Gulf crisis: Subcontracting the UN

By Hasan Kleib

CANBERRA (JP): A solution to the protracted Gulf crisis in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait eight years ago remains elusive as military threats of the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq are still on the table.

In the recent stand-off between Iraq and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) for weapons inspection, the use of force by the coalition was imminent.

It is very interesting to note that diplomats and journalists started to refer to the crisis more as Iraq versus the U.S.-led coalition, rather than Iraq versus the UN. Regardless of the coalition's claims that it is between Iraq and the international community, the fact is that the game is played primarily by Iraq and the U.S.-led coalition. This ambiguity has contributed greatly to the prolonged impasse in the deliberation in the UN Security Council (UNSC) on the crippling UN sanctions against Iraq. It also split the UNSC recently on weapons-related documents requested by the UNSCOM.

The delicate problem in the Gulf crisis is derived from the subcontracting of the UN to the multinational forces. In the post-Cold War era, the UNSC, after failing to insert peace- enforcement elements in UN peace-keeping operations, has been contracting the use of force out to UN member states.

It was based on resolution 678 of 1990 that the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized UN member states to take "all necessary means" to uphold and implement UNSC resolutions on Iraq. That was the beginning of the contract between the UN with the U.S.-led coalition.

The basic difference between UN peace-keeping operations and multinational forces lies in the command and control of forces. In UN peace-keeping operations, the action is under the command of the UN secretary-general based on authority delegated to him by the UNSC. While in the multinational forces, the action is carried out under the command and control of one or more UN member state that has been authorized by the UNSC.

The authorization or privatization of UNSC enforcement measures comes at a considerable cost to the integrity and legitimacy of the process of international peace and security maintenance.

* Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides that the UNSC, rather than individual member states, has the authority to decide when and how to use military force. If the UNSC recommends member states to take "all necessary measures" and states to act on the recommendation, the decision will rest on the states, not the UNSC. By delegating the power to member states, the UNSC has no doubt ignored its responsibility and relinquished its defining role under the UN Charter. Instead of carrying out military actions by itself, the UNSC "hires out" the work to individual states.

* Authorization to member states principally does not mean that the UNSC should release its responsibility to the conduct of operations.

According to Article 47 (3), the Military Staff Committee (MSC) shall be responsible for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the UNSC. However, the UNSC tends to give full command and control to member states. In the case of Iraq, resolution 678 did not mention the MSC at all, and that the only obligation of the coalition forces was to report periodically to the UNSC.

* The authorization technique gives individual member states the right to take action on their own on the basis of their own decisions. It will allow them to enjoy a kind of global blessing from the UNSC.

The states contributing to more aggressive enforcement operations are usually unwilling to submit their actions to continuous and potentially debilitating UN review. The need to keep the UNSC informed about how the authority given is being conducted could also be difficult for reasons of military security.

* There will be significant erosion of legitimacy when the UNSC acts against a target state in a fashion that it ignores the UN Charter by authorizing the action of individual member states.

Such an approach gives the target state valid grounds for objecting to the action taken against it. A target state in such a situation, such as Iraq, depicts itself as a victim of a cabal of states. Such an approach by a state may then garner sympathy from other states and may help the target state to justify it before its own citizens.

* Above all, the most dangerous risk is the absence of UNSC command and control. Without it, states taking action may exceed the level of force the UNSC has authorized. It is quite possible because the UNSC only gives a "blank check". The coalition may then claim international legitimacy and approval for forceful actions that were not in fact envisaged by the UNSC when it gave its authorization to the coalition. Under these circumstances, the UNSC can do very little, particularly if the permanent members participate.

Typically, peace enforcement is contracted out to states that have expressed an interest in it. As a consequence, they may have private aims to pursue. Major powers take military action only when and where their national interests are engaged. The UN, by contrast, is the custodian of international interests.

A number of UN member states have persistently objected to this use of authorization technique as reflected in critical comments made during the Gulf War. Some criticism was voiced against the overwhelming ability of the United States to lead the UN to serve its goals in the Persian Gulf, the extensive use of force being pursued and the UN's inability to command and control the operation.

Indeed the UNSC has enjoyed mixed success in its authorization interventions, such as the success in forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. However, there was controversy over the manner in which this success has been accomplished. The United States directed military forces not only against Iraqi forces in and around Kuwait, but it also bombed central Iraq on the theory of destroying the infrastructure that allowed Iraq to fight.

For these reasons, it is advisable for the UNSC to take enforcement measures under Chapter VII only when it can direct the action itself by its ability to command and control the operations. Unleashing individual states is too risky an approach when one considers sending military forces into a state.

In the case of the Gulf crisis, the U.S.-led coalition still "holds" the authorization of resolution 678 to "take all necessary" measures against Iraq. It could then undertake military attacks against Iraq whenever it prefers to do so, without further UNSC blessing.

In line with the mandate of Article 42 of the UN Charter, it is the UNSC, not individual member states, that makes the decision on when and how to take enforcement measures. Therefore, the use of force, including that by multinational forces, should be and should always remain under the decision, command and control of the UN. Since it is the UNSC which gives authorization, it should also be responsible for reviewing the conduct of operations that is authorized by it. The member states, on the other hand, which receive the blessing of the UNSC, are being held accountable for their actions in implementing the authorization.

The 15 members of the UNSC should always be vigilant that they act on behalf of the total 185 UN member states. It means that 170 states have placed their security in the hands of the 15. This is a solemn and heavy responsibility that each and every member of UNSC carries. Every decision of the UNSC, therefore, should be able to withstand the careful scrutiny of the 170 UN member states on whose behalf the UNSC is expected to act. This is only possible if the UNSC is always guided in its decisions and actions by the UN Charter.

It is now time for UN member states to look seriously at this subcontracting of the UN and its very far-reaching consequences.

The writer is an observer of UN affairs and is currently studying for a master's degree in foreign affairs and trade in Australia.

Window: Indeed the UNSC has enjoyed mixed success in its authorization interventions, such as the success in forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. However, there was controversy over the manner in which this success has been accomplished.