Hard road to Indonesia-Australia ties

By Damien Kingsbury

MELBOURNE (JP): There have been encouraging signs recently about the level of commitment to rebuilding relations between Indonesia and Australia. Former Ambassador to Australia, Wiryono Sastrohandoyo's comments to the Indonesia-Australia Business Council stand as a good illustration of that. But relations remain difficult and, while they will improve, such improvement will not come without real effort on both sides.

The issue of East Timor has been central to the recent fallout between the two states. From the Indonesian perspective, Australia has acted too strongly in what many Indonesians consider an internal matter. From Australia's perspective, Indonesia has failed to curb the violent activities of TNI-backed militias against helpless civilians in a territory legitimately offered the choice of independence.

A very big part of the problem was that, in its efforts to please Jakarta, successive Australian governments endorsed a policy of recognizing Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor. This was despite numerous surveys showing that such endorsement in Australia was always opposed by around three-quarters of its population. Certainly the shift of position on this issue by the Australian government was populist in sentiment, but it was also an accurate reflection of public will.

In appealing to a domestic audience, Australian Prime Minister John Howard also claimed credit for influencing ex-President B.J. Habibie's decision to allow a referendum on independence in East Timor. The reality was that negotiations between Habibie, Portugal and the UN were already well underway. Howard simply did not want Australia to be seen to be endorsing East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia at a time when Indonesia's own president was, at best, ambivalent about it.

Similarly, Australia's involvement in Interfet has been interpreted by some Indonesians as an affront to nationalist sentiment, and an imposition of neo-colonialism in Southeast Asia. Some have even suggested that Australia has strategic designs on the territory.

The only threat to Australia's sovereignty came, in the early 1940s, through the archipelago and Timor was regarded as a critical point to counter-attack. It was from this time that many Australians began their warm relationship with the East Timorese. But Australia has since then had no strategic interest in occupying East Timor. Indeed, Australia's security is far better served by having good relations with Indonesia.

Further, while Australia has acted in East Timor -- only under the auspices of the UN -- it has done so in concert with other Asian states. Regardless of its mixed racial composition or colonial history, Australia does not wish to dominate or occupy East Timor. But it does retain a genuine moral and strategic interest in seeing stability restored there. Once stability is guaranteed, Australia will disengage. Australian aid will probably continue for some time but, as with Indonesia, that is based on humanitarian concerns.

The East Timor issue came at a bad time for Indonesia. Already reeling from economic devastation and political insecurity, it was a further blow to national pride. Burning Indonesian flags in Australia was also going to upset Indonesian nationalists. Yet it was under the Red and White that Indonesia committed unmentionable atrocities in East Timor.

As a symbol, the Red and White was tarnished by those events, and others around the archipelago. But the positive aspirations that many Indonesian still attach to the Red and White remain. It is now time to restore to this flag the honor it deserves. That must be done by the new Indonesian government, acting with and in the best interests of the Indonesian people.

Since 1975, Indonesia's education system and its media have presented an interpretation of Indonesia's involvement in East Timor that is at best open to challenge. This is not the place to debate history, but such an interpretation could not have been otherwise, given the tightly controlled flow of information that existed under Soeharto's New Order government. The New Order is now dead and is in the process of being buried.

Along with this interpretation of history has been Australia's tendency, since the early 1970s, to say what it believes Jakarta's elites wish to hear, as opposed to what it believes to be accurate. It was said that frank expression is at odds with "Indonesian" or "Javanese" culture. So the rare expressions of Australia's frank expression, from its media and diplomats, was not appreciated.

But the days of self-censorship by the Indonesian media are all but over, so there is little chance that Australia's otherwise forthright media will now start to self-censor, about Indonesia or about anything else. In a democracy, in which freedom of expression is valued, political leaders need to be able to accept criticism. Very often it is deserved, helps them correct mistakes and stops them from making more. Does anyone remember a controversial Australian newspaper article in 1986 on Soeharto's ill-gained wealth? Would anyone criticize that now?

As Indonesia is learning, the lessons of democratization follow the painful test of experience. It is a hard path to follow, but one that seems to reflect the aspirations of most Indonesian citizens. Happily, it is a path that Australia also travels so that, as neighbors, both countries might travel together.

As Wiryono said, trust and friendship must be earned. It has been slow coming in the past and will be slow again to restore. But trust and friendship, built on honesty and transparency, is available between the peoples of Indonesian and Australia and between our governments. A relationship built on honesty and transparency is the only sort of relationship worth having.

The writer is Executive Officer of the Monash Asia Institute, author of The Politics of Indonesia (OUP 1998) and co-editor of Reformasi -- crisis and change in Indonesia (MAI 1999).