Golkar on the road to regaining power

Frans Sudiarsis, Research and Development Unit, The Jakarta Post Jakarta

One of the leaders of the reform movement to topple Soeharto in 1998, Amien Rais was once very confident that we could bid good riddance to Golkar, Soeharto's political vehicle during his 32- year rule, in the 1999 party election.

However, Golkar was able to retain its power as the second strongest party with over 23.7 million votes, or 22.42 percent, much more than Amien's National Mandate Party (PAN), which garnered about 7.5 million votes, or 7.11 percent.

Now, a few months ahead of the 2004 elections, the once resented party, a legacy of Soeharto, seems to have regained favor among the public.

Like it or not, similar results were indicated in surveys conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI), Center for the Study of Democracy and Development (CESDA) -- a division under the Institute of Research, Education and Information of Social and Economic Affairs (LP3ES) -- the Danareksa Research Institute (DRI), the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), the research and development unit of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) and The Asia Foundation.

These surveys all placed Golkar first and PDI Perjuangan second, indicating that people who had abandoned Golkar in the 1999 election may be returning to support the party.

Several explanations can be provided for this trend. First, as LSI's September 2003 survey shows, people are disillusioned with the snail-paced reform programs that have been under way for five years, and perceive that at least they could cope under the predictable days a la the New Order.

Although a number of macroeconomic indicators may have improved recently, this has not translated into an improvement in basic needs, living standard and employment -- which are perceived as disparate from conditions in the New Order era.

The strengthening of Golkar also has something to do with its relatively central position in the country's ideological spectrum. Golkar is a pragmatic political entity that is nationalist in its general outlook, but to some extent accommodates the interests of Islamic and other religious groups at the local level.

Thus, Golkar is well-placed to welcome those Muslim voters dissatisfied with the performance of Islamic parties and nationalist parties, such as PDI Perjuangan. The continued dominance of the Association of Islamic Students (HMI), which was formerly led by Golkar chairman Akbar Tandjung, makes it easier for Golkar to reestablish its bases in Muslim-oriented regions.

This may explain Golkar's 1999 victory in South Sulawesi, West Sumatra and West Nusa Tenggara.

The party's third key strength is its sound organization and network. Compared to other parties, internal conflicts are considerably well-managed and cadres rarely leave due to internal spats.

Local leadership is a fourth factor. Its local executive board members are community figures well known for their administrative competence -- a number of governors in eastern Indonesia are Golkar cadres.

Aside from these four advantages, Golkar is also taking other steps to win sympathy from potential constituents other than its nearly 11 million-strong membership, for example, by holding a party convention as a democratic mechanism to select its presidential candidate. Regardless of the criticism this move prompted, Golkar attracted public attention -- free advertisement of its political stance that gave it a head start in "campaigning".

Golkar also has its weaknesses. Like other political parties, it still lacks clear programs on how to bring the country out of crisis, limiting its appeal to rational voters -- or those outside loyal circles and beyond those who would, say, simply follow their religious teachers' preferences.

Golkar might therefore be more likely to attract rural voters who simply rate past performance without any serious interest in scrutinizing future prospects and programs.

The party's national leadership is also weak. Akbar, with his deft political skills, cannot be matched by Amien and PDI Perjuangan chairman and incumbent President Megawati Soekarnoputri. However, his conviction for his involvement in the State Logistics Agency (Bulog) corruption case is a liability, as it reminds people of all that was bad under the New Order, in direct association with the party.

The public also viewed the party's courting of prominent and respected Muslim intellectual Nurcholish Madjid as an effort to neutralize such a negative image, and Nurcholish's withdrawal from the party's presidential convention only fostered it.

Golkar chairman Akbar has said he "does not underestimate" any party. Could there be any serious threat from one of Golkar's splinter parties, which is courting the eldest daughter of Soeharto, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana?

Siti has been popular as a charitable businesswoman, and was briefly a minister for social affairs. The party nominating her as presidential candidate is the Concern for the Nation Functional Party (PKPB), led by former army chief R. Hartono, also a former Golkar executive.

However, a new party needs bold marketing tactics to establish a solid brand image in the short time remaining.

With these strengths and weaknesses, a Golkar victory in the coming elections is not impossible. Idealists thus see a serious challenge for the reform movement, as they see that the "new" Golkar still touts the same old players.

But if Golkar is looking to count on returning voters who wish for the "good old days", as the abovementioned surveys indicate, then that is the price of our seemingly endless transition period toward a reform that still lingers, unseen, beyond the horizon.

This is the second of a series of articles compiled by The Jakarta Post on the political parties contesting the 2004 elections.