Govt must make up its mind on terrorists

Peter Milne, Managing Editor, Van Zorge Report

Whether or not Indonesia has the dubious honor of being host to extremist and potentially dangerous Islamic groups with possible links to al-Qaeda -- the most hotly debated subject among the diplomatic circle in Jakarta at the present time-is almost beside the point. Nobody seems to know for sure one way or the other, so why pretend?

The reality of the matter is that, almost five months after Sept. 11, with the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan in the final stages of searching through debris from Kabul to Kandahar looking for intelligence leads, the focus on terrorism has swung dramatically southwards towards the ASEAN countries.

With Singapore and Malaysia jumping smartly to attention in the U.S. anti-terrorist cause, aided by conveniently well-oiled Internal Security Acts, and the Philippines more than happy for a helping hand in getting to grips with their own Islamic demons, Indonesia is once again under the glare of the global media spotlight -- wondering how to deal with the enormity of it all.

As with many important issues that hit the headlines, few Indonesians can separate the wood from the trees. If one thing seems clear, it is that in Indonesia the question of whether there are terrorist cells in the country or not depends on one's domestic politics. And this is further complicated by whether one sees one's own position as benefiting from the lifting of the U.S. arms embargo to Indonesia, or not.

One day National Intelligence Agency chief Lt. Gen. (ret) A.M. Hendropriyono thinks he sees an al Qaeda training base in Sulawesi, but the next day it is empty and the precise location cannot be divulged. More recently, Vice President Hamzah Haz, understandably worried by the comments of U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, nonetheless states ominously, but without elaboration, said, "I think the U.S. will really lose if Indonesia becomes a target [in the U.S. war against terrorism]. There are plenty of American investments here."

More recently, with the arrest of a man of Indonesian origin in Manila confessing to information that has apparently led to finds of impressive quantities of explosives and firearms, National Police chief Gen. Da'i Bachtiar denied speculation that the arrested man could have links to any international al Qaeda network.

Foreign Affairs Minister Hassan Wirajuda, for his part, doubted the man's Indonesian nationality because "this person lived in Singapore for some time and has a wife". Nobody, it seems, wants to call a spade, a spade ... for fear that it really is a spade!

Regardless of the reasons for such extreme cautiousness, with an absence of clear signals that Indonesia will keep a firm grip on troublesome groups, budding international terrorists could be forgiven for thinking that Indonesia might make a comfortably and conveniently porous location in which to base their regional operations.

This will be all the more so now, with the temperature rising in other Southeast Asian countries. In fact, in its current confused and almost lawless state, Indonesia is pretty much the ideal terrorist base in the entire Southeast Asia region. There is insufficient proof to confirm that cells are already here.

As most people accept, the Indonesian government is in a tight corner, given domestic political pressures and the fragility of President Megawati Soekarnoputri's position, especially vis-a-vis the Muslim majority.

But, just as in October following the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan, indecisiveness makes almost everyone's lives in Indonesia more, not less, difficult. Before anyone can understand how to support Indonesia, in whichever way the country may choose to go, it is crucial that Indonesians themselves decide on what their own overriding national interest is.

Granted, Indonesia no longer has an Internal Security Act, and that is all to the good. Investigations should be thorough and the taking of people into custody fully justified by the law. But the national interest should not become a party political football, to be used for gaining position with an eye to the election in 2004. The rule of law, if only it existed in Indonesia, would be a marvelously simple device for settling these questions without party politics, or the Islamic-secular divide, ever entering into it.

The U.S., for its part, has an even greater responsibility to make sure that Indonesia is given space to find its way, in its own time, as long as it does not drag its heels. If not, this will only make the government's room for maneuver to do what it should do in the national interest all the harder. It is a great relief that President George W. Bush avoided mentioning Indonesia in his State of the Union Address as being timid in its support of the war against terrorism; such a mention would have been a major mistake.

Instead, the U.S. should use its wealth of knowledge and accumulated experience to understand that Indonesia needs a specific approach. There are two sides to this: First, Indonesians desperately need to feel that the U.S. is their true ally. The economy still lies in tatters and this rankles in the minds of many Indonesians. A demonstration of solidarity with Indonesians could then be more easily complemented by much-needed assistance to the Indonesian government in the form of intelligence sharing, police training and also training in anti- money laundering surveillance for the banking sector and hi-tech tracking techniques for the immigration service.

Military assistance should still be limited to specific hardware that will help in the effort to monitor and track down small terrorist cells, and of course close cooperation in intelligence sharing (which is ongoing). So far, the U.S. government has offered US$10 million, an offer that is still being considered by the Indonesian government. The problem is that this is hardly likely to impress Indonesians that the U.S. government is really on their side, as opposed to only looking after American interests.

Meanwhile, Indonesia needs to decide where its interests lie and take appropriate measures to defend those interests. A recent Time story that four tons of ammonium nitrate (in the form of fertilizer) has gone missing in Malaysia gives a prelude of things to come if the risks are ignored. The fertilizer was allegedly ordered by Yazid Sufaat, a former Malaysian army captain in custody in Kuala Lumpur for allegedly having links to al-Qaeda.

According to Malaysian police, on the orders of Abu Bakar (an Indonesian cleric from Central Java, allegedly head of the Jamaah Islamiyah group), Yazid allowed two of the hijackers on the aircraft that crashed into the Pentagon on Sept. 11 to stay at his apartment in Kuala Lumpur. Yazid, who was arrested in December upon his return from fighting the Northern Alliance/U.S. in Afghanistan, had ordered the fertilizer in late 2000 through his company Green Laboratory Medicine. What then happened to the fertilizer is unknown, but Malaysian police seem convinced that it left the country. As Time points out, the haul was four times the amount of ammonium nitrate used to destroy the federal office building in Oklahoma City.

With such quantities of explosive material knocking around the region, all sorts of people will be getting nervous. The Indonesian government needs to make up its mind how to deal with the growing risks. It would be a terrible tragedy if lack of clarity on the Indonesian government's side, coupled with U.S. ineptitude in reading cultural sensitivities and nuances, coalesced to create what could be a very unfortunate miscalculation in Southeast Asia -- especially when, at this stage, we are still looking for "mosquitoes" in Indonesia.