Habibie's legitimacy questioned

Habibie's legitimacy questioned

By Ignas Kleden

JAKARTA (JP): Though B.J. Habibie seems to have taken over the
office of president very easily, smoothly and quickly, he is now
beset by the heavy and protracted question of his legitimacy and
legality. His presidency is considered not fully legally valid
because it has not received the mandate of the People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR). It is also allegedly lacking
legitimacy because he is seen as a man very close to the former
president, Soeharto.

According to his critics, a special session of the People's
Consultative Assembly would solve the two questions if Habibie
can come out as president-elect. However, this might not be
totally true in view of the fact that while election by the
Assembly will solve the problem of legality, Habibie's legitimacy
depends very much on whether or not he can prove himself as more
than a mere protege and faithful follower of Soeharto.

In reality this means that his legitimacy depends very much on
the actions he takes to overcome the shortage of basic
foodstuffs, as well as to stabilize the exchange rate of the
Indonesian currency. The two questions of legality and
legitimacy, unfortunately, seem to have a mutually opposing
effect. If one wants to settle the problem of the legality of the
new president, this might completely absorb public attention and
political time to the extent that the very urgent economic
problems would not be solved on time, this leading to a more
restive situation which, again, will possibly hit political
stability.

If one takes the second option by giving the president enough
time to settle the economic problems (which is essential to his
legitimacy), this will necessitate a suspension of political
discussion and a delay of the pressing demand for political
reform for some time. In so doing one might miss the present
political momentum, because the people would be required to
restrain themselves from political participation and the exercise
of their democratic rights for the sake of economic
stabilization. A possible risk one might be running is that the
postponement of political reform will be extended to an
indefinite period of time, as was the case with the New Order.
This is the reason why demonstrations are still going on despite
the president's repeated request to stop such actions in order
for him to work without too much political disturbance.

In a sense, the beginning of Habibie's governance is fairly
comparable to that of Soeharto's in the mid sixties. Both come
out of economic crisis. The inflation rate by the end of
Soekarno's regime was over 600 percent. People were short of
daily foodstuffs and prices increased astronomically. Now,
according to some forecasts, the inflation rate will go far
beyond 600 percent. People are confronted with serious shortages
of basic foodstuffs and prices are still going up everyday while
the rupiah becomes weaker and weaker.

However, the challenges faced by the two presidents are
totally different. Soeharto, at his time, was entitled to claim
any prerogatives to stabilize the economic situation, which he
did well at the beginning. This gave him a powerful legitimacy,
because people were satisfied with the improvements to the
economic situation after getting fed up with protracted
ideological conflicts and political turbulence.

For the time being Habibie obviously lacks the privilege of
former president Soeharto. For one thing, the trust of
international bodies to the first cabinet of Soeharto was quickly
gained, due to the integrity and the technical expertise of the
ministers of his cabinet. For another, at the beginning of the
New Order people were still willing to sacrifice some of their
political rights for the sake of economic stabilization. This
willingness was owing to the then much propagated assumption that
economic development would eventually bring about a democratizing
process.

Habibie has more problems because not all his ministers are
supposedly free from the old practices of KKN (corruption,
collusion and nepotism), while they also do not represent the
best expertise available in the Indonesian political community,
especially with regards to economic and financial know-how. At
the same time people are much more wary of once again sacrificing
their political rights for economic stabilization, if there is no
political guarantee given in whatever form that this limitation
is treated as a merely provisional measure for a temporary, short
period of time.

The legitimacy of President Habibie will depend not only on
his ability to settle economic problems successfully, but also on
whether or not he can liberate himself from the overshadowing
influences of his predecessor, who according to his often
repeated acknowledgement, was his most important political patron
(he is often quoted as saying, "Soeharto is my political
professor").

This is obviously an important step forward in the building of
people's political consciousness. Economic development is a must
for any government which wants to stay in power, but it is only a
necessary condition which is nevertheless not automatically
sufficient for winning legitimacy. The lesson people have learned
from the New Order is: economic development for democracy: yes;
economic development for authoritarian governance: no.

Another lesson from the present crisis is that participation
is not only a matter of political democracy, but also a condition
for economic sustainability. From a political perspective it
becomes increasingly evident that economic development should not
only aim at sustained growth but also at the capability to
overcome risks. A benefit-oriented economy should be strengthened
by a cost-oriented economy. Economic growth without economic
resilience looks like a palace built upon sand.

This truth is fairly discernible in the political behavior of
Soeharto's regime. The inevitability of a temporary wealth
concentration was often propagated as a stage which economic
development must undergo, but every time the national economy is
hit by a crisis an appeal to people's participation is loudly
heard. Why is it that in good conditions only a few can have
privileges (allegedly as a transitory stage), while in crisis all
people should be responsible? The loss of people's confidence in
Soeharto's governance originates for a great part in the
rejection of this political hypocrisy.

Besides, it is dangerous if the economy is dominated by a
handful of powerful conglomerates. In time of crisis, they turned
out not powerful enough to overcome the emergency by their
capacity alone. A common truth has too long been forgotten and
neglected: distribution of income is not only a claim for social
justice. It entails the distribution of risk among more people,
who of course will have broader shoulders to carry the burden of
the crisis.

Habibie is not so lucky as Soeharto was, because he is faced
with a double challenge, without having the possibility of
meeting one at the expense of the other. He has to overcome the
economic crisis, or, better put, he has to salvage the country
from imminent total economic collapse. At the same time he is
obliged to solve the problem of his legitimacy by enlarging the
political room for more participation, which means, giving
opportunity to more demands, expectations and aspirations.

The question of the legality of his presidency can be best
solved by convening a special session of the People's Assembly as
soon as possible. However, this "as soon as possible" is already
impossible, because there is not enough time for even an
approximate preparation. Besides that, from the economic point of
view, there might be hardly any economic rationale for the huge
expenditure involved for a special session considering the
difficult financial situation. At the same time, by doing that
the focus of government attention will shift from economic
problems to political problems, leaving the people with
uncertainty about what they have to do to meet their basic needs
without delay.

The primary urgency is to improve the price and distribution
of basic commodities and the exchange rate of the rupiah. This
should be done quickly and successfully, because otherwise
another outbreak of social unrest could possibly emerge, which
might bring the whole situation to political chaos, needing a
longer time to recover. You can tell the people about all
possible good things in politics, but you cannot let them wait
for one week with nothing to eat.

President Habibie is obviously aware of this urgency and the
international dilemma it entails. His legitimacy depends very
much on his ability to recover from the financial crisis.
However, this will be unthinkable without regaining the
confidence of international bodies and the trust of the
international market. In turn, the confidence of international
bodies requires the enforcement of democracy and a more serious
observance of human rights as its conditionality. If this is the
case, Habibie should give his attention to Indonesia's domestic
political affairs, which means there will be no possibility for
him to give priority to economic and financial problems while
suspending for the time being political questions.

The difficulty faced by the president is that so many things
are uncertain. One cannot rely on the good intentions of the IMF
alone in view of the implementation of its aid until now. This
means, there are only very limited options for President Habibie
as far as national and international politics are concerned.

He can choose to settle domestic politics first to regain
international confidence, which is instrumental to the
improvement of monetary and economic conditions. This will come
true if the willingness of those international bodies to help
Indonesia is serious enough. If it is not the case it might be
too late for Habibie to overcome the economic crisis, which his
presidency might not survive as well.

He can take another option by concentrating on solving the
economic crisis while trying to persuade the international bodies
of the urgency of this action and the importance of economic
recovery as a material base on which to build democracy. This
might sound logical and reasonable and Habibie might mean it in
good faith. However, this argument lost all its validity and
persuasive power during the regime of Soeharto: 32 years of
economic development and yet no democracy at all. Nobody who has
a good memory will easily buy such an argument right after the
demise of the New Order, which used that argument merely to
maintain its power.

The only way out can be found if there is serious political
will from the present government to give a political guarantee.
Habibie will regain the confidence he needs from both the
Indonesian people and international bodies if he meets two
requirements. First, he has to demonstrate his determination to
overcome the present economic crisis. The political condition for
doing that in the form of political tranquility will be given him
if he can guarantee that the suspension of political rights will
only last for a short period of time. To make sure of this
guarantee, he has to, secondly, announce his unwillingness to be
reelected as president after the end of the present term in order
to rule out the suspicion that the requirement for a temporary
limitation of people's political rights is nothing but a mere
pretext.

I think if the requirements are fulfilled, there will be no
great hesitation among people and international bodies to give
their confidence. This comes as a personal sacrifice to President
Habibie. However, if he wants to salvage the country from
imminent economic collapse, there seems to be no other choice
than to sacrifice himself and his power upon the altar of
national and international politics. This is the price he has to
pay for regaining confidence, which in the present political and
economic situation has become a highly valuable commodity of
extreme scarcity. In so doing he will be out of politics but
welcome in Indonesian history.

Ignas Kleden is a sociologist based in Jakarta.