Govt must make up its mind on terrorists

Govt must make up its mind on terrorists

Peter Milne, Managing Editor, Van Zorge Report

Whether or not Indonesia has the dubious honor of being host
to extremist and potentially dangerous Islamic groups with
possible links to al-Qaeda -- the most hotly debated subject
among the diplomatic circle in Jakarta at the present time-is
almost beside the point. Nobody seems to know for sure one way or
the other, so why pretend?

The reality of the matter is that, almost five months after
Sept. 11, with the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan in the
final stages of searching through debris from Kabul to Kandahar
looking for intelligence leads, the focus on terrorism has swung
dramatically southwards towards the ASEAN countries.

With Singapore and Malaysia jumping smartly to attention in
the U.S. anti-terrorist cause, aided by conveniently well-oiled
Internal Security Acts, and the Philippines more than happy for a
helping hand in getting to grips with their own Islamic demons,
Indonesia is once again under the glare of the global media
spotlight -- wondering how to deal with the enormity of it all.

As with many important issues that hit the headlines, few
Indonesians can separate the wood from the trees. If one thing
seems clear, it is that in Indonesia the question of whether
there are terrorist cells in the country or not depends on one's
domestic politics. And this is further complicated by whether one
sees one's own position as benefiting from the lifting of the
U.S. arms embargo to Indonesia, or not.

One day National Intelligence Agency chief Lt. Gen. (ret) A.M.
Hendropriyono thinks he sees an al Qaeda training base in
Sulawesi, but the next day it is empty and the precise location
cannot be divulged. More recently, Vice President Hamzah Haz,
understandably worried by the comments of U.S. Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, nonetheless states ominously, but
without elaboration, said, "I think the U.S. will really lose if
Indonesia becomes a target [in the U.S. war against terrorism].
There are plenty of American investments here."

More recently, with the arrest of a man of Indonesian origin
in Manila confessing to information that has apparently led to
finds of impressive quantities of explosives and firearms,
National Police chief Gen. Da'i Bachtiar denied speculation that
the arrested man could have links to any international al Qaeda
network.

Foreign Affairs Minister Hassan Wirajuda, for his part,
doubted the man's Indonesian nationality because "this person
lived in Singapore for some time and has a wife". Nobody, it
seems, wants to call a spade, a spade ... for fear that it really
is a spade!

Regardless of the reasons for such extreme cautiousness, with
an absence of clear signals that Indonesia will keep a firm grip
on troublesome groups, budding international terrorists could be
forgiven for thinking that Indonesia might make a comfortably and
conveniently porous location in which to base their regional
operations.

This will be all the more so now, with the temperature rising
in other Southeast Asian countries. In fact, in its current
confused and almost lawless state, Indonesia is pretty much the
ideal terrorist base in the entire Southeast Asia region. There
is insufficient proof to confirm that cells are already here.

As most people accept, the Indonesian government is in a tight
corner, given domestic political pressures and the fragility of
President Megawati Soekarnoputri's position, especially vis-a-vis
the Muslim majority.

But, just as in October following the U.S. bombing of
Afghanistan, indecisiveness makes almost everyone's lives in
Indonesia more, not less, difficult. Before anyone can understand
how to support Indonesia, in whichever way the country may choose
to go, it is crucial that Indonesians themselves decide on what
their own overriding national interest is.

Granted, Indonesia no longer has an Internal Security Act, and
that is all to the good. Investigations should be thorough and
the taking of people into custody fully justified by the law. But
the national interest should not become a party political
football, to be used for gaining position with an eye to the
election in 2004. The rule of law, if only it existed in
Indonesia, would be a marvelously simple device for settling
these questions without party politics, or the Islamic-secular
divide, ever entering into it.

The U.S., for its part, has an even greater responsibility to
make sure that Indonesia is given space to find its way, in its
own time, as long as it does not drag its heels. If not, this
will only make the government's room for maneuver to do what it
should do in the national interest all the harder. It is a great
relief that President George W. Bush avoided mentioning Indonesia
in his State of the Union Address as being timid in its support
of the war against terrorism; such a mention would have been a
major mistake.

Instead, the U.S. should use its wealth of knowledge and
accumulated experience to understand that Indonesia needs a
specific approach. There are two sides to this: First,
Indonesians desperately need to feel that the U.S. is their true
ally. The economy still lies in tatters and this rankles in the
minds of many Indonesians. A demonstration of solidarity with
Indonesians could then be more easily complemented by much-needed
assistance to the Indonesian government in the form of
intelligence sharing, police training and also training in anti-
money laundering surveillance for the banking sector and hi-tech
tracking techniques for the immigration service.

Military assistance should still be limited to specific
hardware that will help in the effort to monitor and track down
small terrorist cells, and of course close cooperation in
intelligence sharing (which is ongoing). So far, the U.S.
government has offered US$10 million, an offer that is still
being considered by the Indonesian government. The problem is
that this is hardly likely to impress Indonesians that the U.S.
government is really on their side, as opposed to only looking
after American interests.

Meanwhile, Indonesia needs to decide where its interests lie
and take appropriate measures to defend those interests. A recent
Time story that four tons of ammonium nitrate (in the form of
fertilizer) has gone missing in Malaysia gives a prelude of
things to come if the risks are ignored. The fertilizer was
allegedly ordered by Yazid Sufaat, a former Malaysian army
captain in custody in Kuala Lumpur for allegedly having links to
al-Qaeda.

According to Malaysian police, on the orders of Abu Bakar (an
Indonesian cleric from Central Java, allegedly head of the Jamaah
Islamiyah group), Yazid allowed two of the hijackers on the
aircraft that crashed into the Pentagon on Sept. 11 to stay at
his apartment in Kuala Lumpur. Yazid, who was arrested in
December upon his return from fighting the Northern Alliance/U.S.
in Afghanistan, had ordered the fertilizer in late 2000 through
his company Green Laboratory Medicine. What then happened to the
fertilizer is unknown, but Malaysian police seem convinced that
it left the country. As Time points out, the haul was four times
the amount of ammonium nitrate used to destroy the federal office
building in Oklahoma City.

With such quantities of explosive material knocking around the
region, all sorts of people will be getting nervous. The
Indonesian government needs to make up its mind how to deal with
the growing risks. It would be a terrible tragedy if lack of
clarity on the Indonesian government's side, coupled with U.S.
ineptitude in reading cultural sensitivities and nuances,
coalesced to create what could be a very unfortunate
miscalculation in Southeast Asia -- especially when, at this
stage, we are still looking for "mosquitoes" in Indonesia.