Gus Dur's gamble
Gus Dur's gamble
Tension has escalated in Aceh and Irian Jaya in recent weeks
after the adoption of a tougher approach by the government in its
dealings with secessionist demands in both provinces. But the
government is taking a big gamble in clamping down on
independence supporters, including by resorting to the use of
force, irrespective of whether they are fighting with arms or
words.
Like all gambles, this one is not without risks. In the last
two weeks, we have seen more bloody clashes in both Irian Jaya
and Aceh, and more casualties on both sides of the row.
Tragically, many innocent civilians are caught in the middle. And
we have seen the government arresting leaders of the independence
movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya, even as they were preaching
nonviolent means in their struggle for freedom.
This is a major departure from the more conciliatory approach
which President Abdurrahman Wahid had used in the first 12 months
of his leadership in dealing with separatist demands. Open
expressions for separation or independence were then tolerated as
long as they were done peacefully and did not call for an armed
rebellion. This led to the political rally of more than one
million people demanding a referendum of self-determination in
Aceh in November 1999, and the Papuan people's conference to
assert their demand for independence in Irian Jaya in May 2000.
Such tolerance now seems to have disappeared as the hard-
liners in the government and in the Indonesian Military have
seized the initiatives away from President Abdurrahman. The
referendum rally in Aceh and the Papuan people's conference in
Irian Jaya must have alarmed many people in Jakarta as they
showed the extent of the support for independence in the two
provinces.
By raising the specter of national disintegration if such
separatist aspirations were further allowed in the open, the
hardliners in the government and in the military seem to have
gained the upper hand. They have now managed to persuade the
President to adopt a stronger stance in facing such demands.
National unity, security and territorial integrity are now once
again the overriding concern of the government, so much so to the
point of suppressing people's democratic rights.
The trouble with this approach is that it had been tried
before and it had failed miserably. Rather than reducing the
demand for independence, this "security approach" in the past
strengthened the aspiration of the people in the regions. The
human casualty that resulted from this approach, particularly
from human rights violations by the security apparatus, drove
more people into the fold of the independence cause. The large
support which the separatist movements today enjoy among the
populace in Aceh and Irian Jaya emanated largely from the
repressive policies of the past regime of president Soeharto.
The government of President Abdurrahman Wahid is now about to
commit exactly the same mistake that Soeharto's tyrannical regime
made in Irian Jaya, Aceh and in East Timor. The expensive lessons
of East Timor seem to have been completely forgotten by the
current administration: that the use of force is an almost sure
recipe for disaster. And since history has a tendency to repeat
itself, at this rate, we are sure to lose the two provinces, with
all the dire consequences for the nation.
By taking a tough stance in both Irian Jaya and Aceh, and by
arresting the proindependence leaders, the government has
eliminated the middle ground where independence supporters could
fight for their cause in a peaceful and democratic way. With this
ground eliminated, these fighters and their supporters would go
underground, and probably even join the armed rebellion. When
they do, it will be hard to draw them to the negotiating tables.
Unless the government stopped the current clampdown in both
Aceh and Irian Jaya, tension in both provinces would soon develop
into full-scale, and probably protracted, conflicts. This will be
a war that Indonesia will find hard to win. The debacle in East
Timor should have taught us by now that you cannot win a war when
you fight against underground or guerrilla forces.
In the meantime, the Indonesian security apparatus, as a
Reuters photo (which appeared on the front page of this newspaper
on Monday) of a police armored vehicle on a street in Aceh
showed, is looking more and more like an unwelcome occupation
force. This looks like a gamble that President Abdurrahman Wahid
should never have taken because it is not going to pay off.