Has Bush govt mismanaged its relations with China?

SINGAPORE: Has U.S. policy on Taiwan changed radically? The very fact that such a question needs to be asked illustrates the extent to which the Bush administration has mismanaged its relations with China.

For close to 30 years now, since president Richard Nixon's historic trip to Beijing in 1972, successive U.S. administrations have been deliberately vague about whether America would come to Taiwan's aid if China were to attack.

There were good reasons for this ambiguity: A clear pledge of aid would have emboldened Taiwan to declare itself independent; a promise to stay out would have encouraged China to invade.

Consequently, in 1979, after America shifted its diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, obliging the United States to supply Taiwan with the weapons it needs to defend itself, but leaving deliberately vague whether the United States will participate directly in that defense. Since then, four presidents -- two Democrats and two Republicans, one the father of the present incumbent -- have confirmed this study in ambiguity.

Asia owes them a debt of gratitude, for the policy helped keep the peace in one of the world's hot spots. To postpone as long as possible the application of force across the Taiwan Straits -- that, for 30 years, has been the whole burden of U.S. policy.

Last week, in interviews marking his first 100 days in office, President George Bush almost succeeded in scuttling that policy. When asked on a talk show if the United States had an obligation to defend Taiwan from an attack by China, he replied: "Yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that. Yes, I would."

Later, he seemed to back away from that bald declaration, telling another media outlet that the use of U.S. force "is certainly an option", but emphasizing his support for the "one- China" policy and reaffirming his opposition to Taiwan's independence. Granted, nuance has never been his strong suit, but his seeming abandonment of a 30-year-old policy, momentary though it was, was inexcusable.

The State Department's later insistence that the policy has not changed one iota was helpful, but the damage was done. Ambiguity was the substance of the policy; being ambiguous about that ambiguity, far from deepening it, can only introduce destabilizing doubts in China's leaders regarding America's commitment to a "one-China", as well as its general intentions toward the country.

Surely, that is the last thing Bush would want. He must realize that the U.S.-China relationship is the key to East Asia's stability. Whether or not China becomes, or is already, a strategic competitor, is neither here nor there; the fact is U.S. interest, as well as those of its allies and friends in the region (including Singapore's), requires that relationship to be managed in such a way as to maximize the possibilities of cooperation and minimize the possibilities of conflict.

Alas, Bush, in his first 100 days, has done little to promote such a rational policy. A series of incidents -- some accidental, some self-inflicted, some the result of Administration hawks doing end-runs around the White House (like Thursday's retracted report that the Pentagon will suspend military-to-military relations with China) have caused a sharp turn for the worse in U.S.-China relations.

If Bush values stability in East Asia, and wants China to play by international rules, he must do all he can to arrest this deterioration. The alternative is to let things drift, from one charged incident to another, leading ultimately to a conclusion that neither Americans nor Chinese can want.

-- The Straits Times/Asia News Network