Hard lessons to be learned from East Timor

Hard lessons to be learned from East Timor

By John Hargreaves

JAKARTA (JP): A number of questions stand out about the
chapter of East Timorese history which just ended. One question
is what made Soeharto and Western countries decide to integrate
East Timor in 1975 to 1976.

Many people say it was a Cold War necessity influenced by
events in Cuba and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. But Castro's
rebels in Cuba were neither hard-line communists nor Soviet
allies when they overthrew Batista in 1958. They became so only
after three years of hostile and inappropriate U.S. policy.

The Fretilin rebels were even less communist or Soviet
aligned. They started out as the Social Democratic Association of
East Timor and saw Australia as a potential key ally. It
certainly was not inevitable that a Fretilin-led East Timor would
turn into a Soviet military outpost.

What really drove the Western-backed takeover was the fear
that a communist East Timor would contaminate Indonesia and
destabilize the Soeharto regime. They still believed in the
domino theory that justified the Vietnam War. But they did not
foresee that the Fretilin rebels would resist a foreign army and
a brutal dictator as fiercely as the Vietcong had.

Later Western policy on East Timor is also questionable. For
example, the Timor Gap treaty was said to be good for Australian-
Indonesian relations. But the East Timorese people were likely to
lose their oil for little return. At a local level, exploitation
of resources by foreign companies is a more important aspect of
international relations than friendliness between central
governments.

Recent Australian actions have worsened relations with
Indonesia through bad presentation. When former president B.J.
Habibie announced his decision to allow independence, stories
circulated that a letter from John Howard had influenced Habibie.
Actually Habibie's policy was totally different from what Howard
proposed. But the policy was popular in Australia so the
Australian government fostered the impression that Australia had
helped to shape it.

When violence broke out, Australia's policy of military
readiness was prudent. But it was accompanied by misleading
reports in some media and aggressive anti-Indonesian
demonstrations. Some comments from Australian leaders were more
in tune with the aggression of the demonstrations than with the
prudence of the policy.

Turning to Indonesia, the man most criticized over East Timor
was Habibie. For sure, Habibie took a risk by offering East Timor
independence, but all possible courses were high risk. Habibie,
stepping out of Soeharto's shadow, chose the course that offered
a quick resolution.

Nonetheless, the announcement of the referendum was flawed. A
normal procedure would be: legislature offers referendum,
referendum held, same legislature ratifies result. In this case
the procedure was: government offers referendum, referendum held,
wait two months, new legislature ratifies result. The two-month
wait became a mine field. The prointegration group hoped that if
it lost it could still persuade the new People's Consultative
Assembly (MPR) to reject the result. The president became trapped
between foreign pressure and fear of preempting the MPR.

Still, the big problem was security. It has been said that
Habibie's decision to offer independence triggered an upsurge in
violence. But Habibie's decision was indeed only a trigger.
Trouble was instigated earlier through the recruitment of
civilian militias to complement the official armed forces.

For Indonesia it is important to find out how security
arrangements went so wrong.

For the United Nations it is important to ask whether any
referendum of this kind can be held without an international
peacekeeping force. Several countries pressed Indonesia to accept
such a force bud did not insist for several reasons: fear that
the ballot offer would be withdrawn, fear of upsetting
Indonesia's democratic transition, need for unity in the UN and
lack of enthusiasm among countries required to supply and fund
troops.

In this last regard, the United States affirmed until well
after the ballot that it expected Indonesia to keep its security
pledge and that the East Timor problem was only one of many in
the world. According to statements by John Howard and Jose Ramos
Horta, a change of mind by Bill Clinton made Interfet possible.

This indicates that United Nations action depends excessively
on the United States. It also suggests that media pressure had an
excessive influence when many international media reports about
East Timor featured exaggerated death tolls and stories of
genocide. In future, stories of a mere couple of thousand deaths
may fail to move world public opinion and world leaders, even
when intervention is practical. East Timor may find that once
outrage subsides the funds it requires will prove elusive.

For Indonesia, the East Timor crisis creates or influences
several important goals.

One aim is to build a friendly relationship with East Timor.
Beyond technical matters, this means a new outlook. After so many
years viewing Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao and Ramos Horta as
enemies of the state, some Indonesians may be suspicious of East
Timor. But East Timor will have a minor influence on Indonesia
while Indonesia will have a major influence on East Timor. While
East Timorese leaders will naturally want to get on well with
Indonesia, it is Indonesia which should lead as it is by far the
larger and more powerful country.

A second aim is to improve Indonesia's position in the world.

An important route to this goal is to develop the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations. The recent crisis showed that it
cannot handle security and human rights problems, which limits
its influence on the world stage. While some members already seek
more cooperation in these areas, it is now up to the group's
biggest member, Indonesia, to take a stance.

It is also important to strengthen the domestic base for
foreign policy. While some commentators saw nonrecognition of
East Timor's integration as a failure of diplomatic lobbying, the
real problem was repression inside East Timor.

This also means strengthening the decision-making process for
foreign policy. The policy of opening trade links with Israel,
for example, has already suffered because it was sprung out of
the blue. Policies of great public concern should be fully
discussed before they are adopted and political parties and
national leaders should take a clear position. Otherwise,
benefits from a policy will be attenuated by doubts about its
long-term direction.

A third aim is to restore order in the province of East Nusa
Tenggara. Officially, it is already government policy to return
as many refugees as possible to East Timor. But in East Timor
itself, lack of commitment in implementing official policy led to
disaster; there is a danger that the same will happen in west
Timor.

A fourth aim is to preserve the unity of Indonesia. The
original invasion of East Timor was driven by the domino theory
that an independent East Timor would transmit communism to other
parts of Indonesia. Now it is feared that an independent East
Timor will transmit separatism to other parts of Indonesia.

The need highlighted is for nation-building. For the military,
nation-building meant extending the gains of the war of
independence: the 1945 Constitution, the expulsion of the
colonialists and the united republic. Anyone doubting any one of
these gains was a traitor. Thus, the government crushed regional
rebellions through force but could not handle the grievances that
caused the rebellions.

With a revised constitution and regional autonomy, Indonesians
now want to build a new Indonesia. But nothing can guarantee that
the Acehnese or others will want in.

A fifth goal is to prevent further human rights disasters.

Improving civil control of the military is important for this.
Long-term plans to reform the bureaucracy, revise the national
budget and overhaul the judicial system will directly affect the
capability and professionalism of the armed forces.

In addition, civilians should plan further internal reform,
including in sensitive areas like intelligence and special
forces.

In the short term, the greatest need is to try cases of abuse.
But none of the high-profile cases from the Habibie era have yet
reached court.

In general, the East Timor crisis highlights the need for
greater commitment to uphold human rights.

Major cases like last year's May riots have not been
satisfactorily resolved. Soon after the riots, attention shifted
from investigating what happened, supporting the victims and
preventing a recurrence to the contention that all reports of
rape during the riot were fake. A report from a fact-finding team
was filed and forgotten.

Unfortunately, a similar outcome is likely in East Timor. Even
at the height of the violence, attention shifted from ending the
terror, supporting the victims and preventing a recurrence to the
contention that Indonesia was the victim of an international
conspiracy.

Although a team is now investigating, its report may not be
followed up. With the military already under pressure over Aceh,
where the political stakes are high, it is unlikely that the
government will want to pile on extra pressure over East Timor,
where there is no apparent political gain.

The writer, a graduate of Cambridge University in Britain, is
a teacher at the Jakarta International Korean School.