Govt pays high price for PDI row

Govt pays high price for PDI row

By Hermawan Sulistyo

SURABAYA (JP): Several factors came into play in pushing the
state authorities to shake the Indonesian Democratic Party.

Without "interference" the PDI would increase its votes in the
coming elections for parliamentary seats.

In the last elections, the ruling Golkar lost 16 seats to PDI.
With a growing number of young people, many of whom join PDI
because of its rebellious edge, it is understandable that Golkar
is taking measures to reduce this risk.

Thus, a "pilot project" was set up in East Java, where Golkar
lost the most seats. PDI's two provincial boards in this
province, where the PDI fiasco began.

That was related to Golkar and not the Army. The latter was
and is involved for different yet related reasons, namely for
fear that the PDI would officially announce Megawati
Soekarnoputri, chairwoman of the now disputed board, as a
presidential candidate to pose a direct challenge to President
Soeharto.

As chairwoman of an official party, she would retain the right
to be a presidential candidate. But, in the eyes of the Army,
this would be a shameful political maneuver and a dangerous game
with President Soeharto. The existing political culture does not
leave any room for direct confrontations.

These two strong currents converged with the insecure feelings
of some members on PDI's central board, who would be the first
victims of a strong and rationalized PDI. Most are at the height
of their political careers.

Soerjadi, Fatimah Achmad and others have been members of the
House of Representatives for two terms. PDI rulings require them
to give their seats to younger candidates.

Take a look at the extreme case of Sumario, the self-acclaimed
PDI leader from Central Java who is one of the board members.
Sumario is in his 70s and would not have the slightest chance to
enjoy political and economic gains.

It should be noted that in contrast to western political
games, here economic gain follows political seats, and not the
other way around.

Thus, those leaders need a political rescue to keep their
political and economic interests preserved in an insecure
climate. A loose cooperation with state authorities and the Army
would be enough. Through this dangerous game, they expect to save
their seats (political, and not necessarily their seats in
parliament) for the next five to ten years.

Unfortunately, there is no ideology that ties together all
the fractured elements of the PDI. This is a party that emerged,
by coercive government measures, from the former members of
nationalist, Catholic, Christian and other parties.

So why does it increasingly attract the masses? With few
political channels open, increasing political conscience and
resentment need a symbol. And PDI serves this function neatly.

While PDI's leaders at the top join hands in fulfilling
their political and economic interests, at the bottom is a
gathering place for resentment of the establishment. Red, the
"official" color of the PDI, symbolizes the rebellious nature of
these resentments.

Caught in the middle, the provincial boards and branches at
the second tiers of the organization are divided. Some take sides
with Soerjadi, and some have chosen to stay with the angry mobs.

As many predicted, merging the external and internal
currents has resulted in the formation of Soerjadi's cabinet and
uncertainly in the immediate future, especially PDI's place in
the coming elections.

Now three issues remain. First, the tug-of-war to control the
"official" headquarters and provincial offices. As a non-
ideological party, it is difficult to expect PDI's members to
occupy these buildings for a relatively long period. They are
militant as far as they are with the masses. There is very little
evidence that they are as militant individually. All Soerjadi
needs to do to takeover these buildings is be patient, and a
little help from the police.

Secondly, PDI has to work out a list of candidates for the
House of Representatives. Under the Army's umbrella this is also
an easy task. There would be some tension, but most would be
solved by accommodating those who are at the other side of the
official game, sharing parliamentary seats is the most logical
solution.

Third is the legal dispute. The result of Megawati's
determination to sue Soerjadi and the government is out of the
question. This threat is not being taken seriously and is a less
disturbing element to domestic security.

In this scenario, could Soerjadi's camp win in the coming
elections? Undoubtedly yes. The candidates will be chosen by
their rankings. All names in Soerjadi's camp will be listed in
the top, which will give them the opportunity to secure their
seats, regardless of how many votes the PDI gets.

But the most disastrous result of this dangerous game is the
boomerang effect. The authorities fear that they might lose
control over sensitive issues such as presidential candidates.
But there is no guarantee that members of the PDI would propose
Soerjadi as a presidential candidate.

The boomerang effect will also emerge from the masses. At
best, the authorities can expect PDI voters to shift their votes
to Golkar, or even PPP. Some of them will prefer to stay out of
the elections, adding to the increasing number of golput, or non-
voting citizens.

In this case, it seems that the government has underestimated
the trend. It is almost certain that the number of golput will
increase. The higher their number, the less legitimate the
elections.

Another underestimated result of the PDI fiasco is the
sympathy the party has received from non-PDI masses, including
members of the critical middle class. With a higher political
consciousness, these people are non-threatening elements for the
status quo as long as economic growth sustains their individual
economic interests. But once there is economic stagnation, they
are as dangerous as the politically less-conscious lower classes.

In the distant future, these games are too expensive to be
paid for by the government. By that time, none of the decision
makers now in power will hold the same political power, freeing
them of the responsibility of whatever ensues.

For the moment, we are watching an excellent telenovela, with
all "good boy, good girl" players, a stick and carrot prologue,
a dramatic coercive conflict, a contrast of tears and delight,
and a clearly predictable ending. The next series will be more
dramatic.

The writer is a fellow from the program for Southeast Asian
studies at Arizona State University, the United States.