Gus Dur will end standoff in his own way

President Abdurrahman Wahid has yet to return from an overseas tour in which his statements have made waves at home. The Jakarta Post talked to lecturer in politics Pratikno from Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta on the likely outcome of the President's standoff with former Indonesian Military commander Gen. Wiranto.

Question: Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security Gen. Wiranto has not stated his willingness to resign as requested by President Abdurrahman Wahid. How do you view the likely outcome?

Answer: I think it's just a matter of time (but) Wiranto and his friends feel they must stall to make a deal (with the President). The President will still ask him to resign in line with his earlier commitment, that whoever (in the Cabinet) becomes a suspect in a case must resign temporarily until legal proceedings are over.

Wiranto would not resign in a hurry because that would give the impression of an indirect confession of guilt to charges in the investigation results of the government-sanctioned Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations (KPP HAM) in East Timor.

Would you say Gen. Wiranto has strong support within the Indonesian Military (TNI) to strengthen his bargaining position with the President?

The continuous sharpening of friction within TNI since Soeharto quit the presidency is logical because the high-ranking officers were used to the need for competition to be able to get close to the center of power, or Soeharto himself.

That was the consequence of a centralistic leadership based on patronage. When Soeharto was still in power, this competition had no serious impact on factionalism within the armed forces because competition was considered over the minute Soeharto issued a decision.

But when the patron fell, the implication regarding factions within the military became long term and serious. The most concrete example is the friction between the then chief of the Army's Strategic Reserves Command, Lt. Gen. Prabowo, with Wiranto who was then TNI Commander.

With TNI in such a condition, I'm not sure that Wiranto can gather enough solid support from most officers. Friction increased when the military was faced with the wave of reform, where democratization meant the supremacy of civilians over the military. TNI is now surrounded in all corners to the extent that it cannot say no to this process of civilian supremacy.

The process has been responded to by TNI's elite, as is evident from the division of "reformist" and "nonreformist" officers.

However, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that those in the "reformist" camp are not all truly reformist. In general, TNI inevitably has to support the civil supremacy process, but some of these so-called reformists have either entered this camp because all this time they were marginal in the armed forces, or because they were little dependent on the old system.

So many among those supporting the above process would not sacrifice much of their own interest. Instead, they could be saved and seek a way to promote themselves.

What about the "nonreformists"?

The same (regarding interests) applies; most of them are the TNI elite which resisted the process of civilian supremacy because it would hurt their personal interests. Resistance should also be expected from those who are on the recommended list of those to be investigated further, which was drawn up by KPP HAM in East Timor.

If Wiranto and other officers on that list were to go to court, should we expect widespread rebellion within the armed forces, or even a coup?

Again, I am far from sure that anyone can garner enough strength in TNI to conduct a coup. Besides, those thinking of a coup against the government of President Abdurrahman Wahid and Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri would have to rationally take into account the extraordinary resistance from the lower class and particularly those among them who support these leaders.

TNI must also be realistic in the sense that it is now besieged by political developments at the national and international level which are against their further dabbling in politics.

The domestic public has expressed antipathy toward military dominance in politics during recent decades. At the international level, a "global constitution" has been formed which no longer provides space for military politics. And last, the economic crisis has much reduced the military's ambition for power.

If a desire for a coup was there, it would surely only be among a small group of hard-line TNI elites supporting the military status quo. The rest of the military elite would have to think the option of a coup is ridiculous because it would mean helping the interest of a small, elite group to retain TNI's position in the midst of public antipathy; while a coup at this time would carry a very high risk.

What I am worried about is the possible heightened corps feeling among the lower ranks, particularly within the Army. The struggle between pro and antireform officers is a debate among the elite which has clear implications on TNI's position and its political consequences.

But all this is not important among the lower ranks.

I fear the development of factions will lead to social and political restlessness among the lower ranks which could have serious implications.

They could become passive in the face of real security problems like riots and crime. This could lead to a collapse of so many basic tenets of democracy.

Do you mean Wiranto could get the support of the lower ranks?

No, I mean that the trial on rights violations against Wiranto and the others shows the supremacy of the human rights issue over the application of state power by the military. That even those with legal authority to use their power can be brought to trial over human rights.

This could cause deep anxiety among the middle to lower ranks of the military because they might think that if a general can be tried in court, then a lower ranked soldier would be much more vulnerable.

What stand should the government then take on the issue of the human rights court?

There should be clarity on which rights violations were preventable but conducted, and which were inevitable. That's only my view. Because many people and members of the military think that Wiranto's fault would have been one that only came with his former position as TNI commander, that anyone in his place would make the same alleged mistakes.

This perception would mean an institutional violation of human rights by TNI, which would mean bringing the military to court through the trial and conviction of Wiranto.

So there must be clarity that the human rights court (against Wiranto) is not the same as a trial of TNI.

But actually ... we don't really know whether we really have the human rights tribunal. I'm sure the plan will be interrupted by lengthy debates -- political and legal -- on the draft bill of the human rights tribunal, especially on whether it can be applied retroactively after it is passed.

On the other hand many parties -- both within the military and civilian officials -- have an interest against the law being able to be applied retroactively.

How do you view President Abdurrahman's stance toward this human rights tribunal?

Gus Dur's (Abdurrahman) administration still looks "moderate". He would not harshly consider Wiranto either entirely guilty or a loser, although he has enough power to take firm action against the generals implicated (by KPP HAM) in the rights violations.

I think Gus Dur's methods will be almost like his way in "consolidating" his administration further, in a gradual manner, in line with the theory that this administration is a transitional one which would not conduct a major replacement of the old regime. Rather, we would see a gradual "trans-placement".

Gus Dur will use his diplomatic skills and international acceptance of him to best possible effect, to enable a local human rights tribunal (rather than an international one). He does not want human rights issues to be a burden on the government, and what is more important is that having a domestic tribunal would lead to a trial which could be managed better in a political, not in a legal, sense.

Gus Dur also knows that the West has a double standard regarding human rights, so it seems like this matter will be settled "in Gus Dur's way". (Asip Agus Hasani)