Govt pays high price for PDI row

By Hermawan Sulistyo

SURABAYA (JP): Several factors came into play in pushing the state authorities to shake the Indonesian Democratic Party.

Without "interference" the PDI would increase its votes in the coming elections for parliamentary seats.

In the last elections, the ruling Golkar lost 16 seats to PDI. With a growing number of young people, many of whom join PDI because of its rebellious edge, it is understandable that Golkar is taking measures to reduce this risk.

Thus, a "pilot project" was set up in East Java, where Golkar lost the most seats. PDI's two provincial boards in this province, where the PDI fiasco began.

That was related to Golkar and not the Army. The latter was and is involved for different yet related reasons, namely for fear that the PDI would officially announce Megawati Soekarnoputri, chairwoman of the now disputed board, as a presidential candidate to pose a direct challenge to President Soeharto.

As chairwoman of an official party, she would retain the right to be a presidential candidate. But, in the eyes of the Army, this would be a shameful political maneuver and a dangerous game with President Soeharto. The existing political culture does not leave any room for direct confrontations.

These two strong currents converged with the insecure feelings of some members on PDI's central board, who would be the first victims of a strong and rationalized PDI. Most are at the height of their political careers.

Soerjadi, Fatimah Achmad and others have been members of the House of Representatives for two terms. PDI rulings require them to give their seats to younger candidates.

Take a look at the extreme case of Sumario, the self-acclaimed PDI leader from Central Java who is one of the board members. Sumario is in his 70s and would not have the slightest chance to enjoy political and economic gains.

It should be noted that in contrast to western political games, here economic gain follows political seats, and not the other way around.

Thus, those leaders need a political rescue to keep their political and economic interests preserved in an insecure climate. A loose cooperation with state authorities and the Army would be enough. Through this dangerous game, they expect to save their seats (political, and not necessarily their seats in parliament) for the next five to ten years.

Unfortunately, there is no ideology that ties together all the fractured elements of the PDI. This is a party that emerged, by coercive government measures, from the former members of nationalist, Catholic, Christian and other parties.

So why does it increasingly attract the masses? With few political channels open, increasing political conscience and resentment need a symbol. And PDI serves this function neatly.

While PDI's leaders at the top join hands in fulfilling their political and economic interests, at the bottom is a gathering place for resentment of the establishment. Red, the "official" color of the PDI, symbolizes the rebellious nature of these resentments.

Caught in the middle, the provincial boards and branches at the second tiers of the organization are divided. Some take sides with Soerjadi, and some have chosen to stay with the angry mobs.

As many predicted, merging the external and internal currents has resulted in the formation of Soerjadi's cabinet and uncertainly in the immediate future, especially PDI's place in the coming elections.

Now three issues remain. First, the tug-of-war to control the "official" headquarters and provincial offices. As a non- ideological party, it is difficult to expect PDI's members to occupy these buildings for a relatively long period. They are militant as far as they are with the masses. There is very little evidence that they are as militant individually. All Soerjadi needs to do to takeover these buildings is be patient, and a little help from the police.

Secondly, PDI has to work out a list of candidates for the House of Representatives. Under the Army's umbrella this is also an easy task. There would be some tension, but most would be solved by accommodating those who are at the other side of the official game, sharing parliamentary seats is the most logical solution.

Third is the legal dispute. The result of Megawati's determination to sue Soerjadi and the government is out of the question. This threat is not being taken seriously and is a less disturbing element to domestic security.

In this scenario, could Soerjadi's camp win in the coming elections? Undoubtedly yes. The candidates will be chosen by their rankings. All names in Soerjadi's camp will be listed in the top, which will give them the opportunity to secure their seats, regardless of how many votes the PDI gets.

But the most disastrous result of this dangerous game is the boomerang effect. The authorities fear that they might lose control over sensitive issues such as presidential candidates. But there is no guarantee that members of the PDI would propose Soerjadi as a presidential candidate.

The boomerang effect will also emerge from the masses. At best, the authorities can expect PDI voters to shift their votes to Golkar, or even PPP. Some of them will prefer to stay out of the elections, adding to the increasing number of golput, or non- voting citizens.

In this case, it seems that the government has underestimated the trend. It is almost certain that the number of golput will increase. The higher their number, the less legitimate the elections.

Another underestimated result of the PDI fiasco is the sympathy the party has received from non-PDI masses, including members of the critical middle class. With a higher political consciousness, these people are non-threatening elements for the status quo as long as economic growth sustains their individual economic interests. But once there is economic stagnation, they are as dangerous as the politically less-conscious lower classes.

In the distant future, these games are too expensive to be paid for by the government. By that time, none of the decision makers now in power will hold the same political power, freeing them of the responsibility of whatever ensues.

For the moment, we are watching an excellent telenovela, with all "good boy, good girl" players, a stick and carrot prologue, a dramatic coercive conflict, a contrast of tears and delight, and a clearly predictable ending. The next series will be more dramatic.

The writer is a fellow from the program for Southeast Asian studies at Arizona State University, the United States.