Golkar on the road to regaining power

Golkar on the road to regaining power

Frans Sudiarsis, Research and Development Unit, The Jakarta Post
Jakarta

One of the leaders of the reform movement to topple Soeharto in
1998, Amien Rais was once very confident that we could bid good
riddance to Golkar, Soeharto's political vehicle during his 32-
year rule, in the 1999 party election.

However, Golkar was able to retain its power as the second
strongest party with over 23.7 million votes, or 22.42 percent,
much more than Amien's National Mandate Party (PAN), which
garnered about 7.5 million votes, or 7.11 percent.

Now, a few months ahead of the 2004 elections, the once
resented party, a legacy of Soeharto, seems to have regained
favor among the public.

Like it or not, similar results were indicated in surveys
conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI), Center
for the Study of Democracy and Development (CESDA) -- a division
under the Institute of Research, Education and Information of
Social and Economic Affairs (LP3ES) -- the Danareksa Research
Institute (DRI), the International Foundation for Election
Systems (IFES), the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), the
research and development unit of the Indonesian Democratic Party
of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) and The Asia Foundation.

These surveys all placed Golkar first and PDI Perjuangan
second, indicating that people who had abandoned Golkar in the
1999 election may be returning to support the party.

Several explanations can be provided for this trend. First, as
LSI's September 2003 survey shows, people are disillusioned with
the snail-paced reform programs that have been under way for five
years, and perceive that at least they could cope under the
predictable days a la the New Order.

Although a number of macroeconomic indicators may have
improved recently, this has not translated into an improvement in
basic needs, living standard and employment -- which are
perceived as disparate from conditions in the New Order era.

The strengthening of Golkar also has something to do with its
relatively central position in the country's ideological
spectrum. Golkar is a pragmatic political entity that is
nationalist in its general outlook, but to some extent
accommodates the interests of Islamic and other religious groups
at the local level.

Thus, Golkar is well-placed to welcome those Muslim voters
dissatisfied with the performance of Islamic parties and
nationalist parties, such as PDI Perjuangan. The continued
dominance of the Association of Islamic Students (HMI), which was
formerly led by Golkar chairman Akbar Tandjung, makes it easier
for Golkar to reestablish its bases in Muslim-oriented regions.

This may explain Golkar's 1999 victory in South Sulawesi, West
Sumatra and West Nusa Tenggara.

The party's third key strength is its sound organization and
network. Compared to other parties, internal conflicts are
considerably well-managed and cadres rarely leave due to internal
spats.

Local leadership is a fourth factor. Its local executive board
members are community figures well known for their administrative
competence -- a number of governors in eastern Indonesia are
Golkar cadres.

Aside from these four advantages, Golkar is also taking other
steps to win sympathy from potential constituents other than its
nearly 11 million-strong membership, for example, by holding a
party convention as a democratic mechanism to select its
presidential candidate. Regardless of the criticism this move
prompted, Golkar attracted public attention -- free advertisement
of its political stance that gave it a head start in
"campaigning".

Golkar also has its weaknesses. Like other political parties,
it still lacks clear programs on how to bring the country out of
crisis, limiting its appeal to rational voters -- or those
outside loyal circles and beyond those who would, say, simply
follow their religious teachers' preferences.

Golkar might therefore be more likely to attract rural voters
who simply rate past performance without any serious interest in
scrutinizing future prospects and programs.

The party's national leadership is also weak. Akbar, with his
deft political skills, cannot be matched by Amien and PDI
Perjuangan chairman and incumbent President Megawati
Soekarnoputri. However, his conviction for his involvement in the
State Logistics Agency (Bulog) corruption case is a liability, as
it reminds people of all that was bad under the New Order, in
direct association with the party.

The public also viewed the party's courting of prominent and
respected Muslim intellectual Nurcholish Madjid as an effort to
neutralize such a negative image, and Nurcholish's withdrawal
from the party's presidential convention only fostered it.

Golkar chairman Akbar has said he "does not underestimate" any
party. Could there be any serious threat from one of Golkar's
splinter parties, which is courting the eldest daughter of
Soeharto, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana?

Siti has been popular as a charitable businesswoman, and was
briefly a minister for social affairs. The party nominating her
as presidential candidate is the Concern for the Nation
Functional Party (PKPB), led by former army chief R. Hartono,
also a former Golkar executive.

However, a new party needs bold marketing tactics to establish
a solid brand image in the short time remaining.

With these strengths and weaknesses, a Golkar victory in the
coming elections is not impossible. Idealists thus see a serious
challenge for the reform movement, as they see that the "new"
Golkar still touts the same old players.

But if Golkar is looking to count on returning voters who wish
for the "good old days", as the abovementioned surveys indicate,
then that is the price of our seemingly endless transition period
toward a reform that still lingers, unseen, beyond the horizon.

This is the second of a series of articles compiled by The
Jakarta Post on the political parties contesting the 2004
elections.