Has Islamic political map altered in early days of regime?

Has Islamic political map altered in early days of regime?

Islam-oriented political parties fared poorly in the last
general elections. But do vocal aspirations of Islamic groups,
like those raised in recent rallies, show that such groups are
stronger now? Among others The Jakarta Post interviewed Victoria-
based Greg Barton, who has written widely about Islam in
Indonesia. A senior lecturer at the School of Social Inquiry, in
the Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, in Geelong, Victoria, he
is currently completing an authorized biography of President
Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur).

The telephone interview is excerpted as follows.

Question: The political map in Indonesia has shifted somewhat
since immediately after the elections when religious-oriented
parties clearly gained little support. What do you think? Has the
so-called Muslim "axis force" brought the Muslim forces together
to the fore?

Answer: Actually I don't believe that things have changed that
much. What the June 7 elections clearly showed is that the vast
majority of Indonesians were disinclined to vote for parties
perceived to be essentially sectarian in outlook.

In terms of their aggregate percentage of the vote, the
Islamist parties garnered but a small proportion of the total
vote. The Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang), for
example, was by far the most successful of all Islamist parties
but gained only 2 percent of the vote. The bulk of the axis force
block was composed of the United Development Party (PPP), the
National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party
(PAN). PKB and PAN are moderate and so too to a significant
extent is PPP.

How do you explain the apparently enormous appeal of the axis
force?

I think that we first need to question what is meant by the
axis force, and secondly we need to question the extent of its
appeal.

I think that when people talk about the axis force what they
really mean is PBB and the other Islamist parties. On certain
issues PPP and a section of PAN can also be included, but mostly
what is meant is the relatively small conservative wing of last
year's eight-party alliance.

In a sense that alliance, which was so skillfully manipulated
by Gus Dur to snatch support away from (former president) B.J.
Habibie and win the presidency, now no longer exists.

Given this, I think that we now have to seriously question the
impression that the axis force has enormous appeal. It is true
that many within the conservative wing of the axis force seem to
have a delusion common to many conservative and reactionary
groups around the world -- they sincerely believe that they
represent "the silent majority." That should not sway us from
taking a more objective view.

So what hard data do we have? Admittedly almost everything is
speculative in this field, but there are nevertheless some
reasonable indicators. Take the "one million gathering" on Jan.
7.

Most reliable observers estimate that the crowd assembled at
Monas numbered in the low tens of thousands rather than in the
hundreds of thousands that had been expected. Subsequent rallies
in front of the Merdeka Palace have been much smaller.

If the One Million rally was to be a serious show of force
then I think that we can assume that the people involved
represent a very small majority of the total population.

Of course many Indonesians, the vast majority no doubt, are
deeply concerned about the violence and suffering of Muslims and
Christians alike in Maluku but they intuitively turn away from
simplistic expressions of "solidarity" that have the potential to
do more harm than good.

How do you read the calls to jihad, the accusations that the
Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations (KPP HAM) in
East Timor are being discriminative, that they only care about
East Timor and Christians? Do you agree that the sufferings of
Muslims haven't been given much attention?

I think that we need to remember that we are currently in a
dangerous and difficult time of transition during which we can
expect considerable turbulence. The fact that people are
emotional and outspoken should not surprise us. The last several
years have been extremely difficult, in fact the last several
decades have been extremely difficult for many people.

There are three factors or elements that we need to recognize
when we consider recent developments: frustration, perception and
manipulation. When people look around and see the suffering that
is going on in places such as Aceh or Maluku it is only natural
that they feel frustrated.

Understandably they seek simple answers to what, in reality,
are very complicated problems. Calling for jihad makes very
little sense, nevertheless the associated sense of urgency and
the desire for action in the face of inaction are certainly
understandable.

Similarly, the perception that KPP HAM is biased may make
little sense in light of objective analysis, but given the
unending cycle of violence in Maluku it is easy to see how many
feel that too little is being done too late.

Finally, without succumbing to an unhealthy obsession with
conspiracy theory, it is essential that we reflect on the serious
possibility of manipulation.

Indeed given the nature of the Soeharto regime and the fact
that we are only in the early stages of regime change, the
possibility that a certain amount of what is happening is being
manipulated cannot be dismissed.

Since the May riots there seems to be an increased resentment
on the part of some Muslims towards what they see as 'secular'
activists. Some 'moderate' Muslim scholars say that these groups
are not representative of most Muslims. But is their influence
growing given the large rallies they have mustered?

As I have already mentioned, pretty much anything we can say
here is to some extent speculative ... In a nation of 210 million
people I don't think that their rally attendances are all that
impressive, particularly in the case of greater Jakarta where we
have a largely impoverished and stressed urban population of 20
million people with rampant unemployment and difficult living
conditions. It is in fact more significant that these rallies are
as small as they are.

Do you presently see a radicalization of Islam?

I can see three groups who would like to see a radicalization
of Islam.

The first is those who are ideologically driven, who believe
that that is the right way to go for Muslims. The second group is
larger, and among them are angry young men unable to find jobs or
see any future for themselves. The third is those who seek to
benefit socially and politically from the radicalization of
Islam. They may be linked to the previous regime.

So you see economic hardships and growing unemployment as very
significant contributors?

Clearly the daily frustration at not being able to find a way
out of demeaning poverty must certainly lead to boredom,
depression, frustration, anger and finally a desperate search for
something to cling to and something to act for. This is part of
the vicious cycle of economic and social crisis.

Even so, I still believe that most people intuitively
recognize that sectarianism and radicalism will only serve to
make things worse, not better.

Here the mass-based religious organizations such as
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama play a vital role in moderating
community sentiment and channeling energy in useful directions.

You've just returned from Indonesia. From your observation,
how do you see the map of Islamic political force now? The
Indonesian Committee for World Muslims Solidarity (KISDI) used to
be quite a popular group, now the Defenders of Islam Front (FPI)
come across as more popular and better organized. How is Gus Dur
oriented vis-a-vis this force?

KISDI was only ever the voice of a very small minority, the
same is now true for FPI. Nevertheless there is reason to believe
that certain elements in society, some in the military as well as
the non-military but linked to the previous regime, might be
financing and manipulating such groups for their own purposes
giving them a much higher profile than they might otherwise
enjoy.

So much of what has occurred over the past two years remains
murky and unclear. At this stage there is a dearth of sound,
clear data so it is difficult to do more than speculate.

Even so, I believe that is reasonable to assume that it is the
nature of change that certain elements will seek to destabilize
and discredit the legitimate, democratically elected
government. Given the way in which Islam was increasingly
politicized during the past decade, it is not surprising that
some find radical Islam to be a convenient and effective tool.
(Dewi Anggraeni)