Govt's new policy on Aceh: Jaw-jaw or war-war?

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly', Centre for Strategic of International Studies, Jakarta, bandoro@csisi.or.id

"Speak softly and carry a big stick" (former U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt), and "You can get much further with a kind word and gun than you can with word alone" (American gangster Al Capone).

"Jaw-jaw is better than war-war" (former British prime minister Harold Macmillan). Perhaps this is the kind of message carried by the government in its new policy on Aceh. Its new policy is that the government would continue talks with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on the condition that GAM recognizes the law on special autonomy for Aceh and halts the armed conflict. The government also gave the rebels a December deadline to drop their demands and resume talks or face the full brunt of the military's might. The government however softened its stance on Wednesday and expressed its readiness for further negotiations in September.

The government believes that the unity of the whole nation is being threatened by the violence which has claimed at least 10.000 lives since it first erupted in the mid 1970's. Attempts to reach a negotiated settlement over the past two years made little headway and GAM have refused to accept a special autonomy package. GAM has even rejected Indonesia's insistence that they drop demands for independence.

What is so interesting about the GAM-government conflict is the fact that on the diplomatic front the talks between the two have led to a stand off. Whether the new policy on Aceh may change fundamentally the climate of the conflict and the current power configuration will mostly depend on the response by GAM and the public in Aceh at large towards the new policy and the way the government is perceiving the response of GAM. A pulling and hauling of interests of the government and GAM, even if the new policy is implemented, is likely to deepen the deadlock as the two sides attempt to find the ultimate resolution.

The conflict between the government and GAM is indeed a strategy game where both have attempted to resolve the conflict through negotiations, but have so far failed even to reduce violence. Both may shake hands after deals, but one of the groups attempts to find ways to avoid meeting their commitments.

The failure of that negotiation process to yield a mutually agreed solution, even to prevent the escalation of conflict, has now been used to justify the government's decision to conduct tougher military operations. For the government, perhaps this is an alternative to negotiation.

Reading the government's seven point policy on Aceh reflects the fact the government seems to speak softly, but at the same time carries with it a big stick, which is meant to be a threat of punishment for non-compliance by GAM. Thus, the use of force by the government, either in the form of violence between GAM and the government or the use of military power against GAM, is not unusual in an attempt to break the stand off.

The government is aware that force or power is a necessary part of the negotiation equation. By saying that it is better to have a talk (jaw-jaw) than to fight (a war-war), the new policy of the government is outlining a kind of fundamental standard for judging the expected behavior of GAM.

With its new policy on Aceh, the government is practicing what the literature on diplomacy terms coercive diplomacy, that is to back the government's demand on GAM to accept the autonomy package with a threat of punishment for non compliance that the government will consider credible and potent enough to persuade GAM to comply with the government's demand. Here the government strategy reveals three basic components: The ultimatum, the means used to create a sense of urgency and the "try and see" approach.

The logic behind the government's new strategy assumes that GAM will behave rationally. However, one may conclude that GAM's perception of the government's coercing motivation and commitment, and GAM's assessment of the credibility and potency of its threat, play the most significant role in determining the success or failure of the government's strategy. The response made by GAM that the Acehenese people have not asked for autonomy but independence is a very clear indication that GAM's position will not change as they have been fighting for independence for more than two decades.

This may lead one to be pessimist about the effectiveness and credibility of the government's strategy. Thus, the worst thing that may result from the government's diplomacy is not only a failure to rebuild mutual trust between GAM and the government, but it may actually also provoke a new war between the two.

Based on an indepth examination of the conflict between GAM and the government, there is no single sufficient condition in the field for the successful employment of the government's new strategy. Instead there are numbers of factors which favor, but do not guarantee, the success of the strategy. These factors, as it has been said above, include clear and consistent demands, adequate motivation, the ability to instill a sense of urgency in GAM and GAM's fear of escalation. Key factors influencing the success or failure of the government's policy are likely to be psychological in nature.

The fifth point of the seven point policy on Aceh states that if GAM refuses to accept the government's offer it will intensify military operations. The government seems to be very serious on this, giving GAM one last chance before it does whatever it takes to ensure the state's unity. This is the kind of stick that is likely to be employed in case of uncooperative gestures from GAM.

From the government's perspective, dealing with GAM without using force is the ultimate test of whether further negotiations can work. Forcing GAM to agree to the demands by threatening military action may actually end to its violence. But the question now is whether the ultimate resolution at the bargaining table will bring about results that will be honored once the big stick is taken away.

In short, while coercive diplomacy employed by the government may be less costly than actual use of military force, it will only rarely be a high-confidence strategy. Time will prove whether the saying of the American gangster Al Capone will turn into a reality.