Going halfway to democratization may be dangerous

Going halfway to democratization may be dangerous

JAKARTA (JP): Indonesia is currently experiencing a transition
period from an authoritarian government under former president
Soeharto, who was forced to step down in May, to a supposedly
democratic government under President B.J. Habibie and future
presidents.

Such a transition, almost by definition, is marked by
uncertainties that could affect various sectors. In this case,
Indonesia is also experiencing the affects of a collapsing
economy and a tumultuous social and political climate.

In many places, people have resorted to taking the law into
their own hands. Examples of this can be seen in the form of land
grabbings, mass lootings of shrimp ponds, the burning down of
brothels, robberies of plantation harvests and the holding of
street rallies to bring village heads down.

Dr. Richard Gunther, executive director of the Office of
International Studies, recently discussed the characteristics of
such transition periods with The Jakarta Post.

The director, who is also a professor of political science at
Ohio State University in the United States, has made a
comparative study on transitions to democracy in Latin America
and Southern Europe.

He was one of a number of experts who attended an
international seminar, Toward Structural Reforms for
Democratization in Indonesia, here in Jakarta from Aug. 12 to
Aug. 14.

The seminar was organized by the Indonesian Institute of
Sciences and the Ford Foundation.

Question: How would you describe the transition period we are
in at the moment?

Gunther: We are currently experiencing a period that I
will refer to as a liberalization phase in which the constraints
on a number of freedoms under the more authoritarian regime are
now being relaxed. But we are also not at a point where there is
a clear commitment to what we would regard as democracy.

And democracy would certainly mean that, for example, there
would not be reserved seats in the MPR (People's Consultative
Assembly). Instead, there would be direct elections for the
important legislative bodies and, if you opt for a presidential
system, the president would also be elected directly.

Now barring that direct commitment, there is a great deal of
uncertainty about whether this is a mere loosening of some
constraints in an authoritarian regime or whether it will
eventually culminate in a democracy.

Under those circumstances, opposition forces -- certainly
students would be among them -- have an incentive to mobilize in
the streets as a means of trying to push the incumbent government
toward more far-reaching reforms, if not full-fledged
democratization.

Q: What kind of risks does this period bring?

G: During this period, I think the risks of polarization are the
greatest as long as the main arena for dialog between those who
want to bring about democracy and the incumbent government is on
the streets.

You have the possibility of violence, in which, as I described
(in the seminar), a jumble of rocks, clubs and tear gas is set in
motion once somebody throws a rock. Police then charge in with
their batons, firing tear gas all over the place. It risks
destabilizing everything.

Q: Is this common during a democratic transition?

G: It's unhealthy for a democratic transition, but it may be the
logical outcome of a lack of clear commitment to democratization.
This is characteristic of periods that a number of other
countries experienced while in democratic transition.

Spain's earliest period and the earliest period in Portugal
before it went through revolution saw this. And it was also
characteristic of a case that most people would be familiar with:
Gorbachev's reforms in Russia. Gorbachev loosened up a great deal
but never committed himself to democracy. He was never on record
as clearly favoring democracy.

What that meant was that there were massive mobilizations of
sections of society, especially in places like Estonia where they
were pressing for far-reaching change. Now this frightened many
moderates and conservatives because even though they may have
been in favor of democratization, they were wary of civil unrest.
They were not in favor of a breakdown of public order.

What that means is that individuals who otherwise would be
willing to go along with change become frightened and can fall
into the hands of reactionaries who want to oppose all political
reform. That's what typically happens in such a period.

Q: What are other characteristics of this phase?

G: There is a mobilization of various groups in society on the
one hand and a crackdown by the police and the military on the
other. Polarization breaks up any semblance of consensus and
again this is very typical in this period and so we should
progress through it as quickly as possible. The clearest way to
end this particular unstable period is for there to be a clear
commitment to democratization.

If, for example, President Habibie said the 1999 DPR (House of
Representatives) would function as a constituent assembly to
either reform the 1945 Constitution or replace it with a new
constitution, either would show a commitment to democratization.

So once such a clear commitment is made, typically you find a
demobilization on the part of those calling for change because
there is a feeling that there is no longer any need to push the
government. Then their elected representatives to the constituent
assembly would be in a more powerful position to create change.

Once this takes place, the dynamic of political change is
fundamentally altered, and for that reason I think that once this
commitment is made, this uncertainty is alleviated. The main
point is that going halfway toward democratization is the most
destabilizing. It is the most dangerous situation to be in
because it maximizes uncertainty.

Q: In the seminar, you mentioned a common thing that happens to
both authoritarian systems and democratic systems...

G: Both an authoritarian system and democratic systems have clear
rules that constrain behavior.

In an authoritarian system, you know that if you attempt to
actively involve yourself in politics you could be attacked by
police or end up in jail. I mean everybody understands what the
rules are: You just stay out of politics.

Conversely, in a democratic system, everybody knows what the
rules are. The rules are you exercise your right to vote, you
peacefully protest, you write letters to your legislators, you
have a complete freedom of the press but you cannot, under any
circumstances, resort to violence.

That's one of the clear rules of democracy. But in our
transition period to democracy, the old rules of the
authoritarian regime have broken down and the new rules of
democracy have yet to be set in place. In essence, there are no
rules. Because the old constraints are discredited, nobody takes
them seriously anymore. But we don't know what the new rules are
and as a result there is confusion over what is proper behavior
and what is improper behavior and that's an additional incentive
for, say, the police or the military to crack down. Its a very
dangerous set of circumstances.

And I think that's a very important point because it is the
characteristic of virtually every transition to democracy. Look
at the East European transitions in 1989, for example, when it
was clear that some kind of political change was going to take
place. There was massive mobilization in the streets.

Q: How has it turned out in other countries?

G: In some cases it turned out well, as in Czechoslovakia. In
other cases, as in Rumania, it did not turn out well and you had
open warfare between Caeusescu's (former president Nicolae
Ceausescu) followers and the military.

But in every case, there was a massive mobilization in favor
of change. Once democratization had been proclaimed as the
ultimate objective, there was an immediate demobilization and
more stability. And I think that's the status that would benefit
peaceful change.

Q: If full-blown change does not take place immediately, would it
take a long time before any real change takes place?

G: It depends. I mean, I was in China in 1989 during such a
period, you know where you had Jiang Zemin making vague
statements that were construed by the students as an indication
that some change was going to take place. But then you had
hardliners, like Li Peng, who put an end to it immediately.

In fact, I was in China on the day of the crackdown in
Tiananmen Square. I was in Wuhan during that entire period and
that's why I am so concerned about this particular stage of
transition because it does create uncertainties. It provides
incentives for mobilization. The rules are unclear, making it
highly possible for a reactionary antidemocratic crackdown.

The painless way to do it is to have a clear statement from
the President indicating that the country will be open to
discussion over the way democratic change takes shape.

Q: But the Habibie regime is widely regarded as having stemmed
from the Soeharto regime. We also have a very strong Armed
Forces...

G: Both of those would be characteristic of many of the countries
that have gone through democratic transitions. For example,
Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, the prime minister of Spain who created
Spanish democracy, had been the secretary-general of the Falange,
Franco's national movement. Nobody trusted him either.

When the new prime minister was announced, everybody said he
was not credible. Nobody trusted him. But it turned out to be the
exact opposite. He was the person who stood between the old
regime and a new potential democratic regime. Therefore, he was
in the ideal position to be a broker between the two.

Q: Do you see Habibie in that place too?

G: He could be. I don't know what his goals are. That's the
problem. I mean, he could either be a Suarez who brought about
democracy or a Gorbachev who was toppled from power.

Gorbachev never made a commitment to democracy... he was
always vacillating, never making it clear what his ultimate
objective was.

On the other hand, Suarez said he wanted a democratic election
and a new constitution. So I don't see that the background of a
particular political figure is problematic. It really depends on
current behavior. In fact, his background gives him legitimacy
among those who were loyal to the old regime.

Juan Linz (a Yale University professor) was referring to this
(in the seminar). Its important to create both a forward
legitimacy, that is by establishing the new democratic rules of
the game and seeking a democratic consensus, and to maintain a
backward legitimacy, that is during this intervening period you
retain the loyalty of those who were loyal to the old regime.
Those are favorable circumstances, rather than unfavorable.

Q: What about the military?

G: With regard to the military, again, this is up to the military
in many respects. If the military has decided that it will not
tolerate change, then who knows what will happen.

If it is absolutely opposed to change, the military would have
to confront a scenario in which the kind of unrest that we saw a
couple of months ago could happen again. And if it wants a future
that looks like that, it would be something that it would bring
down on itself.

The Spanish military under Franco... everybody was afraid
what the military would think (when change started to occur).

Well, the point was, the military was interested in performing
its central military mission, which is the defense of the nation
against foreign aggression and maintaining the integrity of the
state.

And in many cases, the fears about what the military would do
in Spain were totally unwarranted because the military didn't
care about many issues that a lot of people thought they were
intensely interested in.

But not being an expert on Indonesia, let alone the Indonesian
military, I'm not in a position to know exactly what they think.
But if, in fact, the main goal of the military is to maintain the
territorial integrity of the state -- either to prevent complete
disintegration or in order to prevent foreign invasion -- and if
they respect the change of command which is inherent in military
organizations everywhere, there is no reason to automatically
assume the military would oppose democratic change.

Q: If the crisis persists, do you think the military would
declare a state of emergency?

G: That's always possible. But note that that's more likely to
take place during the time of turmoil.

Q: So it is not very likely?

G: I can't predict one way or another. It would be more likely to
take place if there were constant mass mobilizations in the
streets. But if you move quickly to the state of democratization
that involves negotiations between legitimate representatives of
the contending forces in Indonesian society, the military has no
reason to intervene.

Because you know that whatever democratic regime comes into
existence will respect the military's integrity. In fact, there
may be, as I know to be the case in Spain, a dramatic improvement
in the military under a democratic administration.

The Spanish military was underpaid. Their mission was not
clear when the socialist party, this was the former hated
opposition, became the government in Spain in 1982. They
significantly increased the military's pay, modernized the
military and gave it a modern mission by giving it an active role
in NATO. And there is every indication that the Spanish military
is extremely happy with the current democratic regime.

Q: On the other hand, you have the general populace who lived
under political repression and is now suddenly bursting onto the
scene with more than 60 political parties, some with very
exclusive overtones. What do you think about this?

G: It's certainly a risk. That is exactly why the lack of a clear
commitment to democracy is so dangerous because there are intense
demands. It's like a pressure cooker, I mean, when the pressure
is on, it could blow, but once the pressure is off, you know the
pot is boiling.

Q: So there is still a possibility that stability can be
maintained even after 30 years of political repression?

G: Look at Spain. It was 40 years and it was very easily
maintained.

Q: But Spain is not as socially diverse as Indonesia...

G: Well, 30 percent of Spain's population speak languages other
than Spanish. I mean, they also speak Spanish just as most people
here speak Indonesian, but there is tremendous diversity there.

And again, in dealing with ethnic diversity I think there was
a very important point made in the seminar by Donald Horowitz (a
Harvard professor) when he argued that the worst thing that you
could do is to pretend that there is no ethnic diversity and
continue to insist upon the imposition of a centralized unitary
state while not giving any autonomy to those regional groups that
aspire to autonomy.

The best thing you could do is to very quickly grant them some
measure of autonomy and negotiate over how much autonomy they
will have in the future.

Again, that was the Spanish model. One of the very first
things Adolfo Suarez did was to temporarily reestablish
governments in the Basque country and Catalonia to immediately
restore their dignity.

It made them feel as if they were a part of a Spanish reform
and there were wonderful scenes there.

The former secretary-general in Franco's political party who
became prime minister of Spain reestablished the Catalonia
government. He even visited Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia,
on Catalonia's national day and was surrounded by 300,000 people
crying with joy.

And I think that these kinds of political gestures are
important at this particular moment. One of my students did his
dissertation on this. He called it the "generosity moment" in the
transition. Small conciliatory gestures have an impressive
symbolic impact on the dynamic of the transition itself. It
restores confidence and gives a feeling that it is possible to
achieve change through open dialog with former political
opponents. (hbk)