Habibie still has a chance

By Hermawan Sulistyo

JAKARTA (JP): Golkar's nomination of B.J. Habibie as its only presidential candidate has sparked heated debates. But what are his chances of winning the presidential seat? A glance at the expected voting structures reveals the possibilities for the presidential election, to take place in September or October. This analysis focuses only on the hard facts of seat allocation in the House of Representatives (DPR) and ignores intervening variables such as the role of money politics.

In the elections, political parties are competing for 462 seats in the House, as 38 seats are already allocated for representatives of the Indonesian Military (TNI). If a winner, say the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI Perjuangan), could garner 30 percent of the vote, then the party would secure about 160 seats. This is far from enough to secure the presidential seat.

The president and vice president are elected by members of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) which has 700 seats. Thus, in order to secure the presidential seat, a party needs at least 351 seats. Of course, this is not the minimum seat number required to elect the president. If the DPR lacks a majority, the winner of the elections may take the presidential seat at the MPR sessions with a reduced number of seats.

A counterargument for the above assumption on the voting structure would put forward the "fact" that out of 200 additional MPR members, 135 seats are allocated to representatives of regional legislatures. These representatives are elected by members of the local legislatures. It must be emphasized that a party's voting structure in the regions is not necessarily the same as its vote structure at the national level. There is a high possibility of differences between votes garnered for the DPR and votes obtained for local (provincial and regional administrations) legislatures (DPRD I and DPRD II). Thus, if PDI Perjuangan wins 30 percent of the vote for the national DPR, the party does not necessarily obtain the same percentage for regional and provincial legislatures.

Who obtains the benefits from representatives of local legislatures in the MPR? The answer is easy: Golkar. Golkar is the only party with three-decades of solid infrastructure backing, not to mention its financial standing.

Mayors (walikota), regents (bupati) and subdistrict heads (camat) would prefer to stay with Golkar. Because of strong public pressure, only a few will openly support Golkar. But they themselves remain strong supporters of the party. It is not possible that Golkar will win 50 seats for its regional representatives to the MPR. If Golkar wins 25 percent of the votes in the general election, the party would secure about 120 seats in the DPR. This means that in the MPR Golkar would have 170 seats.

In addition to the 135 seats for regional representatives in the MPR, another 65 seats are allocated for appointed MPR members. These members represent various "groups" in society. The largest breakdown of this grouping is 20 seats for religious leaders; the rest of the seats are distributed to intellectuals, students, journalists, workers, farmers and others. This means that Golkar could sweep another cluster of seats. The party would at least save another 30 seats or even more with this prediction. Without playing dirty, the system has generously provided Golkar with more than 200 seats.

As mentioned before, Golkar relies for support mainly on the regional administrations. Although the system does not use this level of administration as the unit of constituency -- the constituency is at the provincial level -- out of the 462 seats up for grabs, 327 are regional-based allocations, with only 135 counted on the basis of a "pure" proportional system.

This ballot framework in turn will provide Golkar with ample opportunities to mobilize its strongest support, that is the regional administrations. The system itself will probably pave the way for Golkar to win more than the moderate prediction of 25 percent of the vote. If this assumption proves true, then Golkar will easily secure 250 votes.

With the ammunition of 250 seats in the MPR, Golkar would still need a further 100 seats to obtain the majority seat requirement of 351. Again, ignoring the possibility of money politics in the MPR, Golkar may make a strategic alliance with one or more factions within the MPR. The most probable partner is, as expected, the military faction. Some small parties may join Golkar's bandwagon, enticed by the offer of various postings, such as positions other than that of Cabinet ministers. There may be dozens of first-echelon positions available, such as director generalships within the ministries. The military has already secured 38 seats. From the local legislatures, this faction may increase its standing to between 70 and 100 seats, enough to support Golkar in its bid for the presidential seat. Under this scheme, a Habibie-Wiranto partnership would make such a strategic alliance profitable for both factions.

Understanding this possible pattern of voting brings us to the conclusion that technically speaking Habibie has a high chance of winning the presidential office. With the not unlikely addition of money politics in the MPR -- a not unfamiliar practice for Golkar -- the party will unfairly seize the new administration.

If this scenario takes place, there is only one possibility left: prolonged and unending conflicts. The winning party in the elections, let us say PDI Perjuangan, with 35 percent of the votes will lose the battle. The party's supporters will not accept the fact that they have been cheated in a "democratic ballot." How come winning elections cannot mean winning an administration? How come a popular vote that perhaps obtains 60 percent of the vote will only obtain 40 percent of seats in the House?

Benefiting from such a "democratic system", Golkar must nevertheless face a potential loss in these elections. Considering an expectation that there will be no majority faction in the MPR, the number of seats alone will not be enough to secure the votes. MPR requires two-thirds of its members as a quorum to vote. If several big parties, for example the National Awakening Party (PKB), the National Mandate Party (PAN) and PDI Perjuangan, along with one or two more parties, decide to walk out of the MPR's ballot room, then a political deadlock will become a reality. The situation will, in turn, provide more disappointment for the masses, who have in the past suffered disillusion with elections' results.

It would appear that the post-election period will be as dangerous and potentially explosive as the pre-election dangers of conflict. It also seems that, unfortunately, no effective remedy is available to prevent such a situation. The best option is then, to let political morality and ethics overcome the temptation of power. Those who have failed in their service to the nation should "quit", just as Soeharto did. In other words, Habibie should reject his nomination as president. Otherwise, he will be responsible for more blood stemming from future conflicts.

Dr. Hermawan Sulistyo is executive director of the Research Institute for Democracy and Peace, Jakarta.