Gus Dur struggles to control TNI

Gus Dur struggles to control TNI

By Kusnanto Anggoro

JAKARTA (JP): There has been a "retreat of the generals"
brought about by the downfall of Soeharto, international pressure,
and the rise of the "democratic wave".

President Abdurrahman Wahid may have brought the military
under civilian control. Nonetheless, a struggle for civil
supremacy is still perilous and uncertain.

In fact, the legislature recently passed a law prohibiting
retroactivity in prosecuting human rights abuses, and reinstated
automatic seats in the legislative body to the military.

President Abdurrahman may have been in a more difficult
position than he was in the past. Ten months after the dismissal
of Gen. Wiranto in February this year, he is struggling for
authority over the military.

Hard-liners in the military remain hard nuts to crack. Yet,
Abdurrahman's loyalists seems to be ineffective. Continuing
conflict in many areas may even open new opportunities for the
military to play a role; and having inexperienced non-military
people leading the military could well be a disaster.

Times could not be worse for the President. Many in the
military are still living in the romantic revolutionary past,
when troops faced the enemy alongside civilians. This culture and
self-image appears to be a self-imposed restriction for reform.
"Professionalism" has a different meaning to different people.

Discussions on reforming the military doctrine are going
nowhere. Institutional adjustment, such as the separation of the
police from the military command, is creating more problems than
solutions. The military is becoming a disoriented entity.

Besides, the military, especially the Army, are now the target
of ire over their alleged involvement in many regional conflicts.
One of their leaders was charged with counterfeiting money to
finance the pro-integration East Timorese militia during the
referendum for self determination last August.

Still, further investigation of the attack on the headquarters
of the Indonesian Democratic Party in 1996 may incriminate many
more high-ranking officers. Rouge military elements might be
behind the campaign of terror, including the bomb blast at the
Jakarta Stock Exchange and the assassination of a leading
candidate for the governor's post in Aceh. The military seems to
be demoralized.

More importantly, there is a situation of chaos in the
military line of command. In many regions, soldiers were just too
emotionally involved, partly because of inadequate logistics
support and of "rivalry" or miscoordination with the regional
Army.

The officers at the top have no way of controlling involvement
of junior officers and troops. The military headquarters is
already running out of steam, distracted by crises, including
long separatist rebellions in Aceh and West Papua.

The "men on horseback", or people in uniform, are in distress
given the need to redefine their role in post-Soeharto Indonesia.
They are no longer a single, cohesive body. The dual function
doctrine has given more benefits to the Army than to the Air
Force and the Navy.

Business activities in which military institutions have been
involved have benefited some generals but not the soldiers.
Vertical mobility was hardly on meritocratic consideration.
Esprit de corps and the corporate nature are now gone.

However, President Abdurrahman is in no better position.
Previously credited with reining in the military, he is looking
less able to keep the peace -- beset by his future war with the
legislature and his own "drunken master style" of maneuvering.

Many realize that his survival depends on negotiating a deal
between his elite and the old regime, in the civilian and
military quarters. In the case of terrorist acts allegedly
involving military members, Abdurrahman has authorized military
chief Admiral Widodo to break through barriers and to resolve the
problem institutionally. So far, it has not worked.

It is a big question mark whether the President will be able
to capitalize on the Army's disorientation to consolidate power
to himself, for example, in the next military reshuffle, likely
to take place in early October.

It looks like a two-level game of chicken. A demoralized,
disoriented, and crumbling line of command in the military has
made President Abdurrahman afraid of diminishing his own power by
issuing orders that are not obeyed.

A clear plan is needed; otherwise, his back-and-forth strategy
will not be effective in bargaining for a win-win solution.
Without public support, and perhaps even extra-constitutional
courage, the President may have no other choice but to avoid
confrontation with the military.

The writer is a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies who teaches at the postgraduate studies
program at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.