General election results reveal the real Indonesia

General election results reveal the real Indonesia

By Prapti Widinugraheni

Indonesia's next government will most likely rid itself of the
corruption of the Soeharto administration because of the people's
desire for reform, as expressed through the ballot box. H.S.
Dillon, a former government official turned government critic,
and currently a member of the National Commission on Human
Rights, shares the reasons behind his optimism over the next
administration.

Question: Corruption, collusion and nepotism were cultivated
by Soeharto's regime and basically are now systemic. How can you
be sure that a new government will not make the same mistake as
Soeharto's administration?

Dillon: It goes beyond just being systemic. Soeharto was very
adept at using corruption as an instrument for regime
maintenance. And this is what I would call a Mafia style of
management. This means that anybody in the Mafia hierarchy has to
commit a crime, and once you have committed a crime you are held
for ransom. That is why the salaries of all officials and
government employees were kept so low, so that almost everybody
had to be corrupt. Why did Soeharto and his people do this?
Because they realized they needed the bureaucracy as their source
of support.

Now, for the first time in 30 years, or maybe 20 years because
initially Golkar had a clear constituency -- Megawati (Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle chairwoman) and Gus Dur (Abdurrahman
Wahid, National Awakening Party chairman) will have a clear
constituency. And they will not be dependent on the bureaucracy
for support. That means they will have to address the needs of
this constituency -- the real needs -- because they have been
democratically elected.

Q: And how do you propose they eliminate the corruption which has
been so deeply embedded for such a long time?

D: I have a very simple formula. We would have to arrest a
handful of officials who are very easy to identify, in the sense
that they are people that the public at large knows are very
corrupt. Then we would issue a blanket pardon: Any junior
official who comes up with evidence that can be used to convict a
former superior -- even though this means he has also been
corrupt and equally guilty -- would be let free. That is the only
way you can come up with evidence. Because asking for evidence of
corruption is, well, contrary to reason, because successful
corruption is corruption where you don't leave any traces.

So I think it is necessary and crucial for the next
government, in the first six months of its administration, to
prove and demonstrate that it is going to be different from the
previous government. If you look back in history, there was a
time when we actually had very good officials. Prior to 1955,
when government salaries were good and there was a working
democracy, people were very honest. People were doing well and
they were ashamed of being corrupt. I personally believe that
it's not whether Megawati and Gus Dur will want to (prove they
are different from the previous government); I think we, the
people, will never let them (do otherwise).

Q: There seems to be a lot of backroom politics, secret deals,
compromises and other political games between political party
leaders. As a 'people's advocate', do you see this as an
'elephant fight with the deer crushed in the middle' (to quote an
Indonesian saying)?

D: Not really, because what these elections have done is expose
the fraudulent claims to majority by various groups and various
elite. People -- the elite -- have asked me: 'What type of people
voted for Megawati?' And this is why I say the Indonesian elite
is not ready for democracy. The people are, the elite is not.
Because for the last 20 years, the elite -- in collaboration with
the Army, since technocrats can only come into power when you
have authoritarian states -- have never had their position
questioned. So in the past, the elite always thought they
represented Indonesia, that they constituted Indonesia. And so
come questions like these -- which came from a close friend of
mine with a PhD -- asking why I thought Megawati had to be
president and what sort of people voted for her.

And that's the very essence, because the people who voted for
Megawati, Gus Dur, they are Indonesia. We are not Indonesia, they
are more Indonesia than we are. That's the essence of democracy.
And that's why it's important to see that this momentum keeps
building, so that in rural areas institutions like cooperatives,
which have become what I call extracted institutions, can be
retransformed into representative institutions. It's very
important that you have an effective working democracy in rural
areas before you have decentralization, before you provide
autonomy. If you were to provide autonomy now, without a working
democracy or the capacity of farmers and the rural community to
organize itself and press for their needs, then instead of one
centralized tyrant you'd have 27 or more decentralized tyrants.

Q: Do you see the blood oaths by Megawati's followers as
primitive intimidation which can be manipulated and lead to
further bloodshed, making it not much different from Soeharto's
style of rule (as stated by Amien Rais)?

D: Why has Megawati kept quiet all this time? Why did she appear
to condone these blood oaths? When you are faced with circulars
saying that people of a certain faith should not vote for those
from different faiths within this nation-state -- which, mind
you, was designed by the founding fathers as a multiethnic,
multireligious nation-state -- when you are confronted with these
sorts of people, the only language they understand is the
language they speak. Their language is a primitive one; they try
to circumscribe. In fact, they are so undemocratic they were
trying to terrorize their own faith. So (the blood oaths) are
more a means -- a response, rather -- that speaks in that same
language. What those people who are signing their names in blood
are saying is: Our candidate has won, don't try to stop her. So
actually, they are being very democratic.

They are cognizant of the fact that people around Habibie,
even if he has denied it, have been effectively using money to
garner support from within Golkar. We know for a fact that there
were a lot of people who were against him initially, and now they
are for him. Either he has a very convincing argument, or there
have been other instruments employed to convince them. Now we're
afraid because there are so many people in the current
administration -- and I say that this transitional administration
is much more corrupt than the previous one -- who have the
capacity to use these funds to, how should I say, convince
members of the legislature to vote for Habibie. So (the blood
oaths) are a very natural response.

Q: What do you think of the International Monetary Fund's reform
program for Indonesia? Can a new government implement it?

D: I don't believe in (the IMF). You see, if you look at the
IMF's reforms, then what is immediately apparent is that they are
here to set the agenda for us. The IMF is telling us what is good
for us. OK, if you're dealing with a corrupt government, fine.
The IMF and the World Bank have shaped the agenda with the
consent of the current government -- the elite -- the same elite
which was in a state of denial until Soeharto was forced to step
aside. Let me be more specific. Ginandjar (coordinating minister
for economy and finance), who is the chief architect now, was the
chief architect of the GBHN (State Policy Guidelines) 1998. And
if you have time to delve into it, this made no mention at all of
the crisis. Can you imagine that? So here they were preparing
guidelines for the next five years, and they were denying what
was happening around them. How can anyone trust anything created
by them? There was a debate even then whether the clothes cut and
sewn by the IMF really fit Indonesia, let alone if they would fit
Indonesia in the future.

Compare Indonesia to Malaysia. Both will come out of this
crisis. The major difference will be, we will come out with a
huge debt. And if you look at the focus or emphasis of the IMF,
you can see it is very elitist, very urban. More or less, I
accuse them of trying to recreate Soeharto's Indonesia. No, I
want a people's Indonesia. So we'll have to renegotiate with the
IMF. Of course, I can understand why Kwik Kian Gie (of the
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) and others have said
we'll go along (with the IMF reforms). Because they don't want
Washington to stop the reforms now. I can understand that.

But no, I don't believe in them. You see, last year industrial
economies spent US$360 billion protecting their farmers. Their
farmers, who are probably a hundred times richer than you and I,
let alone our farmers. So unless someone can teach me how to
enhance the productivity of farmers without using nonmarket
measures, then I will believe that to achieve food security and
enhance the productivity of our farmers, we have to use all the
means at our disposal, market or otherwise.

Q: How should a new government respond to the IMF's reform
package?

D: They can carry them out as long as the reforms really address
the needs of the constituents, and because it is a different ball
game now. You won't be catering to the needs of the urban elite.
It was the small people who brought Megawati and Gus Dur into
power. People that we, the elite, dismiss as if they were not
citizens.

Q: Do you see yourself anywhere in the new government?

D: For me, it is much more important to serve. So far, I have
been very fortunate that I have been able to serve the people by
just coming out and criticizing. Of course, if I were to be put
on the team, a team whose members respected each other and whose
objectives were really to meet the demands of the people, then
for me it would be an honor and I would be very willing to serve.
It all depends: If they deliver, then it would really be a
privilege for me to join them. If, however, they were to continue
with the old mode, then there would be no point.

Q: What paradigm shifts and economic policies do you think are
necessary?

D: In the initial years of Soeharto, the 1960s, growth opposed
equity. You thought there was a trade-off between growth and
equity. In later years, you said it could be done in parallel,
growth with equity. Now, I believe you should have growth through
equity. That equity is an instrument and equity comes first.