Habibie still has a chance

Habibie still has a chance

By Hermawan Sulistyo

JAKARTA (JP): Golkar's nomination of B.J. Habibie as its only
presidential candidate has sparked heated debates. But what are
his chances of winning the presidential seat? A glance at the
expected voting structures reveals the possibilities for the
presidential election, to take place in September or October.
This analysis focuses only on the hard facts of seat allocation
in the House of Representatives (DPR) and ignores intervening
variables such as the role of money politics.

In the elections, political parties are competing for 462
seats in the House, as 38 seats are already allocated for
representatives of the Indonesian Military (TNI). If a winner,
say the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI Perjuangan), could
garner 30 percent of the vote, then the party would secure about
160 seats. This is far from enough to secure the presidential
seat.

The president and vice president are elected by members of the
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) which has 700 seats. Thus,
in order to secure the presidential seat, a party needs at least
351 seats. Of course, this is not the minimum seat number
required to elect the president. If the DPR lacks a majority, the
winner of the elections may take the presidential seat at the MPR
sessions with a reduced number of seats.

A counterargument for the above assumption on the voting
structure would put forward the "fact" that out of 200 additional
MPR members, 135 seats are allocated to representatives of
regional legislatures. These representatives are elected by
members of the local legislatures. It must be emphasized that a
party's voting structure in the regions is not necessarily the
same as its vote structure at the national level. There is a high
possibility of differences between votes garnered for the DPR and
votes obtained for local (provincial and regional
administrations) legislatures (DPRD I and DPRD II). Thus, if PDI
Perjuangan wins 30 percent of the vote for the national DPR, the
party does not necessarily obtain the same percentage for
regional and provincial legislatures.

Who obtains the benefits from representatives of local
legislatures in the MPR? The answer is easy: Golkar. Golkar is
the only party with three-decades of solid infrastructure
backing, not to mention its financial standing.

Mayors (walikota), regents (bupati) and subdistrict heads
(camat) would prefer to stay with Golkar. Because of strong
public pressure, only a few will openly support Golkar. But they
themselves remain strong supporters of the party. It is not
possible that Golkar will win 50 seats for its regional
representatives to the MPR. If Golkar wins 25 percent of the
votes in the general election, the party would secure about 120
seats in the DPR. This means that in the MPR Golkar would have
170 seats.

In addition to the 135 seats for regional representatives in
the MPR, another 65 seats are allocated for appointed MPR
members. These members represent various "groups" in society. The
largest breakdown of this grouping is 20 seats for religious
leaders; the rest of the seats are distributed to intellectuals,
students, journalists, workers, farmers and others. This means
that Golkar could sweep another cluster of seats. The party would
at least save another 30 seats or even more with this prediction.
Without playing dirty, the system has generously provided Golkar
with more than 200 seats.

As mentioned before, Golkar relies for support mainly on the
regional administrations. Although the system does not use this
level of administration as the unit of constituency -- the
constituency is at the provincial level -- out of the 462 seats
up for grabs, 327 are regional-based allocations, with only 135
counted on the basis of a "pure" proportional system.

This ballot framework in turn will provide Golkar with ample
opportunities to mobilize its strongest support, that is the
regional administrations. The system itself will probably pave
the way for Golkar to win more than the moderate prediction of 25
percent of the vote. If this assumption proves true, then Golkar
will easily secure 250 votes.

With the ammunition of 250 seats in the MPR, Golkar would
still need a further 100 seats to obtain the majority seat
requirement of 351. Again, ignoring the possibility of money
politics in the MPR, Golkar may make a strategic alliance with
one or more factions within the MPR. The most probable partner
is, as expected, the military faction. Some small parties may
join Golkar's bandwagon, enticed by the offer of various
postings, such as positions other than that of Cabinet ministers.
There may be dozens of first-echelon positions available, such as
director generalships within the ministries. The military has
already secured 38 seats. From the local legislatures, this
faction may increase its standing to between 70 and 100 seats,
enough to support Golkar in its bid for the presidential seat.
Under this scheme, a Habibie-Wiranto partnership would make such
a strategic alliance profitable for both factions.

Understanding this possible pattern of voting brings us to the
conclusion that technically speaking Habibie has a high chance of
winning the presidential office. With the not unlikely addition
of money politics in the MPR -- a not unfamiliar practice for
Golkar -- the party will unfairly seize the new administration.

If this scenario takes place, there is only one possibility
left: prolonged and unending conflicts. The winning party in the
elections, let us say PDI Perjuangan, with 35 percent of the
votes will lose the battle. The party's supporters will not
accept the fact that they have been cheated in a "democratic
ballot." How come winning elections cannot mean winning an
administration? How come a popular vote that perhaps obtains 60
percent of the vote will only obtain 40 percent of seats in the
House?

Benefiting from such a "democratic system", Golkar must
nevertheless face a potential loss in these elections.
Considering an expectation that there will be no majority faction
in the MPR, the number of seats alone will not be enough to
secure the votes. MPR requires two-thirds of its members as a
quorum to vote. If several big parties, for example the National
Awakening Party (PKB), the National Mandate Party (PAN) and PDI
Perjuangan, along with one or two more parties, decide to walk
out of the MPR's ballot room, then a political deadlock will
become a reality. The situation will, in turn, provide more
disappointment for the masses, who have in the past suffered
disillusion with elections' results.

It would appear that the post-election period will be as
dangerous and potentially explosive as the pre-election dangers
of conflict. It also seems that, unfortunately, no effective
remedy is available to prevent such a situation. The best option
is then, to let political morality and ethics overcome the
temptation of power. Those who have failed in their service to
the nation should "quit", just as Soeharto did. In other words,
Habibie should reject his nomination as president. Otherwise, he
will be responsible for more blood stemming from future
conflicts.

Dr. Hermawan Sulistyo is executive director of the Research
Institute for Democracy and Peace, Jakarta.