Gus Dur's gamble

Tension has escalated in Aceh and Irian Jaya in recent weeks after the adoption of a tougher approach by the government in its dealings with secessionist demands in both provinces. But the government is taking a big gamble in clamping down on independence supporters, including by resorting to the use of force, irrespective of whether they are fighting with arms or words.

Like all gambles, this one is not without risks. In the last two weeks, we have seen more bloody clashes in both Irian Jaya and Aceh, and more casualties on both sides of the row. Tragically, many innocent civilians are caught in the middle. And we have seen the government arresting leaders of the independence movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya, even as they were preaching nonviolent means in their struggle for freedom.

This is a major departure from the more conciliatory approach which President Abdurrahman Wahid had used in the first 12 months of his leadership in dealing with separatist demands. Open expressions for separation or independence were then tolerated as long as they were done peacefully and did not call for an armed rebellion. This led to the political rally of more than one million people demanding a referendum of self-determination in Aceh in November 1999, and the Papuan people's conference to assert their demand for independence in Irian Jaya in May 2000.

Such tolerance now seems to have disappeared as the hard- liners in the government and in the Indonesian Military have seized the initiatives away from President Abdurrahman. The referendum rally in Aceh and the Papuan people's conference in Irian Jaya must have alarmed many people in Jakarta as they showed the extent of the support for independence in the two provinces.

By raising the specter of national disintegration if such separatist aspirations were further allowed in the open, the hardliners in the government and in the military seem to have gained the upper hand. They have now managed to persuade the President to adopt a stronger stance in facing such demands. National unity, security and territorial integrity are now once again the overriding concern of the government, so much so to the point of suppressing people's democratic rights.

The trouble with this approach is that it had been tried before and it had failed miserably. Rather than reducing the demand for independence, this "security approach" in the past strengthened the aspiration of the people in the regions. The human casualty that resulted from this approach, particularly from human rights violations by the security apparatus, drove more people into the fold of the independence cause. The large support which the separatist movements today enjoy among the populace in Aceh and Irian Jaya emanated largely from the repressive policies of the past regime of president Soeharto.

The government of President Abdurrahman Wahid is now about to commit exactly the same mistake that Soeharto's tyrannical regime made in Irian Jaya, Aceh and in East Timor. The expensive lessons of East Timor seem to have been completely forgotten by the current administration: that the use of force is an almost sure recipe for disaster. And since history has a tendency to repeat itself, at this rate, we are sure to lose the two provinces, with all the dire consequences for the nation.

By taking a tough stance in both Irian Jaya and Aceh, and by arresting the proindependence leaders, the government has eliminated the middle ground where independence supporters could fight for their cause in a peaceful and democratic way. With this ground eliminated, these fighters and their supporters would go underground, and probably even join the armed rebellion. When they do, it will be hard to draw them to the negotiating tables.

Unless the government stopped the current clampdown in both Aceh and Irian Jaya, tension in both provinces would soon develop into full-scale, and probably protracted, conflicts. This will be a war that Indonesia will find hard to win. The debacle in East Timor should have taught us by now that you cannot win a war when you fight against underground or guerrilla forces.

In the meantime, the Indonesian security apparatus, as a Reuters photo (which appeared on the front page of this newspaper on Monday) of a police armored vehicle on a street in Aceh showed, is looking more and more like an unwelcome occupation force. This looks like a gamble that President Abdurrahman Wahid should never have taken because it is not going to pay off.