential vote on Sept.
20, since it is expected that in the first round no
presidential/vice-presidential pair will garner enough votes to
win outright.

Meanwhile, a flurry of analytical forecasts have been
published on the possible outcome of the elections, both
legislative and presidential. Even more are likely to follow.
Surprisingly, however, several of these predictions, although
well written, seem to be based on assumptions about Indonesia's
political sociology and the political behavior of Indonesians
that are not quite in accordance with the existing realities.

As an example we could mention a recently published report by
the Brussels-based International Crisis Group entitled Indonesia
Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections. The report clearly
states in conclusion that "the 2004 elections cannot be expected
to produce fundamental change. The elections will likely bring a
result similar to 1999, when PDI-P and Golkar were the largest
parties, though they may change places." That pessimistic
statement seems to ignore the vast changes that have taken place
in Indonesian society during the last five years in terms of
political understanding, and also the shifts in the social
psychological make-up of Indonesian voters.

For one thing, during the last five years, technology has made
it possible for information to be more widespread, practically
reaching every corner of Indonesia, either through the print
media, electronic media, Internet or personal messages. A simple
household in a remote location in North Sumatra, for example, may
have little access to clean water, yet find it easy to follow
political developments throughout the country by means of
television and radio broadcasts. If this phenomenon is coupled
with the dynamic growth of the media -- aggressive is perhaps a
better word, although the quality may be questionable -- then it
can be said that tens of millions of Indonesian voters are by now
quite accustomed to being presented with a range of political
views.

All this is particularly true with regard to the large amount
of new voters this year, whose numbers are estimated to total
about 27 million. This figure reflects a 23 percent increase from
the 118.5 million voters in the 1999 ballot. These first-time
voters may very well be indifferent to the question of which
parties dominated the 1999 elections. Another factor why we
expect that the political preferences of voters in 2004 will be
different is the impact of expanding regional autonomy. A growing
number of government officials in the various regions of
Indonesia at present are inclined to take an independent attitude
and do not feel it necessary to constantly bow to the will of
Jakarta. All these developments obviously do not benefit Golkar,
whose performance in every general election in the past depended
very much on the rigidity and the hierarchical structure of the
state bureaucracy.

In other words, the entire political situation in Indonesia in
terms of ideological preferences and political loyalties are
quite fluid. Although primordial affinities are, of course, still
a factor to be reckoned with, even this phenomenon is undergoing
a process of erosion. Needless to say, the conclusion reached by
ICG is indeed premature, and the assumptions on which it is based
are questionable.

Moreover, the report contains a number of contradictions,
specifically in the executive summary. On the one hand the report
states that "public disillusionment with the performance of
democratic government since the first post-authoritarian election
in 1999 has been spreading rapidly. The elected government is
widely seen as having failed to cope with the massive challenges
that the nation is facing." That elected government consists
primarily of PDI-P and Golkar.

Public disillusionment with the two parties is indeed
spreading. Significant changes have been taking place in the
traditional bases of PDI-P, such as Bali. The loyalty of Golkar
functionaries is no longer as it was in 1999 as it now depends
very much on the performance of local government officials, many
of whom are Golkar party functionaries. And yet, the report's
executive summary states that "public opinion surveys indicate
that the two leading parties in 1999 -- President Megawati's PDI-
P and Golkar, the party of the Soeharto government -- are again
likely to occupy the top positions."

A small concession made by the author of the ICG report
concedes that the Indonesian electorate is in fact not entirely
rigid as, it says, "many who voted for the underdog PDI-P in 1999
have been alienated by its (the party's) behavior and are
returning to Golkar." It seems that the shift of political
preferences among the 2004 electorate that could have an impact
on the coming April 5 elections are more multi-faceted and
qualitatively significant than being merely a shift between PDI-P
and Golkar.

The ICG is not the only one inclined to draw hasty conclusions
about Indonesia's future political development because of the
failure to apply a rigorous analysis.

Although a news analysis cannot be expected to be too academic
in nature, nevertheless a rather lengthy news analysis on the
possible outcome of the April 5 elections, published in the Asia
section of the Singapore newspaper The Straits Times (Monday,
Jan.10, 2004), showed the same superficiality we referred to
before. One would expect that the newspaper's seasoned Jakarta
correspondent, Derwin Pereira, who has observed Indonesian
political developments for quite some time, would have been more
thorough and applied a more sensitive touch to the vagaries of
Indonesian political dynamics.

Instead, his analysis puts too much of the focus on just two
political parties, PDI-P and Golkar, as if no changes and shifts
have taken place in the political landscape of Indonesia during
the five years since the 1999 elections.

With only three months to go until the April 5 general
elections, 24 political parties participating and a potential 27
million first-time voters of almost 146 million registered, it
would be prudent for any political observer to follow and observe
the Indonesian political trends. That also means, of course, that
it would be wise to refrain from drawing hasty political
conclusions, given the vast changes that have happened and are
happening in the Indonesian society.