Golkar's contradictions

When the wind of reform swept through Indonesia last year, Golkar survived against all odds to garner the second-most number of votes in the June general election behind the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan). Most people assumed Golkar, the political machine which helped keep Soeharto in power for over three decades, had lost its relevance and would crumble as soon as the tyrant was deposed in May last year.

They could not be more wrong. Under chairman Akbar Tandjung and with its strong financial base, Golkar has controlled the national political agenda for the past year and convinced 24 percent of the electorate in June of its reformist stance.

No force has yet been capable of destroying the mighty Golkar. The students who brought Soeharto down tried and failed. New political parties made little headway despite their aggressive campaign to discredit Golkar as a "status quo" party during the elections.

Golkar may have succeeded in staving off external forces, but internal pressures are slowly emerging which could prove to be its undoing. An internal challenge to Akbar's leadership is the litmus test for the party. The bickering between the pro-Habibie camp and Akbar's camp this past week was probably only the tip of the iceberg. Events in the coming days or weeks will determine whether the party can survive the storm.

Today's Golkar has lost some of the internal strengths that previously kept it together. President B.J. Habibie, as much as he would like to, does not control the party the way Soeharto did in his capacity as the all-powerful chairman of Golkar's board of patrons. The party no longer enjoys the support and patronage of the military, itself under pressure to surrender its sociopolitical role.

Power in Golkar today is shared between the chairman, Akbar, and leaders of the regional chapters and interest groups. The new Golkar is certainly much more democratic than it was during Soeharto's reign. This presumably is one of the chief reasons why many respected politicians, including reformist figures like Marzuki Darusman, stayed with Golkar in spite of the legacy of the Soeharto years. Whether Golkar, more known for its antidemocratic traditions, can survive in a democratic Indonesia is something that only time will tell.

Sooner or later, however, well-meaning politicians like Marzuki will come into conflict with the party's old guard, who have no interest in promoting change, including democracy.

Over the past year, Marzuki has departed from the official party line on more than one occasion, including Golkar's nomination of Habibie for the November presidential election. But in his crusade to unveil the Bank Bali scandal, he has for the first time enjoyed the open support of many of his colleagues, including Akbar.

Marzuki sees the scandal as an opportunity to restore Golkar's credibility, even if it means sacrificing Habibie's presidential nomination. He antagonized the pro-Habibie camp, which in turn initiated a motion to have him removed from Golkar's central executive board. They have even threatened to unseat Akbar himself if he does not comply with their demand.

It is difficult to tell where this will lead, and while it is an interesting development to follow, not many people in this country truly care whether Golkar survives or crumbles as a result of the conflict. Few people would shed tears over the demise of a party with a 30-year history of complicity in depriving people of their sovereignty. Whatever emerges from this apparent process of self-destruction within Golkar, it further strengthens the belief that reformist forces can never lie in the same bed with status quo forces.