Getting rid of the military's dual-function

Getting rid of the military's dual-function

Tiarma Siboro, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Although it has formally abandoning the much criticized dual
function (Dwifungsi) doctrine, the Indonesian Military (TNI) is
yet to shed its image as a "troublemaker".

Normally, the military's presence in an area of conflict will
raise the hope that peace and order will be restored.

But that is not always the case. Look at the heavy military
presence in areas of conflict in Maluku, North Maluku, Poso,
Aceh, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya.

Critics have long suspected that the military have no genuine
intention to put out communal and separatist conflicts in various
regions. Some have even charge that the military added fuel to
the fire.

The benefit they gain range from short-term like selling arms
to the warring factions to the long-term such as showing that the
military is still high in demand because The country is unsafe.
The speculation receives mere credence when communal conflict in
Poso, Aceh and Irian Jaya got even worse amid news that 50,000
troops have been deployed in areas of conflict.

Military data shows that the largest troop deployment is in
Aceh and Maluku, where some 22,000 personnel are now stationed.
The remaining troops are stationed in several other regions such
as Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, and Poso in Central Sulawesi.

Syamsuddin Haris, a senior observer of the National Institute
of Sciences (LIPI), has cynically said that the existing
conflicts amount to constitute lucrative "projects" managed by
"those who don't want to see the struggle for reform and
democracy in this country a success."

Syamsuddin is pessimistic that the government is be able to
settle the problems because otherwise there must be a deal that
would favor the military.

Soeharto's militaristic regime's fall on May 21, 1998 after
ruling Indonesia with an iron fist for 32 years rekindled hope
for political reform that would allow the civil society to
flourish.

The wind of change following the dictator's fall and the had
also prompted the military to reform. The most important move was
probably dropping the dual function doctrine that allowed it both
defense and political role.

The military liquidated its social and political affairs posts
in 1998 and created a territorial affairs post, which was also
scrapped in November.

Both TNI's social and political roles, and later its
territorial roles, had been seen as hampering democracy because
they allowed the military to become deeply involved in civilian
affairs.

To support its role, TNI has extensive network: Regional
Military Commands (Kodam) in nearly all of Indonesia's 31
provinces, Military Resort Commands (Korem) in the smaller
provinces, District Military Commands (Kodim) in regencies and
mayoralties, Subdistrict Military Commands (Koramil) in
subdistricts and Military Representative Posts in villages.

Over the past year, TNI internal reform remains rhetorical.
Its leadership does not seem to have any a clear vision on where
the military is heading for. The territorial post has been
dropped from the military's organization structure but not the
omnipresent supporting institutions used for so long to back
Soeharto regime.

Many have also charged that after abolishing its territorial
function, TNI established and trained civilian militias in
several conflict regions such as Red-and-White Task Force in
Irian Jaya. TNI has also been understood to have defended the
involvement of Laskar Jihad in sectarian conflicts in Maluku and
Poso.

The presence of these militias, of course, is only worsening
the conflict and makes all efforts to stop them futile.

A high ranking military officer at the TNI Headquarters who
asked to be anonymity once revealed that military prefers to use
a strategy called "war by proxy".

"Supporting the militia is intended to cover up the military's
involvement in the conflicts," he said.

Friction in the military top leadership is has Been well-
known. The best-known was probably that of between former Army's
Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) chief, the late Lt. Gen.
Agus Wirahadikusumah, and former TNI's chief of territorial
Affairs Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo. Their rivalry broke into the open
when the two promoted a review over TNI's territorial roles..

Wirahadikusumah, an outspoken general, insisted that TNI must
abolish its territorial role and scrap its institutions at the
command level (from the village to provincial). Widjojo was
fiercely opposed to the idea. He proposed, instead, that TNI
should transfer its territorial authority to the local
administration and national police.

Widjojo also said that should TNI dissolve its institutions at
command level, it must be done in phases and might take years.

The TNI chief Adm. Widodo A.S. later clarified Widjojo's
statement, saying that the eliminating TNI territorial function
did not mean dissolving its institutions at the command level.

Speaking in a hearing with the House of Representatives'
Commission I on Political, Security, and Foreign Affairs, Widodo
said that the presence of TNI's command level across the country
aimed at safeguarding security.

But in fact many believe that the bottomline of the endless
debate among the top officers on the territorial issue is that
the military is reluctant to go back to barrack as the reformist
demand.