Gus Dur's small 'r' reform

By Lesley McCulloch

CANBERRA (JP): It seems that with each day that passes, criticism of Indonesia's President Abdurrahman Wahid gains momentum. No one denies that many things are certainly different than they were 12 months ago -- and that these changes have been for the better -- but are they the changes that really matter?

Initial praise for the President's "bravery" in ousting key players in the government who were seen to be potential "roadblocks" to reform -- such as former coordinating minister for political affairs and security Gen. Wiranto -- has been waning in recent weeks.

Gus Dur, as the President is affectionately called, appears to be losing his embryonic and tenuous grip on two very important aspects of the reform agenda: the military and the economy.

Many people don't seem to understand that the two are inextricably linked. Military reform involves more than simply replacing key individuals with reformists.

The President needs to adopt an institutional approach to reform rather than an individual one. Indeed this may be beginning to happen with the recent announcement that plans are afoot to reform the military at territorial and village level -- although whether this will have any impact on "rogue" elements of the military who are accused of "non-government sanctioned" behavior in such outlying places as Aceh, Ambon and the Maluku islands is doubtful.

Add to this government-approved police and military action, such as the policy to "shoot on sight" nonmilitary elements carrying weapons on the legendary Spice Islands (Maluku), and the situation has all the ingredients for escalating violence which may very well spiral out of control.

It can safely be assumed that such a policy, following so closely on the East Timor fiasco, was sanctioned at the behest of the military.

Recent reports of military and police personnel fatally wounding "innocent bystanders" has led to a barrage of protest by international human rights organizations and others.

It remains to be seen whether the recently signed cease fire agreement on Aceh between the government and the separatist rebels due to come into effect June 2 is sustainable.

The link -- often overlooked -- is the role that the still powerful military has in the economy. The fact that the Indonesian Military (TNI) is involved in business activities is no secret. Business down the barrel of a gun is a practice as old as Indonesia itself.

It has been, and continues to be, extremely lucrative, both for the armed forces as an institution and for some well-placed individuals.

The military initially became involved in commercial activities because the government could not afford to provide for their welfare and running costs.

Since Gus Dur became President there has been little change. Regular salaries do not adequately provide for the basic needs of personnel. With prices spiraling, recent salary increases of on average 30 percent have made little difference.

While an inadequate defense budget remains the official rational for such "unorthodox" military activities, powerful vested interests (often individual) are at stake, but perhaps none more so than the very existence of the government itself.

In recognition of the need for a delicate balancing act, Gus Dur has warned against "anti-TNI" sentiment.

When defense minister Juwono Sudarsono requested late last year a 62.9 percent rise in this year's defense budget, there were few who thought the government, already financially strained, would comply.

However, it seemed reasonable to expect some increase as an indication of the commitment to "cleaning up" the pervasive corruption which surrounds the business activities of the armed forces.

No such increase was forthcoming. The defense budget for the current financial year, which extends for only nine months, stands at Rp10.1 trillion (about US$1.4 billion) -- a prorated version of the 1999 budget.

The government has said it must continue to accept the military's commercial activities, both as a method of individual personnel topping-up inadequate salaries and to boost the coffers of the budget for other expenditures.

The implicit acceptance by the government that there is also a "leakage" of resources to already wealthy individuals is disconcerting -- the amounts involved in such "unconventional" activities remains as much a mystery to the Indonesian government as it does to the observer.

As the country continues to languish in the aftermath of the economic crisis, and the recent fall in the rupiah by 10 percent in as many days keeps foreign investors away, reliance on these extra-budgetary sources of funding for the military may become even more vital.

An increase in the defense budget must be forthcoming if military development plans are to be fulfilled. Recent reports that one-third of all maritime piracy attacks in the first three months of this year took place in the busy straits around Indonesia has led Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Achmad Sutjipto to request the creation of a coast guard that would focus on piracy and smuggling.

In addition, he has announced plans to increase naval personnel by 20,000 over the next five years, and the intention to double the Navy's current at-sea capability.

Many of the vessels are close to their end-of-life date and should be replaced just to maintain present capabilities which Sutjipto and many observers maintain is wholly inadequate.

The President must not push the military offside. In many ways they are the only truly functioning government institution -- and are seen (by the government at least) to be the only hope of maintaining some semblance of order in the trouble spots of the vast archipelago.

While measures toward reform continue apace, one must not lose sight of the fact that it is "selective reform" -- and that until a fully functioning institutional change has been engaged, the military's role in the economy will remain.

The road to such far-reaching reform is fraught with danger; furthermore, it is a very long road indeed.

The writer is a researcher at the Bonn International Center for Conversion and is currently at the Australian National University in Canberra, studying the business activities of the Indonesian Military.