Good ties: Insurance for RI and Australia
By Paul Dibb and Peter Prince
CANBERRA (JP): Australia's future is intimately bound up with that of Indonesia. A stable Indonesia gives Australia security and protection across its vast northern approaches. And the state of Australia's relations with Jakarta heavily affects its links with Southeast Asia as a whole.
It might also be noted, however, that at a time when Indonesia and its new democratic institutions have only just started the long journey towards political, economic and social stability, poor relations with Australia are of no help to those seeking to guide this process.
A further deterioration in ties between the two countries, already at their lowest level for more than thirty years, would be a very serious matter for both nations.
In the crisis over East Timor we have seen how words alone can inflame tensions between Indonesia and Australia. Strong national feelings have been aroused. It is vital for both governments to appreciate that while some measure of calm has been restored to the relationship over the last several weeks, the current situation retains the potential to escalate quickly. The volatility of bilateral ties is a recurring lesson in international relations. It applies with great force to Indonesia and Australia today.
Conflict between Indonesia and Australia would be a calamity. On the one hand, it would end the peace and security Australians have enjoyed largely uninterrupted since the World War II. And on the other hand it would scare away investors from Indonesia and make any large scale economic recovery improbable in the short to medium term. It would also leave Indonesia even more vulnerable to internal tension and conflict.
Moreover, such an occurrence would seriously undermine the stability of the whole Southeast Asian region. In this part of the world, the challenge of the next century, now mere days away, will be whether the ASEAN nations -- weakened but not defeated by the regional economic crisis -- will be able to hold their own in the struggle for economic and political influence with the great powers of North Asia. As the founders of ASEAN so clearly perceived three decades ago, an Indonesia in conflict with its neighbors would sap the strength and cohesion of the whole of their region.
At a time of great change in Indonesia, it has to be recognized that further tensions with Australia are likely. Governments will need sound and sensible advice if they are to manage these tension properly.
Such friction needs to be anticipated. It is no good expressing the vague hope that current problems will soon pass and everything will "return to normal". Time has moved on, and we have to go forward, not back. The two countries are now in a new relationship which requires active management from governments to keep it on the straight and level, land to prevent a disastrous dive from which bilateral ties might never recover.
East Timor was for many years a major bilateral irritant between Indonesia and Australia. Now East Timor is suddenly independent, and there is a new trilateral Indonesia/East Timor/Australia relationship. Given the sudden and uneasy birth of the new nation -- and the emotions this has aroused in Indonesia and Australia -- we must anticipate further strains over East Timor, and have mechanisms in place to prevent any escalation of such tension
In our view, two specific mechanisms are needed to prepare for and defuse potential bilateral or trilateral friction. These mechanisms should be at a government to government level. Given the strong feeling on all sides since the East Timor issue emerged, standard diplomacy may not be enough. We need mechanisms which can be activated quickly allowing direct personal contact between political leaders.
The first mechanism should be bilateral between Indonesia and Astral. It would enable the leaders of the two countries to resolve bilateral tensions face to face. It might be argued that a formal mechanism is unnecessary -- meetings could be quickly arranged or matters could be discussed directly by telephone or video link. But recent events prove that argument wrong. Direct contact between Indonesian and Australian leaders after the East Timor crisis broke out was difficult precisely because of the seriousness of the situation. For example, Australia's Defense Minister John Moore tried many times in vain to telephone his then Indonesian counterpart, Gen. Wiranto, to discuss the crisis.
Once governments appreciate the serious potential dangers which will persist for some time in the changed circumstances of the current Indonesia-Australia relationship, then the need for a formal mechanism to help defuse such dangers should also be accepted.
The second mechanism should be trilateral -- between Indonesia, Australia and East Timor. It would be wise to put a procedure in place to help manage this relationship. Perhaps over time this could simply be a bilateral Indonesia/East Timor mechanism, much like the border commissions Indonesia already has with neighbors such as Malaysia. However, given Australia's presence in East Timor and the significance of the East Timor issue for Indonesia-Australia relations overall, Australian involvement in such a mechanism is essential at least for the short term.
Such mechanisms would give Indonesia and Australia a measure of insurance to protect the two nations against escalation of bilateral tensions. In recent weeks, we have seen some imaginative diplomacy by President Wahid, including a visit to China and approaches to Israel. The Indonesian and Australian Governments should consider a similarly forward looking initiative to help ensure long term peace and stability between their two nations.
Prof. Paul Dibb is Head of the Strategic and Defense Studies Center at the Australian National University, Canberra. Dr. Peter Prince is a former head of the ASEAN section in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. They contribute this article exclusively for The Jakarta Post.