Govt's new policy on Aceh: Jaw-jaw or war-war?

Govt's new policy on Aceh: Jaw-jaw or war-war?

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly',
Centre for Strategic of International Studies, Jakarta,
bandoro@csisi.or.id

"Speak softly and carry a big stick" (former U.S. president
Theodore Roosevelt), and "You can get much further with a kind
word and gun than you can with word alone" (American gangster Al
Capone).

"Jaw-jaw is better than war-war" (former British prime
minister Harold Macmillan). Perhaps this is the kind of message
carried by the government in its new policy on Aceh. Its new
policy is that the government would continue talks with the Free
Aceh Movement (GAM) on the condition that GAM recognizes the law
on special autonomy for Aceh and halts the armed conflict. The
government also gave the rebels a December deadline to drop their
demands and resume talks or face the full brunt of the military's
might. The government however softened its stance on Wednesday
and expressed its readiness for further negotiations in
September.

The government believes that the unity of the whole nation is
being threatened by the violence which has claimed at least
10.000 lives since it first erupted in the mid 1970's. Attempts
to reach a negotiated settlement over the past two years made
little headway and GAM have refused to accept a special autonomy
package. GAM has even rejected Indonesia's insistence that they
drop demands for independence.

What is so interesting about the GAM-government conflict is
the fact that on the diplomatic front the talks between the two
have led to a stand off. Whether the new policy on Aceh may
change fundamentally the climate of the conflict and the current
power configuration will mostly depend on the response by GAM and
the public in Aceh at large towards the new policy and the way
the government is perceiving the response of GAM. A pulling and
hauling of interests of the government and GAM, even if the new
policy is implemented, is likely to deepen the deadlock as the
two sides attempt to find the ultimate resolution.

The conflict between the government and GAM is indeed a
strategy game where both have attempted to resolve the conflict
through negotiations, but have so far failed even to reduce
violence. Both may shake hands after deals, but one of the groups
attempts to find ways to avoid meeting their commitments.

The failure of that negotiation process to yield a mutually
agreed solution, even to prevent the escalation of conflict, has
now been used to justify the government's decision to conduct
tougher military operations. For the government, perhaps this is
an alternative to negotiation.

Reading the government's seven point policy on Aceh reflects
the fact the government seems to speak softly, but at the same
time carries with it a big stick, which is meant to be a threat
of punishment for non-compliance by GAM. Thus, the use of force
by the government, either in the form of violence between GAM and
the government or the use of military power against GAM, is not
unusual in an attempt to break the stand off.

The government is aware that force or power is a necessary
part of the negotiation equation. By saying that it is better to
have a talk (jaw-jaw) than to fight (a war-war), the new policy
of the government is outlining a kind of fundamental standard for
judging the expected behavior of GAM.

With its new policy on Aceh, the government is practicing what
the literature on diplomacy terms coercive diplomacy, that is to
back the government's demand on GAM to accept the autonomy
package with a threat of punishment for non compliance that the
government will consider credible and potent enough to persuade
GAM to comply with the government's demand. Here the government
strategy reveals three basic components: The ultimatum, the means
used to create a sense of urgency and the "try and see" approach.

The logic behind the government's new strategy assumes that
GAM will behave rationally. However, one may conclude that GAM's
perception of the government's coercing motivation and
commitment, and GAM's assessment of the credibility and potency
of its threat, play the most significant role in determining the
success or failure of the government's strategy. The response
made by GAM that the Acehenese people have not asked for autonomy
but independence is a very clear indication that GAM's position
will not change as they have been fighting for independence for
more than two decades.

This may lead one to be pessimist about the effectiveness and
credibility of the government's strategy. Thus, the worst thing
that may result from the government's diplomacy is not only a
failure to rebuild mutual trust between GAM and the government,
but it may actually also provoke a new war between the two.

Based on an indepth examination of the conflict between GAM
and the government, there is no single sufficient condition in
the field for the successful employment of the government's new
strategy. Instead there are numbers of factors which favor, but
do not guarantee, the success of the strategy. These factors, as
it has been said above, include clear and consistent demands,
adequate motivation, the ability to instill a sense of urgency in
GAM and GAM's fear of escalation. Key factors influencing the
success or failure of the government's policy are likely to be
psychological in nature.

The fifth point of the seven point policy on Aceh states that
if GAM refuses to accept the government's offer it will intensify
military operations. The government seems to be very serious on
this, giving GAM one last chance before it does whatever it takes
to ensure the state's unity. This is the kind of stick that is
likely to be employed in case of uncooperative gestures from GAM.

From the government's perspective, dealing with GAM without
using force is the ultimate test of whether further negotiations
can work. Forcing GAM to agree to the demands by threatening
military action may actually end to its violence. But the
question now is whether the ultimate resolution at the bargaining
table will bring about results that will be honored once the big
stick is taken away.

In short, while coercive diplomacy employed by the government
may be less costly than actual use of military force, it will
only rarely be a high-confidence strategy. Time will prove
whether the saying of the American gangster Al Capone will turn
into a reality.