Golkar's contradictions
Golkar's contradictions
When the wind of reform swept through Indonesia last year,
Golkar survived against all odds to garner the second-most number
of votes in the June general election behind the Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan). Most people
assumed Golkar, the political machine which helped keep Soeharto
in power for over three decades, had lost its relevance and would
crumble as soon as the tyrant was deposed in May last year.
They could not be more wrong. Under chairman Akbar Tandjung
and with its strong financial base, Golkar has controlled the
national political agenda for the past year and convinced 24
percent of the electorate in June of its reformist stance.
No force has yet been capable of destroying the mighty Golkar.
The students who brought Soeharto down tried and failed. New
political parties made little headway despite their aggressive
campaign to discredit Golkar as a "status quo" party during the
elections.
Golkar may have succeeded in staving off external forces, but
internal pressures are slowly emerging which could prove to be
its undoing. An internal challenge to Akbar's leadership is the
litmus test for the party. The bickering between the pro-Habibie
camp and Akbar's camp this past week was probably only the tip of
the iceberg. Events in the coming days or weeks will determine
whether the party can survive the storm.
Today's Golkar has lost some of the internal strengths that
previously kept it together. President B.J. Habibie, as much as
he would like to, does not control the party the way Soeharto did
in his capacity as the all-powerful chairman of Golkar's board of
patrons. The party no longer enjoys the support and patronage of
the military, itself under pressure to surrender its
sociopolitical role.
Power in Golkar today is shared between the chairman, Akbar,
and leaders of the regional chapters and interest groups. The new
Golkar is certainly much more democratic than it was during
Soeharto's reign. This presumably is one of the chief reasons why
many respected politicians, including reformist figures like
Marzuki Darusman, stayed with Golkar in spite of the legacy of
the Soeharto years. Whether Golkar, more known for its
antidemocratic traditions, can survive in a democratic Indonesia
is something that only time will tell.
Sooner or later, however, well-meaning politicians like
Marzuki will come into conflict with the party's old guard, who
have no interest in promoting change, including democracy.
Over the past year, Marzuki has departed from the official
party line on more than one occasion, including Golkar's
nomination of Habibie for the November presidential election. But
in his crusade to unveil the Bank Bali scandal, he has for the
first time enjoyed the open support of many of his colleagues,
including Akbar.
Marzuki sees the scandal as an opportunity to restore Golkar's
credibility, even if it means sacrificing Habibie's presidential
nomination. He antagonized the pro-Habibie camp, which in turn
initiated a motion to have him removed from Golkar's central
executive board. They have even threatened to unseat Akbar
himself if he does not comply with their demand.
It is difficult to tell where this will lead, and while it is
an interesting development to follow, not many people in this
country truly care whether Golkar survives or crumbles as a
result of the conflict. Few people would shed tears over the
demise of a party with a 30-year history of complicity in
depriving people of their sovereignty. Whatever emerges from this
apparent process of self-destruction within Golkar, it further
strengthens the belief that reformist forces can never lie in the
same bed with status quo forces.