Germany modifies defense policy

LONDON: Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has moved further and faster in shedding the constraints on the use of its armed forces than many observers had initially anticipated:

* the legal issue over the use of its armed forces 'out of area' has been resolved;

* a new blueprint for the Bundeswehr includes the full spectrum of peace-support and possible combat missions beyond national borders;

* German elite and public opinion are more supportive of a new military role;

* the political debate has shifted so far that Bonn's participation in new missions is no longer a question of whether, but when, where and how much.

On Dec. 13, 1996, the Bundestag approved by 499 votes to 93 the participation of 3,000 German troops in the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. Whereas German forces in the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) had a support role, this has been expanded and upgraded in SFOR. Not only will Bonn become the fourth largest troop contributor in the Balkans, but it has now crossed a symbolic rubicon: this is the first deployment of German troops abroad in a potential combat mission since World War II.

These changes amount to a 'national personality shift' in post-war German politics. This modification in security policy is the most significant development in German attitudes towards the use of force and the armed forces in nearly 50 years. There has also been a concomitant shift in German foreign-policy priorities. While the U.S. and NATO remain crucial to Europe's overall security structure, Bonn's top priority is increasing European integration.

German officials believe that the U.S. wants to shed at least part of its security burden in Europe. They see a stronger European security and defense identity (ESDI) as the way to create a more cohesive and credible European partner for Washington. They also see closer European integration, especially with France, as a precondition for Germany assuming a greater military role beyond its borders. To this end, Paris and Bonn signed a strategy document in December 1996 in which they agreed to open discussions on the role of nuclear deterrence in European security policy, and enhanced cooperation in other areas. While German officials would deny that Bonn has downgraded its ties with Washington, actions such as supporting the transfer of NATO's Southern Command from U.S. to European control underscore Bonn's shifting priorities. In essence, Germany is placing greater emphasis on its European than on its Atlanticist credentials.

German policy has changed in response to three post-Cold War factors. The first is Germany's new strategic position in Europe. Once a divided country located at the center of East-West military confrontation, unified Germany is now surrounded by allies and friendly countries. Furthermore, it plays the role of bridge-builder in a still unbalanced Europe. Bonn has met this challenge by making the integration and Westernization of its eastern neighbors through European Union (EU) and NATO enlargement one of its top priorities.

Second, political events convinced the German political class that Bonn had to change its security thinking and role to avoid being marginalised in Europe and internationally. The 1991 Gulf War followed by conflict in the former Yugoslavia destroyed the comfortable illusion that conflicts could always be resolved through peaceful means and that war had been banned from Europe and its environs. In both cases, Bonn realized that limiting the role of the Bundeswehr was forcing it to pay a heavy price financially and politically. Unable to meet the needs and expectations of its key allies, its influence was waning.

German leaders also realized that if policies did not change, Bonn risked contributing to the paralysis and decay of precisely those institutions considered vital to Germany's future security. The result has been a concerted effort to steer German policy and politics carefully towards a new consensus based on a 'return to normalcy' and the principle that Germany, while remaining sensitive to the legacy of history, has to assume the same responsibilities as its allies.

Third, this new look in security policy has been facilitated by the shift in German elite and public opinion on security issues. Successive polls have shown that a majority of Germans favor assuming a larger security role, and support German participation in peacekeeping operations. On the issue of Germany's involvement in combat missions beyond its borders, however, elite and public opinion still diverge.

Against this background, Bonn has also moved to reform and restructure the Bundeswehr. Current plans, when fully implemented, are designed to give it a modest but potent capability to project military forces and operate as a key ally in future coalition operations. While the Bundeswehr has been reduced to 340,000 troops, Bonn has also created some 50,000 Crisis Reaction Forces (CRF). Although German military leaders emphasis that the Main Defense Forces (MDF) are the backbone of the armed forces, developing the CRF is a priority.

The CRF's mission will be in-region defense throughout NATO territory, as well as participation in future crisis-management operations. Future German peacekeeping contributions will also come from these assets. The CRF are designed to deploy in one major operation (up to an army division along with corresponding air assets) as well as participating simultaneously in smaller missions, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.

As impressive as such changes have been, Germany still faces several major dilemmas. The first is when and where it will be willing to deploy its armed forces and for what purpose. While German officials speak in Europe's name, they still distance themselves from their European allies when it comes to missions they dislike, such as the aborted intervention operation in Zaire.

Instead, Bonn insists that the core task for the Bundeswehr remains German and NATO defense. However, with EU and NATO enlargement, Germany is unlikely to have to worry about defending national soil. It will undoubtedly be asked to provide forces for possible Article 5 contingencies on the flanks of an enlarged Alliance, or non-Article 5 missions beyond its borders, but neither of these contingencies are likely to involve the defense of German territory. In short, Germany will eventually join the US, the UK, France and others as the key force providers in the Alliance.

But will the changes go far enough to meet the new requirements? The Bundeswehr remains heavily oriented towards territorial defense with an emerging capability for peacekeeping and a more questionable capability for larger or more demanding war-fighting missions. The CRF will constitute, when completed, 70% of the air force, nearly 100% of the navy but only 16% of the army.

While German officials justify the need for conscript forces that can provide nearly 700,000 troops as necessary to maintain stability in Central Europe, it is unclear whether the current structure can provide the kinds of forces that Washington might ideally like Germany to provide. The U.S. might prefer a force with more deployable CRF and MDF, less focused on territorial defense and instead capable of conducting higher-intensity military missions over greater distances than is currently the German plan.

Second, it is not clear whether Germany will be able fully to implement these reform plans given the progressive cuts in the defense budget as Bonn moves to ensure that it complies with the budget-deficit criteria required for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). A series of recent budget cuts have thus far largely been absorbed by freezing procurement for the MDF while preserving funds for the CRF. Additional cuts for the MDF will further erode the careful balance in the overall Bundeswehr structure and may create a two-tiered armed force, something German military leaders strongly oppose.

The real financial crunch will come when the procurement budget for the MDF has already been reduced to save funds and Bonn must still finance several major procurement items - such as the Eurofighter and the Franco-German Tiger helicopter - which will only further deplete investment funds. Even more draining is German involvement in France's Helios and Horus spy satellite programs. Such issues may force Bonn to consider further cuts in force structure if it is to avoid developing a hollow force and find the funds for defense modernization within existing budgetary constraints.

No one in Bonn is eager to face this issue, however, because it immediately brings into play the third dilemma: whether Germany can and should retain a conscript army. Both demographic and financial pressures undercut the draft's viability. Germany's political class is strongly and emotionally committed to the draft, arguing that it has helped heal the post-war rift between army and society, that service to the state remains important for democracy and that a large conscript army still contributes to strategic stability.

It remains questionable whether Germany can maintain a first- rate armed force able to participate fully in the new missions its key allies are primarily interested in while its armed forces are conscript-based. Additionally, it will be difficult for such a force to absorb the changes in military doctrine and technology effectively.

Some German officials respond to this dilemma by suggesting an implicit division of labor whereby Germany retains its current defense model, contributes to peacekeeping on Europe's periphery, but refrains from any out-of-area war-fighting missions, leaving those operations to countries such as the U.S., the UK and France. In return, Germany would assume primary responsibility for stabilizing new NATO members in Eastern and Central Europe, by making modest adjustments to its current structures. This division of labor runs the double risk of not keeping Germany's principal allies fully engaged in the East, and marginalising Germany on other major strategic issues where Bonn would not be a key player. Despite this, Bonn's security agenda increasingly overlaps with Paris rather than Washington.