Going halfway to democratization may be dangerous

JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia is currently experiencing a transition period from an authoritarian government under former president Soeharto, who was forced to step down in May, to a supposedly democratic government under President B.J. Habibie and future presidents.

Such a transition, almost by definition, is marked by uncertainties that could affect various sectors. In this case, Indonesia is also experiencing the affects of a collapsing economy and a tumultuous social and political climate.

In many places, people have resorted to taking the law into their own hands. Examples of this can be seen in the form of land grabbings, mass lootings of shrimp ponds, the burning down of brothels, robberies of plantation harvests and the holding of street rallies to bring village heads down.

Dr. Richard Gunther, executive director of the Office of International Studies, recently discussed the characteristics of such transition periods with The Jakarta Post.

The director, who is also a professor of political science at Ohio State University in the United States, has made a comparative study on transitions to democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe.

He was one of a number of experts who attended an international seminar, Toward Structural Reforms for Democratization in Indonesia, here in Jakarta from Aug. 12 to Aug. 14.

The seminar was organized by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences and the Ford Foundation.

Question: How would you describe the transition period we are in at the moment?

Gunther: We are currently experiencing a period that I will refer to as a liberalization phase in which the constraints on a number of freedoms under the more authoritarian regime are now being relaxed. But we are also not at a point where there is a clear commitment to what we would regard as democracy.

And democracy would certainly mean that, for example, there would not be reserved seats in the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly). Instead, there would be direct elections for the important legislative bodies and, if you opt for a presidential system, the president would also be elected directly.

Now barring that direct commitment, there is a great deal of uncertainty about whether this is a mere loosening of some constraints in an authoritarian regime or whether it will eventually culminate in a democracy.

Under those circumstances, opposition forces -- certainly students would be among them -- have an incentive to mobilize in the streets as a means of trying to push the incumbent government toward more far-reaching reforms, if not full-fledged democratization.

Q: What kind of risks does this period bring?

G: During this period, I think the risks of polarization are the greatest as long as the main arena for dialog between those who want to bring about democracy and the incumbent government is on the streets.

You have the possibility of violence, in which, as I described (in the seminar), a jumble of rocks, clubs and tear gas is set in motion once somebody throws a rock. Police then charge in with their batons, firing tear gas all over the place. It risks destabilizing everything.

Q: Is this common during a democratic transition?

G: It's unhealthy for a democratic transition, but it may be the logical outcome of a lack of clear commitment to democratization. This is characteristic of periods that a number of other countries experienced while in democratic transition.

Spain's earliest period and the earliest period in Portugal before it went through revolution saw this. And it was also characteristic of a case that most people would be familiar with: Gorbachev's reforms in Russia. Gorbachev loosened up a great deal but never committed himself to democracy. He was never on record as clearly favoring democracy.

What that meant was that there were massive mobilizations of sections of society, especially in places like Estonia where they were pressing for far-reaching change. Now this frightened many moderates and conservatives because even though they may have been in favor of democratization, they were wary of civil unrest. They were not in favor of a breakdown of public order.

What that means is that individuals who otherwise would be willing to go along with change become frightened and can fall into the hands of reactionaries who want to oppose all political reform. That's what typically happens in such a period.

Q: What are other characteristics of this phase?

G: There is a mobilization of various groups in society on the one hand and a crackdown by the police and the military on the other. Polarization breaks up any semblance of consensus and again this is very typical in this period and so we should progress through it as quickly as possible. The clearest way to end this particular unstable period is for there to be a clear commitment to democratization.

If, for example, President Habibie said the 1999 DPR (House of Representatives) would function as a constituent assembly to either reform the 1945 Constitution or replace it with a new constitution, either would show a commitment to democratization.

So once such a clear commitment is made, typically you find a demobilization on the part of those calling for change because there is a feeling that there is no longer any need to push the government. Then their elected representatives to the constituent assembly would be in a more powerful position to create change.

Once this takes place, the dynamic of political change is fundamentally altered, and for that reason I think that once this commitment is made, this uncertainty is alleviated. The main point is that going halfway toward democratization is the most destabilizing. It is the most dangerous situation to be in because it maximizes uncertainty.

Q: In the seminar, you mentioned a common thing that happens to both authoritarian systems and democratic systems...

G: Both an authoritarian system and democratic systems have clear rules that constrain behavior.

In an authoritarian system, you know that if you attempt to actively involve yourself in politics you could be attacked by police or end up in jail. I mean everybody understands what the rules are: You just stay out of politics.

Conversely, in a democratic system, everybody knows what the rules are. The rules are you exercise your right to vote, you peacefully protest, you write letters to your legislators, you have a complete freedom of the press but you cannot, under any circumstances, resort to violence.

That's one of the clear rules of democracy. But in our transition period to democracy, the old rules of the authoritarian regime have broken down and the new rules of democracy have yet to be set in place. In essence, there are no rules. Because the old constraints are discredited, nobody takes them seriously anymore. But we don't know what the new rules are and as a result there is confusion over what is proper behavior and what is improper behavior and that's an additional incentive for, say, the police or the military to crack down. Its a very dangerous set of circumstances.

And I think that's a very important point because it is the characteristic of virtually every transition to democracy. Look at the East European transitions in 1989, for example, when it was clear that some kind of political change was going to take place. There was massive mobilization in the streets.

Q: How has it turned out in other countries?

G: In some cases it turned out well, as in Czechoslovakia. In other cases, as in Rumania, it did not turn out well and you had open warfare between Caeusescu's (former president Nicolae Ceausescu) followers and the military.

But in every case, there was a massive mobilization in favor of change. Once democratization had been proclaimed as the ultimate objective, there was an immediate demobilization and more stability. And I think that's the status that would benefit peaceful change.

Q: If full-blown change does not take place immediately, would it take a long time before any real change takes place?

G: It depends. I mean, I was in China in 1989 during such a period, you know where you had Jiang Zemin making vague statements that were construed by the students as an indication that some change was going to take place. But then you had hardliners, like Li Peng, who put an end to it immediately.

In fact, I was in China on the day of the crackdown in Tiananmen Square. I was in Wuhan during that entire period and that's why I am so concerned about this particular stage of transition because it does create uncertainties. It provides incentives for mobilization. The rules are unclear, making it highly possible for a reactionary antidemocratic crackdown.

The painless way to do it is to have a clear statement from the President indicating that the country will be open to discussion over the way democratic change takes shape.

Q: But the Habibie regime is widely regarded as having stemmed from the Soeharto regime. We also have a very strong Armed Forces...

G: Both of those would be characteristic of many of the countries that have gone through democratic transitions. For example, Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, the prime minister of Spain who created Spanish democracy, had been the secretary-general of the Falange, Franco's national movement. Nobody trusted him either.

When the new prime minister was announced, everybody said he was not credible. Nobody trusted him. But it turned out to be the exact opposite. He was the person who stood between the old regime and a new potential democratic regime. Therefore, he was in the ideal position to be a broker between the two.

Q: Do you see Habibie in that place too?

G: He could be. I don't know what his goals are. That's the problem. I mean, he could either be a Suarez who brought about democracy or a Gorbachev who was toppled from power.

Gorbachev never made a commitment to democracy... he was always vacillating, never making it clear what his ultimate objective was.

On the other hand, Suarez said he wanted a democratic election and a new constitution. So I don't see that the background of a particular political figure is problematic. It really depends on current behavior. In fact, his background gives him legitimacy among those who were loyal to the old regime.

Juan Linz (a Yale University professor) was referring to this (in the seminar). Its important to create both a forward legitimacy, that is by establishing the new democratic rules of the game and seeking a democratic consensus, and to maintain a backward legitimacy, that is during this intervening period you retain the loyalty of those who were loyal to the old regime. Those are favorable circumstances, rather than unfavorable.

Q: What about the military?

G: With regard to the military, again, this is up to the military in many respects. If the military has decided that it will not tolerate change, then who knows what will happen.

If it is absolutely opposed to change, the military would have to confront a scenario in which the kind of unrest that we saw a couple of months ago could happen again. And if it wants a future that looks like that, it would be something that it would bring down on itself.

The Spanish military under Franco... everybody was afraid what the military would think (when change started to occur).

Well, the point was, the military was interested in performing its central military mission, which is the defense of the nation against foreign aggression and maintaining the integrity of the state.

And in many cases, the fears about what the military would do in Spain were totally unwarranted because the military didn't care about many issues that a lot of people thought they were intensely interested in.

But not being an expert on Indonesia, let alone the Indonesian military, I'm not in a position to know exactly what they think. But if, in fact, the main goal of the military is to maintain the territorial integrity of the state -- either to prevent complete disintegration or in order to prevent foreign invasion -- and if they respect the change of command which is inherent in military organizations everywhere, there is no reason to automatically assume the military would oppose democratic change.

Q: If the crisis persists, do you think the military would declare a state of emergency?

G: That's always possible. But note that that's more likely to take place during the time of turmoil.

Q: So it is not very likely?

G: I can't predict one way or another. It would be more likely to take place if there were constant mass mobilizations in the streets. But if you move quickly to the state of democratization that involves negotiations between legitimate representatives of the contending forces in Indonesian society, the military has no reason to intervene.

Because you know that whatever democratic regime comes into existence will respect the military's integrity. In fact, there may be, as I know to be the case in Spain, a dramatic improvement in the military under a democratic administration.

The Spanish military was underpaid. Their mission was not clear when the socialist party, this was the former hated opposition, became the government in Spain in 1982. They significantly increased the military's pay, modernized the military and gave it a modern mission by giving it an active role in NATO. And there is every indication that the Spanish military is extremely happy with the current democratic regime.

Q: On the other hand, you have the general populace who lived under political repression and is now suddenly bursting onto the scene with more than 60 political parties, some with very exclusive overtones. What do you think about this?

G: It's certainly a risk. That is exactly why the lack of a clear commitment to democracy is so dangerous because there are intense demands. It's like a pressure cooker, I mean, when the pressure is on, it could blow, but once the pressure is off, you know the pot is boiling.

Q: So there is still a possibility that stability can be maintained even after 30 years of political repression?

G: Look at Spain. It was 40 years and it was very easily maintained.

Q: But Spain is not as socially diverse as Indonesia...

G: Well, 30 percent of Spain's population speak languages other than Spanish. I mean, they also speak Spanish just as most people here speak Indonesian, but there is tremendous diversity there.

And again, in dealing with ethnic diversity I think there was a very important point made in the seminar by Donald Horowitz (a Harvard professor) when he argued that the worst thing that you could do is to pretend that there is no ethnic diversity and continue to insist upon the imposition of a centralized unitary state while not giving any autonomy to those regional groups that aspire to autonomy.

The best thing you could do is to very quickly grant them some measure of autonomy and negotiate over how much autonomy they will have in the future.

Again, that was the Spanish model. One of the very first things Adolfo Suarez did was to temporarily reestablish governments in the Basque country and Catalonia to immediately restore their dignity.

It made them feel as if they were a part of a Spanish reform and there were wonderful scenes there.

The former secretary-general in Franco's political party who became prime minister of Spain reestablished the Catalonia government. He even visited Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia, on Catalonia's national day and was surrounded by 300,000 people crying with joy.

And I think that these kinds of political gestures are important at this particular moment. One of my students did his dissertation on this. He called it the "generosity moment" in the transition. Small conciliatory gestures have an impressive symbolic impact on the dynamic of the transition itself. It restores confidence and gives a feeling that it is possible to achieve change through open dialog with former political opponents. (hbk)