Has Islamic political map altered in early days of regime?

Islam-oriented political parties fared poorly in the last general elections. But do vocal aspirations of Islamic groups, like those raised in recent rallies, show that such groups are stronger now? Among others The Jakarta Post interviewed Victoria- based Greg Barton, who has written widely about Islam in Indonesia. A senior lecturer at the School of Social Inquiry, in the Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, in Geelong, Victoria, he is currently completing an authorized biography of President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur).

The telephone interview is excerpted as follows.

Question: The political map in Indonesia has shifted somewhat since immediately after the elections when religious-oriented parties clearly gained little support. What do you think? Has the so-called Muslim "axis force" brought the Muslim forces together to the fore?

Answer: Actually I don't believe that things have changed that much. What the June 7 elections clearly showed is that the vast majority of Indonesians were disinclined to vote for parties perceived to be essentially sectarian in outlook.

In terms of their aggregate percentage of the vote, the Islamist parties garnered but a small proportion of the total vote. The Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang), for example, was by far the most successful of all Islamist parties but gained only 2 percent of the vote. The bulk of the axis force block was composed of the United Development Party (PPP), the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN). PKB and PAN are moderate and so too to a significant extent is PPP.

How do you explain the apparently enormous appeal of the axis force?

I think that we first need to question what is meant by the axis force, and secondly we need to question the extent of its appeal.

I think that when people talk about the axis force what they really mean is PBB and the other Islamist parties. On certain issues PPP and a section of PAN can also be included, but mostly what is meant is the relatively small conservative wing of last year's eight-party alliance.

In a sense that alliance, which was so skillfully manipulated by Gus Dur to snatch support away from (former president) B.J. Habibie and win the presidency, now no longer exists.

Given this, I think that we now have to seriously question the impression that the axis force has enormous appeal. It is true that many within the conservative wing of the axis force seem to have a delusion common to many conservative and reactionary groups around the world -- they sincerely believe that they represent "the silent majority." That should not sway us from taking a more objective view.

So what hard data do we have? Admittedly almost everything is speculative in this field, but there are nevertheless some reasonable indicators. Take the "one million gathering" on Jan. 7.

Most reliable observers estimate that the crowd assembled at Monas numbered in the low tens of thousands rather than in the hundreds of thousands that had been expected. Subsequent rallies in front of the Merdeka Palace have been much smaller.

If the One Million rally was to be a serious show of force then I think that we can assume that the people involved represent a very small majority of the total population.

Of course many Indonesians, the vast majority no doubt, are deeply concerned about the violence and suffering of Muslims and Christians alike in Maluku but they intuitively turn away from simplistic expressions of "solidarity" that have the potential to do more harm than good.

How do you read the calls to jihad, the accusations that the Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations (KPP HAM) in East Timor are being discriminative, that they only care about East Timor and Christians? Do you agree that the sufferings of Muslims haven't been given much attention?

I think that we need to remember that we are currently in a dangerous and difficult time of transition during which we can expect considerable turbulence. The fact that people are emotional and outspoken should not surprise us. The last several years have been extremely difficult, in fact the last several decades have been extremely difficult for many people.

There are three factors or elements that we need to recognize when we consider recent developments: frustration, perception and manipulation. When people look around and see the suffering that is going on in places such as Aceh or Maluku it is only natural that they feel frustrated.

Understandably they seek simple answers to what, in reality, are very complicated problems. Calling for jihad makes very little sense, nevertheless the associated sense of urgency and the desire for action in the face of inaction are certainly understandable.

Similarly, the perception that KPP HAM is biased may make little sense in light of objective analysis, but given the unending cycle of violence in Maluku it is easy to see how many feel that too little is being done too late.

Finally, without succumbing to an unhealthy obsession with conspiracy theory, it is essential that we reflect on the serious possibility of manipulation.

Indeed given the nature of the Soeharto regime and the fact that we are only in the early stages of regime change, the possibility that a certain amount of what is happening is being manipulated cannot be dismissed.

Since the May riots there seems to be an increased resentment on the part of some Muslims towards what they see as 'secular' activists. Some 'moderate' Muslim scholars say that these groups are not representative of most Muslims. But is their influence growing given the large rallies they have mustered?

As I have already mentioned, pretty much anything we can say here is to some extent speculative ... In a nation of 210 million people I don't think that their rally attendances are all that impressive, particularly in the case of greater Jakarta where we have a largely impoverished and stressed urban population of 20 million people with rampant unemployment and difficult living conditions. It is in fact more significant that these rallies are as small as they are.

Do you presently see a radicalization of Islam?

I can see three groups who would like to see a radicalization of Islam.

The first is those who are ideologically driven, who believe that that is the right way to go for Muslims. The second group is larger, and among them are angry young men unable to find jobs or see any future for themselves. The third is those who seek to benefit socially and politically from the radicalization of Islam. They may be linked to the previous regime.

So you see economic hardships and growing unemployment as very significant contributors?

Clearly the daily frustration at not being able to find a way out of demeaning poverty must certainly lead to boredom, depression, frustration, anger and finally a desperate search for something to cling to and something to act for. This is part of the vicious cycle of economic and social crisis.

Even so, I still believe that most people intuitively recognize that sectarianism and radicalism will only serve to make things worse, not better.

Here the mass-based religious organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama play a vital role in moderating community sentiment and channeling energy in useful directions.

You've just returned from Indonesia. From your observation, how do you see the map of Islamic political force now? The Indonesian Committee for World Muslims Solidarity (KISDI) used to be quite a popular group, now the Defenders of Islam Front (FPI) come across as more popular and better organized. How is Gus Dur oriented vis-a-vis this force?

KISDI was only ever the voice of a very small minority, the same is now true for FPI. Nevertheless there is reason to believe that certain elements in society, some in the military as well as the non-military but linked to the previous regime, might be financing and manipulating such groups for their own purposes giving them a much higher profile than they might otherwise enjoy.

So much of what has occurred over the past two years remains murky and unclear. At this stage there is a dearth of sound, clear data so it is difficult to do more than speculate.

Even so, I believe that is reasonable to assume that it is the nature of change that certain elements will seek to destabilize and discredit the legitimate, democratically elected government. Given the way in which Islam was increasingly politicized during the past decade, it is not surprising that some find radical Islam to be a convenient and effective tool. (Dewi Anggraeni)