Good spokesperson, not information minister

Good spokesperson, not information minister

Alpha Amirrachman, Jakarta

In his article, Information minister vital for Susilo's
success (The Jakarta Post, Oct. 11, 2004), Muhammad Qodari argued
that Megawati Soekarnoputri had failed to make use of the
"strategic" information ministry. The appointment of Syamsul
Mu'arif of the rival Golkar Party, not a cadre from her own
party, as the information minister was also regarded as a
blunder.

Qodari underlined the failure of Megawati to learn from the
former president Soeharto who effectively used the information
ministry to mobilize support although he was elected by the
largely appointed members of the MPR (People's Consultative
Assembly), not by the people.

Harmoko, the then-information minister and a Soeharto loyalist
was regarded as an effective minister who successfully
transmitted the message of the government's successes to the
people, although Qodari admitted that Harmoko "was more a
minister of propaganda than a communication minister."

Qodari said that we did not need such a powerful information
ministry, yet he argued that the president-elect Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono should re-empower the information ministry by giving
the ministry "wider authority and bigger budget than it had under
Megawati."

I would argue that we do not need a strong information
ministry and that Qodari's arguments are clearly disturbing.

First, linking the present socio-political situation to that
under the Soeharto era is irrelevant. Under Soeharto, Indonesia
was relatively stable not only because of his ability to control
information, but also because of his massive economic
achievements.

On one hand, the stability was also further shaped by his
authoritarian rule where civil liberties were curtailed and the
mass media was heavily controlled. This combination of economic
achievements and authoritarianism appeared to have brought
stability to the country.

However, after being hit by the 1997 crisis, people realized
that something was wrong with the way the country was governed.
It was unfortunate that the heavily controlled media appeared to
have slowed people's awareness of the wrongdoings of the
Soeharto-supported elite. If the media had been critical, the
country would have taken earlier steps to overcome the crisis.

The post-Soeharto era marked the boom of the independent
media, not only at a national but also at a local level. Media,
such as television, has penetrated households even at the lowest
level of society; the family. As a result, people have become
more openly critical towards governments' policies.

People seemed to rely more on independent media, rather than
on the state-controlled media.

Arguably, Megawati's defeat in the election was not
significantly caused by her appointment of Syamsul Mu'arif as a
communication and information minister and her failure to
effectively make use of this ministry, but more by her own
failure to intelligently make use of the independent media to
articulate her message.

Her taciturn style and obvious impatience during tough
interview sessions seems to have cost her reelection bid. Above
all, she simply failed to convey the message of her government's
macroeconomic achievements to people.

Second, fully re-empowering the information ministry -- if it
means reestablishing its apparatus down to the district and city
level -- would be a massive financial burden on the government.

Third, reestablishing the ministry of information could be a
starting point of a rollback of the hard-won civil liberties
during this transitional period. As "power tends to corrupt",
Susilo's government could fall into the trap of gradually
controlling the independent media, which is dangerous to our
young democracy. In any democracy, press freedom is a must to
ensure a multitude of views are aired and that no party dominates
or abuses the media.

Therefore, having an increasingly powerful information
ministry in Indonesia as a newly emerging democracy could be
detrimental.

Fourth, as the reestablishment and re-empowerment of
information ministry may well be unpopular, this could backfire
against Susilo, especially if the minister of information, as
Qodari suggested, should be picked from Susilo's inner circle or
his own political party -- the Democratic Party.

This could be a blunder and could politically cost Susilo and
his new fledging political party, especially since during the
campaign period Susilo had consistently declared his support for
press freedom. It is therefore important that Susilo keep his
promise to defend press freedom.

Fifth, the "how" rather than the "what" is more vital in
regards with "information management." In this case, how
information is managed, articulated, and transmitted is more
important than the reestablishment of ministry of information. In
fact, Susilo is far more eloquent a leader compared with Soeharto
or Megawati.

Susilo is well-known for his skills in dealing with the
independent media, proven during his time as a minister under the
previous government. Susilo has demonstrated his impressive
ability to tackle intricate questions not only from journalists,
but also from the panel of experts during the presidential
campaign period. He therefore does not need a ministry of
information to act as a formal "public relations agent" as Qodari
suggested.

Susilo as a president may not need to talk to the press as
much anymore, but to help his job more effectively, he should
have a professional "presidential spokesperson" to articulate his
message and views to the people. The presidential spokesperson
could have a public relations team to ensure that messages about
all the government's achievements are being articulated through
the independent media.

Susilo's success and Megawati's failure in the presidential
elections show how leaders have to be shrewdly articulate in
dealing with the independent media. How to turn the independent
media either to their own advantage or disadvantage entirely
depends on the skills and knowledge of the leader and their
public relations team.

The writer is a lecturer at the Prof Dr Hamka Muhammadiyah
University and a deputy director of the Public Sphere Institute.
This opinion is personal one. He can be reached at
a.amirrachman@edfac.usyd.edu.au