Tue, 05 Jun 2001

German historian discusses Sukarno in a troubled time

By Aboeprijadi Santoso

AMSTERDAM (JP): The key idea to understanding Sukarno, according to the German historian Bernhard Dahm, 68, is charisma. This concept explains Sukarno's rise to power and the challenges he faced in leading Indonesia through changing times.

In 1964 Dr. Dahm wrote a thesis later published as Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesia's Independence (1969). He met Indonesia's first president in late 1966, a critical moment in the country's history.

Dahm said that a charismatic leader, in the sense referred to by sociologist Max Weber, "appears in times of rapid changes as fears of losing identity and social well being dominate the society".

In an interview with The Jakarta Post, Dahm added that in such times "there comes the need for a leader who can be trusted, who is oriented to traditional values, making himself part of the society and knowing how to (deal with) traditions so that people will not fall prey to changes".

But at the same time "(such a leader) understands modern ideas and challenges, and is able to translate these into the traditional context".

"Sukarno's synthetic idea of Nasakom (uniting nationalism, religion and communism) is a case in point," Dahm said.

"Therefore, a man like him is admired by his society, seen as (possessing) a special power or gift which can fulfill popular wishes."

However, he added, "it also shows that a charismatic leader is restricted to his time, that is, when people have expectations and need promises and help".

Thirty years after Sukarno's death, Dahm says Sukarno's messages "are no longer valuable".

"So it is not so much the legacy of the content of his messages, no more Nasakom, but it is more the form, how he approached difficult themes and questions, that becomes eminently important for Indonesia today."

Dahm cited the way Sukarno described his nationalism "as an openness".

"He borrowed concepts from Mahatma Gandhi, who said, 'My love of my homeland is part of my love for all mankind' and 'I'm a patriot because I'm a man and a human being, no one is excluded from my life.'"

Nationalism for Sukarno, therefore, "must be broad-minded and reject narrow, exclusive ideas".

"This explains why he succeeded in convincing, for instance, the Dayaks or the Bataks that they are all Indonesians, not looking at them as minorities."

Dahm stressed that "this nonexclusivism is relevant today".

Dahm said in 1958 he began to read about Sukarno, but material was hard to get. "I needed years to study the archives," he said.

In 1966, Dahm met Sukarno: "He was very much as I expected him to be: charming, friendly and polite."

"Westerners," he adds, "who considered him a devil were surprised."

He tells of when Sukarno met the press attache to the German Embassy in Jakarta, Mrs. Muller.

When he asked her name, she said her name was a very ordinary German name.

"To her surprise," Dahm recalls, "Sukarno said, 'No, no, that's not ordinary, that's a very popular name.' Sukarno was right and the lady was beaming and happy. What a charmer he was, she said."

Dahm met Sukarno at Merdeka Palace in October 1966, when the Mahmilub (the special court for members of the military or the Communist Party involved in the 1965 coup attempt) was going on.

"We talked about the Gestapu (the abortive coup of Sept. 30, 1965). At that moment, Gen. Soeharto was somewhere in the palace, and Sukarno told me that some people said Soeharto was going to depose him."

In August, the military commander of East Java, Gen. Soemitro, "asked me about the (pro-Sukarno) KKO (Marines) and Siliwangi forces in Jakarta..."

"So, I believe, the so-called March 11 (1966) order (transferring power to Soeharto) was exaggerated. Even in October Soeharto was not yet really in command. And Sukarno's speech on Aug. 17, 1966, was not to the liking of the generals. Only in December did the military commanders decide to depose him."

October was tense, Dahm said. "Sukarno was not in command of everything, but very calm. There was no impression that he was completely out. Not at all."

"All the propaganda against him actually started with the Mahmilub. The dailies Api Pantjasila and Angkatan Bersendjata discussed the sweet life Sukarno had with people like (businessman) Jusuf Muda Dalam, who was then tried by the Mahmilub."

This was in September, Dahm said, when respect for Sukarno was still very high in the media. The Mahmilub "brought his image down; that he was womanizing, spending a lot of money, had a good time while people had nothing to eat, etc."

Such talk about the president over the course of the Mahmilub and the trial of former foreign minister Soebandrio gave rise to the image that Soebandrio was sent to China by Sukarno to conspire against the generals.

"So there was something building up to downgrade Sukarno, so that when he was finally deposed people would not rebel. Power according to Javanese ideas, according to (Indonesianist) Ben Anderson, is a quantitative thing. Sukarno had immense power and in order to get rid of some of that quantity, they started to discriminate against him by means of the Mahmilub."

"That," argues Dahm, "was the character assassination of Sukarno in order to depose him."

Dahm never believed in Sukarno's involvement in the attempted coup. "During the revolution people killed Dutchmen. When someone brought the head of a Dutch soldier to the palace to be shown to Sukarno, he was angry.

"He shouted, he didn't want to see it and didn't want to see the killings. So if we think of the killings on the night of Sept. 30, 1965, that could never have been with the consent of Sukarno.

"October 1966 was a time of decision for Sukarno. By then, he faced the option of either outlawing the Communist Party and remaining president or being deposed."

Dahm said he further discussed the concept of uniting nationalism, religion and communism with the president.

"I asked him why he still believed in Nasakom and claimed to be a Marxist when the students on the street had banners saying 'Bung Karno is the mastermind of Gestapu'. I said, 'You are no Marxist' and he insisted, 'Yes, I'm a Marxist."

"'But your way of thinking is more idealistic than materialistic,' I said. Then he replied, 'Ah, you Germans, you are too fond of theories. Of course, I'm a Marxist, but not only a Marxist, I'm also a Muslim and a nationalist.'"

That is the key to Sukarno the person, says Dahm. "Not dominated by tactics, one day putting his weight behind the Army, next behind Aidit (the communist leader) and the third day behind the Islamic groups."

"He really wanted unity. So his goal was still Nasakom, believing it was possible to bring these groups together to build a prosperous Indonesia .... "

"Sukarno was convinced," says Dahm, "that according to Indonesian traditions, different groups could come together to achieve a common goal, i.e. improving people's welfare."

"I told him that this was correct when Hinduism and Islam came and you could make the synthesis. But with modern communications that you cannot control, it is no longer so in the 20th century. But Sukarno didn't want to listen."

"He agreed with me, that he as a Javanese saw things differently, more synthetically, whereas Hatta and Sutan Syahrir were more analytical."

"Sukarno succeeded," Dahm concludes, "in giving the people the feeling that Indonesia is a nation. That is what holds Indonesia together, and is his most important legacy."

Of his daughter Megawati Soekarnoputri, she "now has the duty to keep this alive. Her appeal to the people is itself a legacy of Sukarno..."

The writer is a journalist in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.