Gus Dur's small 'r' reform

Gus Dur's small 'r' reform

By Lesley McCulloch

CANBERRA (JP): It seems that with each day that passes,
criticism of Indonesia's President Abdurrahman Wahid gains
momentum. No one denies that many things are certainly different
than they were 12 months ago -- and that these changes have been
for the better -- but are they the changes that really matter?

Initial praise for the President's "bravery" in ousting key
players in the government who were seen to be potential
"roadblocks" to reform -- such as former coordinating minister
for political affairs and security Gen. Wiranto -- has been
waning in recent weeks.

Gus Dur, as the President is affectionately called, appears to
be losing his embryonic and tenuous grip on two very important
aspects of the reform agenda: the military and the economy.

Many people don't seem to understand that the two are
inextricably linked. Military reform involves more than simply
replacing key individuals with reformists.

The President needs to adopt an institutional approach to
reform rather than an individual one. Indeed this may be
beginning to happen with the recent announcement that plans are
afoot to reform the military at territorial and village level --
although whether this will have any impact on "rogue" elements of
the military who are accused of "non-government sanctioned"
behavior in such outlying places as Aceh, Ambon and the Maluku
islands is doubtful.

Add to this government-approved police and military action,
such as the policy to "shoot on sight" nonmilitary elements
carrying weapons on the legendary Spice Islands (Maluku), and the
situation has all the ingredients for escalating violence which
may very well spiral out of control.

It can safely be assumed that such a policy, following so
closely on the East Timor fiasco, was sanctioned at the behest of
the military.

Recent reports of military and police personnel fatally
wounding "innocent bystanders" has led to a barrage of protest by
international human rights organizations and others.

It remains to be seen whether the recently signed cease fire
agreement on Aceh between the government and the separatist
rebels due to come into effect June 2 is sustainable.

The link -- often overlooked -- is the role that the still
powerful military has in the economy. The fact that the
Indonesian Military (TNI) is involved in business activities is
no secret. Business down the barrel of a gun is a practice as old
as Indonesia itself.

It has been, and continues to be, extremely lucrative, both
for the armed forces as an institution and for some well-placed
individuals.

The military initially became involved in commercial
activities because the government could not afford to provide for
their welfare and running costs.

Since Gus Dur became President there has been little change.
Regular salaries do not adequately provide for the basic needs of
personnel. With prices spiraling, recent salary increases of on
average 30 percent have made little difference.

While an inadequate defense budget remains the official
rational for such "unorthodox" military activities, powerful
vested interests (often individual) are at stake, but perhaps
none more so than the very existence of the government itself.

In recognition of the need for a delicate balancing act, Gus
Dur has warned against "anti-TNI" sentiment.

When defense minister Juwono Sudarsono requested late last
year a 62.9 percent rise in this year's defense budget, there
were few who thought the government, already financially
strained, would comply.

However, it seemed reasonable to expect some increase as an
indication of the commitment to "cleaning up" the pervasive
corruption which surrounds the business activities of the armed
forces.

No such increase was forthcoming. The defense budget for the
current financial year, which extends for only nine months,
stands at Rp10.1 trillion (about US$1.4 billion) -- a prorated
version of the 1999 budget.

The government has said it must continue to accept the
military's commercial activities, both as a method of individual
personnel topping-up inadequate salaries and to boost the coffers
of the budget for other expenditures.

The implicit acceptance by the government that there is also a
"leakage" of resources to already wealthy individuals is
disconcerting -- the amounts involved in such "unconventional"
activities remains as much a mystery to the Indonesian government
as it does to the observer.

As the country continues to languish in the aftermath of the
economic crisis, and the recent fall in the rupiah by 10 percent
in as many days keeps foreign investors away, reliance on these
extra-budgetary sources of funding for the military may become
even more vital.

An increase in the defense budget must be forthcoming if
military development plans are to be fulfilled. Recent reports
that one-third of all maritime piracy attacks in the first three
months of this year took place in the busy straits around
Indonesia has led Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Achmad Sutjipto to
request the creation of a coast guard that would focus on piracy
and smuggling.

In addition, he has announced plans to increase naval
personnel by 20,000 over the next five years, and the intention
to double the Navy's current at-sea capability.

Many of the vessels are close to their end-of-life date and
should be replaced just to maintain present capabilities which
Sutjipto and many observers maintain is wholly inadequate.

The President must not push the military offside. In many ways
they are the only truly functioning government institution -- and
are seen (by the government at least) to be the only hope of
maintaining some semblance of order in the trouble spots of the
vast archipelago.

While measures toward reform continue apace, one must not lose
sight of the fact that it is "selective reform" -- and that until
a fully functioning institutional change has been engaged, the
military's role in the economy will remain.

The road to such far-reaching reform is fraught with danger;
furthermore, it is a very long road indeed.

The writer is a researcher at the Bonn International Center for
Conversion and is currently at the Australian National University
in Canberra, studying the business activities of the Indonesian
Military.