Sun, 09 Jul 1995

Government to reduce ABRI representation

Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin analyses the reasons for and the likely impact of the proposed reduction of the Indonesian Armed Forces' representation in the House of Representatives.

The Indonesian government recently announced intentions to reduce the size of the Armed Forces' representation in the House of Representatives (DPR).

The move will materialize when the DPR formally endorses it. In order to attain that objective, the government presented a bill to the DPR at the end of April. It expects that the DPR will not take much time to pass the bill. Once it is passed, the number of the Armed Forces' (ABRI) seats will be reduced by 25 per cent before 1997.

Currently, ABRI holds 100 of the 500 seats. According to a national consensus reached by political parties and ABRI in the late 1960s, members of the armed forces are not allowed to take part in the general elections so as to prevent them from directly interfering with the political process. Instead, ABRI is given a number of uncontested seats in the DPR. All parties agreed to this national consensus. It was clear that behind the consensus was a fear that Indonesia could well follow the road of a number of Latin American countries where military coups had become a common political feature. Hence, in order to avoid that situation, ABRI was given a number of seats.

Originally, all parties involved in the national consensus of the 1960s had agreed to allocate to ABRI 100 out of the 460 DPR seats after the 1971 elections. Of the 100, 75 were for ABRI serving officers, while the rest were allocated to Karyawan officers or military officers serving in non-military roles. This allocation of non-contested seats remained until 1987. After the 1987 general elections, the DPR's seats increased to 500 while the non-elected component remained at 100. However, ABRI's membership increased because all the 100 non-contested seats were now allocated to serving officers.

In percentage terms, ABRI's representation has varied from time to time. From 1971 up to 1987, before new members were sworn in, ABRI held slightly over 16 percent of all DPR seats. This percentage increased to 20 in the new parliament of 1987. There seems to be no explanation to account for this increase, except the fact that it was in line with the consensus that appointed members should constitute 20 per cent of the DPR's seats. This figure was doubled for the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) simply because its membership is twice the DPR's.

Indonesia's New Order Government opted for this approach to explain its political stance largely to avoid replicating the Latin American experience. But what it actually meant was that political stability could be achieved only by maintaining the Pancasila state ideology and the 1945 Constitution. This is because, on the one hand, the state ideology was the very major source of political conflict among the political parties in the 1950s which led to the failure of the constitutional assembly to draft a new constitution to replace the provisional one. This situation eventually led President Sukarno, with support from the army, to revalidate the older 1945 Constitution and set up a totalitarian regime.

The 1945 Constitution, however, is based on the Pancasila ideology, which promises political stability to the nation. This is because that constitution, inspired by the US and the French constitutions, guarantees continuous presidential rule for at least five years. Also, under this constitution, the president possesses dominant power, including a right to draft legislative bills.

Securing presidential power is not the only problem faced by Indonesia in its endeavor to achieve political stability. The more basic and real question is the maintenance of the 1945 Constitution, through the government's majority in parliament. If the government controls 20 per cent of the seats through ABRI's representation, then it can secure the rest to obtain a majority through Golkar, the government-backed party, which has successfully fulfilled this task since the first general elections held by the New Order in 1971.

The government's intentions to reduce ABRI's seats does not mean that it has given up its commitment to preserve Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution. Neither does it mean that the President is tiring in the search for political stability which for almost three decades has been prescribed as a prerequisite for economic development. Likewise, it is not a signpost of ABRI's intention to withdraw from politics.

What, then, is the significance of ABRI's purpose in wanting to decrease its representation in parliament?

First, the reduction of ABRI's numbers would have a psychological impact on the people by indicating that the country is politically stable enough for such a parliamentary modification.

Second, it would also enhance the notion of democratization, as the parliamentary seats vacated by ABRI will be redesignated as contested seats in the 1997 general elections.

And third, and finally, the reduction would signify the transformation of ABRI's dual function from "leading the people from the front" to "leading them from the rear" as repeatedly proposed by President Soeharto.

Dr. Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin is Professor of Political Science, University of Indonesia, and Chairman of the Indonesian Political Science Association.