Gus Dur will end standoff in his own way

Gus Dur will end standoff in his own way

President Abdurrahman Wahid has yet to return from an overseas
tour in which his statements have made waves at home. The Jakarta
Post talked to lecturer in politics Pratikno from Gadjah Mada
University in Yogyakarta on the likely outcome of the President's
standoff with former Indonesian Military commander Gen. Wiranto.

Question: Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and
Security Gen. Wiranto has not stated his willingness to resign as
requested by President Abdurrahman Wahid. How do you view the
likely outcome?

Answer: I think it's just a matter of time (but) Wiranto and
his friends feel they must stall to make a deal (with the
President). The President will still ask him to resign in line
with his earlier commitment, that whoever (in the Cabinet)
becomes a suspect in a case must resign temporarily until legal
proceedings are over.

Wiranto would not resign in a hurry because that would give
the impression of an indirect confession of guilt to charges in
the investigation results of the government-sanctioned Commission
of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations (KPP HAM) in East Timor.

Would you say Gen. Wiranto has strong support within the
Indonesian Military (TNI) to strengthen his bargaining position
with the President?

The continuous sharpening of friction within TNI since
Soeharto quit the presidency is logical because the high-ranking
officers were used to the need for competition to be able to get
close to the center of power, or Soeharto himself.

That was the consequence of a centralistic leadership based on
patronage. When Soeharto was still in power, this competition had
no serious impact on factionalism within the armed forces because
competition was considered over the minute Soeharto issued a
decision.

But when the patron fell, the implication regarding factions
within the military became long term and serious. The most
concrete example is the friction between the then chief of the
Army's Strategic Reserves Command, Lt. Gen. Prabowo, with Wiranto
who was then TNI Commander.

With TNI in such a condition, I'm not sure that Wiranto can
gather enough solid support from most officers. Friction
increased when the military was faced with the wave of reform,
where democratization meant the supremacy of civilians over the
military. TNI is now surrounded in all corners to the extent that
it cannot say no to this process of civilian supremacy.

The process has been responded to by TNI's elite, as is
evident from the division of "reformist" and "nonreformist"
officers.

However, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that those in
the "reformist" camp are not all truly reformist. In general, TNI
inevitably has to support the civil supremacy process, but some
of these so-called reformists have either entered this camp
because all this time they were marginal in the armed forces, or
because they were little dependent on the old system.

So many among those supporting the above process would not
sacrifice much of their own interest. Instead, they could be
saved and seek a way to promote themselves.

What about the "nonreformists"?

The same (regarding interests) applies; most of them are the
TNI elite which resisted the process of civilian supremacy
because it would hurt their personal interests. Resistance should
also be expected from those who are on the recommended list of
those to be investigated further, which was drawn up by KPP HAM
in East Timor.

If Wiranto and other officers on that list were to go to
court, should we expect widespread rebellion within the armed
forces, or even a coup?

Again, I am far from sure that anyone can garner enough
strength in TNI to conduct a coup. Besides, those thinking of a
coup against the government of President Abdurrahman Wahid and
Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri would have to rationally
take into account the extraordinary resistance from the lower
class and particularly those among them who support these
leaders.

TNI must also be realistic in the sense that it is now
besieged by political developments at the national and
international level which are against their further dabbling in
politics.

The domestic public has expressed antipathy toward military
dominance in politics during recent decades. At the international
level, a "global constitution" has been formed which no longer
provides space for military politics. And last, the economic
crisis has much reduced the military's ambition for power.

If a desire for a coup was there, it would surely only be
among a small group of hard-line TNI elites supporting the
military status quo. The rest of the military elite would have to
think the option of a coup is ridiculous because it would mean
helping the interest of a small, elite group to retain TNI's
position in the midst of public antipathy; while a coup at this
time would carry a very high risk.

What I am worried about is the possible heightened corps
feeling among the lower ranks, particularly within the Army. The
struggle between pro and antireform officers is a debate among
the elite which has clear implications on TNI's position and its
political consequences.

But all this is not important among the lower ranks.

I fear the development of factions will lead to social and
political restlessness among the lower ranks which could have
serious implications.

They could become passive in the face of real security
problems like riots and crime. This could lead to a collapse of
so many basic tenets of democracy.

Do you mean Wiranto could get the support of the lower ranks?

No, I mean that the trial on rights violations against Wiranto
and the others shows the supremacy of the human rights issue over
the application of state power by the military. That even those
with legal authority to use their power can be brought to trial
over human rights.

This could cause deep anxiety among the middle to lower ranks
of the military because they might think that if a general can be
tried in court, then a lower ranked soldier would be much more
vulnerable.

What stand should the government then take on the issue of the
human rights court?

There should be clarity on which rights violations were
preventable but conducted, and which were inevitable. That's only
my view. Because many people and members of the military think
that Wiranto's fault would have been one that only came with his
former position as TNI commander, that anyone in his place would
make the same alleged mistakes.

This perception would mean an institutional violation of human
rights by TNI, which would mean bringing the military to court
through the trial and conviction of Wiranto.

So there must be clarity that the human rights court (against
Wiranto) is not the same as a trial of TNI.

But actually ... we don't really know whether we really have
the human rights tribunal. I'm sure the plan will be interrupted
by lengthy debates -- political and legal -- on the draft bill of
the human rights tribunal, especially on whether it can be
applied retroactively after it is passed.

On the other hand many parties -- both within the military and
civilian officials -- have an interest against the law being able
to be applied retroactively.

How do you view President Abdurrahman's stance toward this
human rights tribunal?

Gus Dur's (Abdurrahman) administration still looks "moderate".
He would not harshly consider Wiranto either entirely guilty or a
loser, although he has enough power to take firm action against
the generals implicated (by KPP HAM) in the rights violations.

I think Gus Dur's methods will be almost like his way in
"consolidating" his administration further, in a gradual manner,
in line with the theory that this administration is a
transitional one which would not conduct a major replacement of
the old regime. Rather, we would see a gradual "trans-placement".

Gus Dur will use his diplomatic skills and international
acceptance of him to best possible effect, to enable a local
human rights tribunal (rather than an international one). He does
not want human rights issues to be a burden on the government,
and what is more important is that having a domestic tribunal
would lead to a trial which could be managed better in a
political, not in a legal, sense.

Gus Dur also knows that the West has a double standard
regarding human rights, so it seems like this matter will be
settled "in Gus Dur's way". (Asip Agus Hasani)