Gus Dur struggles to control TNI

By Kusnanto Anggoro

JAKARTA (JP): There has been a "retreat of the generals" brought about by the downfall of Soeharto, international pressure, and the rise of the "democratic wave".

President Abdurrahman Wahid may have brought the military under civilian control. Nonetheless, a struggle for civil supremacy is still perilous and uncertain.

In fact, the legislature recently passed a law prohibiting retroactivity in prosecuting human rights abuses, and reinstated automatic seats in the legislative body to the military.

President Abdurrahman may have been in a more difficult position than he was in the past. Ten months after the dismissal of Gen. Wiranto in February this year, he is struggling for authority over the military.

Hard-liners in the military remain hard nuts to crack. Yet, Abdurrahman's loyalists seems to be ineffective. Continuing conflict in many areas may even open new opportunities for the military to play a role; and having inexperienced non-military people leading the military could well be a disaster.

Times could not be worse for the President. Many in the military are still living in the romantic revolutionary past, when troops faced the enemy alongside civilians. This culture and self-image appears to be a self-imposed restriction for reform. "Professionalism" has a different meaning to different people.

Discussions on reforming the military doctrine are going nowhere. Institutional adjustment, such as the separation of the police from the military command, is creating more problems than solutions. The military is becoming a disoriented entity.

Besides, the military, especially the Army, are now the target of ire over their alleged involvement in many regional conflicts. One of their leaders was charged with counterfeiting money to finance the pro-integration East Timorese militia during the referendum for self determination last August.

Still, further investigation of the attack on the headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic Party in 1996 may incriminate many more high-ranking officers. Rouge military elements might be behind the campaign of terror, including the bomb blast at the Jakarta Stock Exchange and the assassination of a leading candidate for the governor's post in Aceh. The military seems to be demoralized.

More importantly, there is a situation of chaos in the military line of command. In many regions, soldiers were just too emotionally involved, partly because of inadequate logistics support and of "rivalry" or miscoordination with the regional Army.

The officers at the top have no way of controlling involvement of junior officers and troops. The military headquarters is already running out of steam, distracted by crises, including long separatist rebellions in Aceh and West Papua.

The "men on horseback", or people in uniform, are in distress given the need to redefine their role in post-Soeharto Indonesia. They are no longer a single, cohesive body. The dual function doctrine has given more benefits to the Army than to the Air Force and the Navy.

Business activities in which military institutions have been involved have benefited some generals but not the soldiers. Vertical mobility was hardly on meritocratic consideration. Esprit de corps and the corporate nature are now gone.

However, President Abdurrahman is in no better position. Previously credited with reining in the military, he is looking less able to keep the peace -- beset by his future war with the legislature and his own "drunken master style" of maneuvering.

Many realize that his survival depends on negotiating a deal between his elite and the old regime, in the civilian and military quarters. In the case of terrorist acts allegedly involving military members, Abdurrahman has authorized military chief Admiral Widodo to break through barriers and to resolve the problem institutionally. So far, it has not worked.

It is a big question mark whether the President will be able to capitalize on the Army's disorientation to consolidate power to himself, for example, in the next military reshuffle, likely to take place in early October.

It looks like a two-level game of chicken. A demoralized, disoriented, and crumbling line of command in the military has made President Abdurrahman afraid of diminishing his own power by issuing orders that are not obeyed.

A clear plan is needed; otherwise, his back-and-forth strategy will not be effective in bargaining for a win-win solution. Without public support, and perhaps even extra-constitutional courage, the President may have no other choice but to avoid confrontation with the military.

The writer is a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies who teaches at the postgraduate studies program at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.