Habibie's legitimacy questioned

By Ignas Kleden

JAKARTA (JP): Though B.J. Habibie seems to have taken over the office of president very easily, smoothly and quickly, he is now beset by the heavy and protracted question of his legitimacy and legality. His presidency is considered not fully legally valid because it has not received the mandate of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). It is also allegedly lacking legitimacy because he is seen as a man very close to the former president, Soeharto.

According to his critics, a special session of the People's Consultative Assembly would solve the two questions if Habibie can come out as president-elect. However, this might not be totally true in view of the fact that while election by the Assembly will solve the problem of legality, Habibie's legitimacy depends very much on whether or not he can prove himself as more than a mere protege and faithful follower of Soeharto.

In reality this means that his legitimacy depends very much on the actions he takes to overcome the shortage of basic foodstuffs, as well as to stabilize the exchange rate of the Indonesian currency. The two questions of legality and legitimacy, unfortunately, seem to have a mutually opposing effect. If one wants to settle the problem of the legality of the new president, this might completely absorb public attention and political time to the extent that the very urgent economic problems would not be solved on time, this leading to a more restive situation which, again, will possibly hit political stability.

If one takes the second option by giving the president enough time to settle the economic problems (which is essential to his legitimacy), this will necessitate a suspension of political discussion and a delay of the pressing demand for political reform for some time. In so doing one might miss the present political momentum, because the people would be required to restrain themselves from political participation and the exercise of their democratic rights for the sake of economic stabilization. A possible risk one might be running is that the postponement of political reform will be extended to an indefinite period of time, as was the case with the New Order. This is the reason why demonstrations are still going on despite the president's repeated request to stop such actions in order for him to work without too much political disturbance.

In a sense, the beginning of Habibie's governance is fairly comparable to that of Soeharto's in the mid sixties. Both come out of economic crisis. The inflation rate by the end of Soekarno's regime was over 600 percent. People were short of daily foodstuffs and prices increased astronomically. Now, according to some forecasts, the inflation rate will go far beyond 600 percent. People are confronted with serious shortages of basic foodstuffs and prices are still going up everyday while the rupiah becomes weaker and weaker.

However, the challenges faced by the two presidents are totally different. Soeharto, at his time, was entitled to claim any prerogatives to stabilize the economic situation, which he did well at the beginning. This gave him a powerful legitimacy, because people were satisfied with the improvements to the economic situation after getting fed up with protracted ideological conflicts and political turbulence.

For the time being Habibie obviously lacks the privilege of former president Soeharto. For one thing, the trust of international bodies to the first cabinet of Soeharto was quickly gained, due to the integrity and the technical expertise of the ministers of his cabinet. For another, at the beginning of the New Order people were still willing to sacrifice some of their political rights for the sake of economic stabilization. This willingness was owing to the then much propagated assumption that economic development would eventually bring about a democratizing process.

Habibie has more problems because not all his ministers are supposedly free from the old practices of KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism), while they also do not represent the best expertise available in the Indonesian political community, especially with regards to economic and financial know-how. At the same time people are much more wary of once again sacrificing their political rights for economic stabilization, if there is no political guarantee given in whatever form that this limitation is treated as a merely provisional measure for a temporary, short period of time.

The legitimacy of President Habibie will depend not only on his ability to settle economic problems successfully, but also on whether or not he can liberate himself from the overshadowing influences of his predecessor, who according to his often repeated acknowledgement, was his most important political patron (he is often quoted as saying, "Soeharto is my political professor").

This is obviously an important step forward in the building of people's political consciousness. Economic development is a must for any government which wants to stay in power, but it is only a necessary condition which is nevertheless not automatically sufficient for winning legitimacy. The lesson people have learned from the New Order is: economic development for democracy: yes; economic development for authoritarian governance: no.

Another lesson from the present crisis is that participation is not only a matter of political democracy, but also a condition for economic sustainability. From a political perspective it becomes increasingly evident that economic development should not only aim at sustained growth but also at the capability to overcome risks. A benefit-oriented economy should be strengthened by a cost-oriented economy. Economic growth without economic resilience looks like a palace built upon sand.

This truth is fairly discernible in the political behavior of Soeharto's regime. The inevitability of a temporary wealth concentration was often propagated as a stage which economic development must undergo, but every time the national economy is hit by a crisis an appeal to people's participation is loudly heard. Why is it that in good conditions only a few can have privileges (allegedly as a transitory stage), while in crisis all people should be responsible? The loss of people's confidence in Soeharto's governance originates for a great part in the rejection of this political hypocrisy.

Besides, it is dangerous if the economy is dominated by a handful of powerful conglomerates. In time of crisis, they turned out not powerful enough to overcome the emergency by their capacity alone. A common truth has too long been forgotten and neglected: distribution of income is not only a claim for social justice. It entails the distribution of risk among more people, who of course will have broader shoulders to carry the burden of the crisis.

Habibie is not so lucky as Soeharto was, because he is faced with a double challenge, without having the possibility of meeting one at the expense of the other. He has to overcome the economic crisis, or, better put, he has to salvage the country from imminent total economic collapse. At the same time he is obliged to solve the problem of his legitimacy by enlarging the political room for more participation, which means, giving opportunity to more demands, expectations and aspirations.

The question of the legality of his presidency can be best solved by convening a special session of the People's Assembly as soon as possible. However, this "as soon as possible" is already impossible, because there is not enough time for even an approximate preparation. Besides that, from the economic point of view, there might be hardly any economic rationale for the huge expenditure involved for a special session considering the difficult financial situation. At the same time, by doing that the focus of government attention will shift from economic problems to political problems, leaving the people with uncertainty about what they have to do to meet their basic needs without delay.

The primary urgency is to improve the price and distribution of basic commodities and the exchange rate of the rupiah. This should be done quickly and successfully, because otherwise another outbreak of social unrest could possibly emerge, which might bring the whole situation to political chaos, needing a longer time to recover. You can tell the people about all possible good things in politics, but you cannot let them wait for one week with nothing to eat.

President Habibie is obviously aware of this urgency and the international dilemma it entails. His legitimacy depends very much on his ability to recover from the financial crisis. However, this will be unthinkable without regaining the confidence of international bodies and the trust of the international market. In turn, the confidence of international bodies requires the enforcement of democracy and a more serious observance of human rights as its conditionality. If this is the case, Habibie should give his attention to Indonesia's domestic political affairs, which means there will be no possibility for him to give priority to economic and financial problems while suspending for the time being political questions.

The difficulty faced by the president is that so many things are uncertain. One cannot rely on the good intentions of the IMF alone in view of the implementation of its aid until now. This means, there are only very limited options for President Habibie as far as national and international politics are concerned.

He can choose to settle domestic politics first to regain international confidence, which is instrumental to the improvement of monetary and economic conditions. This will come true if the willingness of those international bodies to help Indonesia is serious enough. If it is not the case it might be too late for Habibie to overcome the economic crisis, which his presidency might not survive as well.

He can take another option by concentrating on solving the economic crisis while trying to persuade the international bodies of the urgency of this action and the importance of economic recovery as a material base on which to build democracy. This might sound logical and reasonable and Habibie might mean it in good faith. However, this argument lost all its validity and persuasive power during the regime of Soeharto: 32 years of economic development and yet no democracy at all. Nobody who has a good memory will easily buy such an argument right after the demise of the New Order, which used that argument merely to maintain its power.

The only way out can be found if there is serious political will from the present government to give a political guarantee. Habibie will regain the confidence he needs from both the Indonesian people and international bodies if he meets two requirements. First, he has to demonstrate his determination to overcome the present economic crisis. The political condition for doing that in the form of political tranquility will be given him if he can guarantee that the suspension of political rights will only last for a short period of time. To make sure of this guarantee, he has to, secondly, announce his unwillingness to be reelected as president after the end of the present term in order to rule out the suspicion that the requirement for a temporary limitation of people's political rights is nothing but a mere pretext.

I think if the requirements are fulfilled, there will be no great hesitation among people and international bodies to give their confidence. This comes as a personal sacrifice to President Habibie. However, if he wants to salvage the country from imminent economic collapse, there seems to be no other choice than to sacrifice himself and his power upon the altar of national and international politics. This is the price he has to pay for regaining confidence, which in the present political and economic situation has become a highly valuable commodity of extreme scarcity. In so doing he will be out of politics but welcome in Indonesian history.

Ignas Kleden is a sociologist based in Jakarta.