Gus Dur vs 'the Green Dragon'
Gus Dur vs 'the Green Dragon'
By Nuruddin Amin
JAKARTA (JP): The existence of intelligence operations between
political parties has been a rumor for some time. The Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU) conferences of both 1994 and 1995, and the internal
strife of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) were subject to
the rumors. The intelligence operations were said to have put
into motion the Red Dragon and the Green Dragon.
It is hard to know who were behind these operations.
Information on high-level political behavior is usually closely
guarded, although it is always reflected by the political event
that has taken place. There are usually two things that can be
focused in the context of current political violence.
First, intelligence operations are linked to the conflict of
multipolar power elite interests. The military, bureaucratic,
Islamic and other elite groups are not on a single power line.
Various factions exist in the political groups. These factions
interact in a multipolar political collaboration.
A certain political event can be a political project of a
multipolar collaboration. It is hard to detect the actor behind
the event, because this type of political collaboration is very
unstable. There is a great possibility that responsibility will
be pushed onto others and cheating among factions may shift
political alliances in a very short time.
Second, the case of the Red Dragon and the Green Dragon was
linked to rumors that Megawati Soekarnoputri and Abdurrahman
Wahid, who is popularly known as Gus Dur, were seen as
troublemakers for the political mechanism created toward the
national succession. Political elite factions are interested in
the succession process which will take place through the 1998
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) meeting.
Megawati is a symbol of change and people power, while Gus Dur
through his concept of Khittah Nahdliyyah (basic principles of
NU), is deemed to make the jama'ah nahdliyyah (NU members) the
basis of an efficient civil society. These political signs
endanger the status quo because of the capability of the two
figures to move the forces of grassroots politics.
The process of unsettling Megawati through the Red Dragon
operation took place smoothly despite people's strong resistance
to maintain commitment to the eldest daughter of the late
president Sukarno who is said to be at the helm of the future
national leadership. It was different with the Green Dragon
operation, which saw every effort to unseat Gus Dur. But his
authority and political legitimacy have taken root, covering NU,
intellectual circles, activists, NGOs, and religious circles of
all faiths. It is this authority and political legitimacy that a
grand-scale political scenario tries to tear into tatters.
If it is true that the Situbondo and Tasikmalaya riots were
linked to the Green Dragon operation, there was apparently a
political conspiracy behind the grand scenario, which has various
targets. The targets point to which political factions'
collaboration were behind the current political violence. There
are at least three identifiable targets.
First, President Soeharto's power is a target. Political
violence in various regions including the capital city, which
includes elements of religion and race is a distant target to
delegitimatize the President's power by creating political
instability until the general election and the People's
Consultative Assembly meeting. This political violence is in
protest against the long repression, the social, political and
economic disparities which have become very acute and the demands
for accommodating certain political factions.
It would be naive to say that political violence in a number
of provinces was only spontaneous religious, racial or ethnic
ruptures. The pattern of the mass movements, the issues raised
and the targets of violence strongly indicate long-term political
engineering. Accurate reading of the political symptoms show that
political violence will continue and accompany the most sacred
political ritual: the 1997 general election and the 1998 People's
Consultative Assembly meeting. It is fairly certain that national
political instability targets Soeharto's power. If this analysis
is correct, it is only a result of the competition of the second-
layer political elite.
Second, the basis of ICMI's power is a target. The
Islamization of political discourse on a wide scale in the past
decade has made a number of political elite factions feel
oppressively uncomfortable. It is a public secret that the
political elite of the pre-1980s was dominated by the first
political generation based on nationalist-secular and abangan
(nominal Moslem) circles established in alliance with the old
equilibrium. When things shifted toward the establishment of the
new equilibrium based on modernist Moslem circles, tensions arose
between the second political generation and the first political
generation.
It is likely that political violence combined with religious
and racial issues are part of this tension. This tension can be
explained from two perspectives.
The theological perspective says there are still religious and
racial prejudices which are not clear between the first and
second political generations.
The economic and political perspective says a sharp disparity
exists between the two groups. The tension reached its momentum
with the establishment of a new equilibrium dominated by the
second political generation from modernist Moslem circles. If
this logic is valid, ICMI can become a target and a scapegoat.
Third, Gus Dur's power base is a target. As a political
troublemaker and a traditional Moslem power exponent who has been
alienated from the power elite, there is enough reason for Gus
Dur and his power base to become a target. Given the rupture of
the old equilibrium and the tension with the new equilibrium, Gus
Dur as the political leader of the traditional Moslem group
(third political generation), has limited access to the formal
power and has an alliance with the first political generation.
This alliance of power then obtained relevance through two
factors. When the second generation modernist Moslems held power
through political representation, it was considered boasting by
traditionalist Moslems, so the third political generation
obtained a point of interest with the first political generation
to set up an alliance.
The power alliance also met on issues of democracy, pluralism
and inter-religious dialog. At the point targets were released,
traditional Moslems (NU) were considered targets of political
violence given the elements of religion and race.
This may help in determining what interest and who is behind
the current spate of political violence. Of course, the answer is
never black and white. The hostility between Gus Dur and Adi
Sasono on the mastermind behind the Tasikmalaya riot points to a
greater political scenario. But on the other hand, Gus Dur
apparently has a strong wish to save NU members from a political
game full of camouflage. It is hoped Gus Dur will not be trapped
in a political scenario outside himself.
The writer is a member of the Institute of Islamic and Social
Studies and secretary of the provincial branch of Nahdlatul Ulama
in Yogyakarta.
Window: The process of unsettling Megawati through the Red Dragon
operation took place smoothly despite people's strong resistance
to maintain commitment...