Government to reduce ABRI representation
Government to reduce ABRI representation
Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin analyses the reasons for and the likely
impact of the proposed reduction of the Indonesian Armed Forces'
representation in the House of Representatives.
The Indonesian government recently announced intentions to
reduce the size of the Armed Forces' representation in the House
of Representatives (DPR).
The move will materialize when the DPR formally endorses it.
In order to attain that objective, the government presented a
bill to the DPR at the end of April. It expects that the DPR will
not take much time to pass the bill. Once it is passed, the
number of the Armed Forces' (ABRI) seats will be reduced by 25
per cent before 1997.
Currently, ABRI holds 100 of the 500 seats. According to a
national consensus reached by political parties and ABRI in the
late 1960s, members of the armed forces are not allowed to take
part in the general elections so as to prevent them from directly
interfering with the political process. Instead, ABRI is given a
number of uncontested seats in the DPR. All parties agreed to
this national consensus. It was clear that behind the consensus
was a fear that Indonesia could well follow the road of a number
of Latin American countries where military coups had become a
common political feature. Hence, in order to avoid that
situation, ABRI was given a number of seats.
Originally, all parties involved in the national consensus of
the 1960s had agreed to allocate to ABRI 100 out of the 460 DPR
seats after the 1971 elections. Of the 100, 75 were for ABRI
serving officers, while the rest were allocated to Karyawan
officers or military officers serving in non-military roles. This
allocation of non-contested seats remained until 1987. After the
1987 general elections, the DPR's seats increased to 500 while
the non-elected component remained at 100. However, ABRI's
membership increased because all the 100 non-contested seats were
now allocated to serving officers.
In percentage terms, ABRI's representation has varied from
time to time. From 1971 up to 1987, before new members were sworn
in, ABRI held slightly over 16 percent of all DPR seats. This
percentage increased to 20 in the new parliament of 1987. There
seems to be no explanation to account for this increase, except
the fact that it was in line with the consensus that appointed
members should constitute 20 per cent of the DPR's seats. This
figure was doubled for the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)
simply because its membership is twice the DPR's.
Indonesia's New Order Government opted for this approach to
explain its political stance largely to avoid replicating the
Latin American experience. But what it actually meant was that
political stability could be achieved only by maintaining the
Pancasila state ideology and the 1945 Constitution. This is
because, on the one hand, the state ideology was the very major
source of political conflict among the political parties in the
1950s which led to the failure of the constitutional assembly to
draft a new constitution to replace the provisional one. This
situation eventually led President Sukarno, with support from the
army, to revalidate the older 1945 Constitution and set up a
totalitarian regime.
The 1945 Constitution, however, is based on the Pancasila
ideology, which promises political stability to the nation. This
is because that constitution, inspired by the US and the French
constitutions, guarantees continuous presidential rule for at
least five years. Also, under this constitution, the president
possesses dominant power, including a right to draft legislative
bills.
Securing presidential power is not the only problem faced by
Indonesia in its endeavor to achieve political stability. The
more basic and real question is the maintenance of the 1945
Constitution, through the government's majority in parliament. If
the government controls 20 per cent of the seats through ABRI's
representation, then it can secure the rest to obtain a majority
through Golkar, the government-backed party, which has
successfully fulfilled this task since the first general
elections held by the New Order in 1971.
The government's intentions to reduce ABRI's seats does not
mean that it has given up its commitment to preserve Pancasila or
the 1945 Constitution. Neither does it mean that the President is
tiring in the search for political stability which for almost
three decades has been prescribed as a prerequisite for economic
development. Likewise, it is not a signpost of ABRI's intention
to withdraw from politics.
What, then, is the significance of ABRI's purpose in wanting
to decrease its representation in parliament?
First, the reduction of ABRI's numbers would have a
psychological impact on the people by indicating that the country
is politically stable enough for such a parliamentary
modification.
Second, it would also enhance the notion of democratization,
as the parliamentary seats vacated by ABRI will be redesignated
as contested seats in the 1997 general elections.
And third, and finally, the reduction would signify the
transformation of ABRI's dual function from "leading the people
from the front" to "leading them from the rear" as repeatedly
proposed by President Soeharto.
Dr. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin is Professor of Political Science,
University of Indonesia, and Chairman of the Indonesian Political
Science Association.