Generals in the dock?

Generals in the dock?

Perhaps it is the novelty of the phenomenon. Or it could be
the expectation that with such highly placed officials as former
military commanders testifying before the country's judicial and
law enforcement authorities, Indonesians will finally learn what
crimes were committed by the state or its instruments in the name
of national stability during the 32 years of the New Order.

Whatever the case, the intense interest with which the public
is following the latest developments is justified: Indonesians
are totally unaccustomed to seeing top ranking officials, much
less generals of the once all-powerful Army, being summoned by
law enforcement officers to answer questions about their role in
past violence and atrocities or, in official parlance, the
excessive use of force. After all, it was not so long ago that
the country's high and mighty could kill, or cause people to
disappear, with impunity.

It is true that in a couple of cases military tribunals were
set up to try police and military personnel involved in some of
the worst instances of violence that occurred in the recent past.
The fatal shooting of four Trisakti University students in May
1997, which sparked social unrest that forced president Soeharto
to step down, for example, is a case in point. Another involved
what has since become known as the Semanggi incident, in which
about a dozen people died.

None of those trials, however, satisfied the public's sense of
justice. Both failed to expose the person or persons responsible
for ordering the shooting or even for actually having fired the
fatal shots. Instead, the fatalities were judged mere results of
"errors in procedure". Both trials left the public still none the
wiser about what actually happened and who was responsible for
the deaths. No serious attempt was made in either case to take
the investigation to a higher level.

At this point in the reform movement's development, although
at what many activists consider a snail's pace, signs are
emerging, and with them hope, that investigators are finally
ready to be more serious in looking for the real causes and
perpetrators responsible for atrocities committed in the past.
Hence the summoning of officers whose onetime positions warrant
investigators' suspicions that they were either responsible or
knew about what happened at the time the violence occurred.

Cases in point are the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident in which at
least 40 people died, and the 1996 unrest following the forcible
takeover of the Indonesian Democratic Party headquarters from one
faction by another government-supported rival faction of the
party. Apart from lives lost, dozens of people were declared
missing after both incidents. In both cases, the official
announcements on the number of dead and missing were
unsatisfying.

Given all this it is not surprising that hopes are high that
the truth will finally emerge. At this point, though, it is
appropriate to caution the public against overoptimism which
might only lead to further frustration.

The public is correct to believe that those who can clear up
the doubt cloaking past atrocities are the people near the top of
the New Order's power pyramid at the time the events occurred. So
far, though, none of the top Army officers questioned -- with one
exception -- has shown the chivalry, courage or magnanimity to
acknowledge responsibility. Instead, they have shifted blame to
their subordinates or superiors, or even the system.

The one exception is Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, former
commander of the Army's Special Force (Kopassus). Although
denying having ordered or taken part in the kidnapping and
torture of reform activists in 1997 and early 1998, Prabowo
accepted responsibility for the incidents due to his position.
Indonesians can only hope that the time will come soon when
chivalry becomes an integral part of the spirit of service of the
country's military officers.