Futile to only cut off heads of jihadi hydro terror

Futile to only cut off heads of jihadi hydro terror

B. Raman, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

The bomb explosion in Jakarta on Tuesday is a reminder that
terrorist motivation remains as strong as ever, despite
determined action by governments of the region. Southeast Asia
has been experiencing what India has experienced for over a
decade -- the carnage of the hydra-headed monster of jihadi
terrorism. The more heads one cuts off, the more they grow.
Captures and body counts are unreliable indicators of progress
made in the action against them.

The Jakarta blast came two days before an Indonesian court was
due to give its verdict on one of the accused in the October 2002
Bali bombings.

It also came two days after the telecast by the Al Arabiya TV
station in the Gulf of a tape purported to be of Ayman al-
Zawahiri, number 2 to Osama bin Laden in al-Qaeda, in which he
warned: "All those who handed over the prisoners to America or to
any of its agents will also pay. Let it be clear to those who
conspire with America that America cannot defend itself, let
alone defend others."

Was the timing intended? It is difficult to say.

Acts of terrorism to intimidate the judiciary are not uncommon
in India, but the Jakarta blast, which was directed at the
American-owned JW Marriott Hotel, does not appear to have been
meant for the Indonesian judiciary. If they had wanted to convey
a warning to the judiciary, they would have chosen as their
target a building associated with the judiciary or at least the
government.

Was it in pursuance of Ayman's warning to the United States
and its collaborators? Possibly, but one cannot be certain.

Though the target was a U.S.-owned hotel, the manner in which
the operation was carried out and the relatively few foreign
casualties indicate that it was more of a shot-in-the-dark
operation than a well-planned and well-executed one.

The prime purpose of the blast seems to have been to proclaim
to the world and the region that jihadi terrorists are alive and
kicking, despite the successes claimed by regional governments in
their counter-terrorism operations.

One also cannot rule out an economic purpose to keep foreign
tourists and businessmen away from the region. Since November
last year, messages purporting to be from Osama, which have been
circulating in Asia, have underlined the economic component of
the jihad.

Countries in the region have stepped up counter-terrorism
operations and strengthened cooperation. Many arrests have been
made in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia
and Thailand. Successful investigations have led to quick
prosecutions. Many terrorist cells have been dismantled.

However, there have been setbacks. The authorities in the
Philippines and Indonesia remain unable to prevent major acts of
terrorism, and to identify and neutralize terrorist hideouts in
their territories.

In the 1960s and the 1970s, the governments of the region
cooperated effectively against communist and communist-inspired
insurgencies. Compared with the fight against jihadi terrorism,
the fight against communist insurgency was easier because
communism was an alien ideology that did not gel with the
thinking and religious beliefs of most people in the region.

Feelings of hostility towards the West and the U.S. were not
as widespread as they are today, and hence did not obstruct
effective counter-insurgency operations at national and regional
levels.

Jihadi terrorism is a different kettle of fish -- it is an
outgrowth of the soil of the region, and more ruthless. Its pan-
Islamic ideology finds ready resonance in the mindset and
religious beliefs of growing numbers of people in the region. The
vastly increased hostility towards the U.S. since the Gulf War of
1991 has provided this octopus with a strength it might not have
otherwise had.

Countries in the region woke up to the common danger posed by
jihadi terrorism only after 9/11, but jihadi terrorists have been
burrowing into this region for more than a decade, setting up
secret cells, networks, training camps and other infrastructure.

Initially, the leadership role in creating rear bases in the
region was taken by Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), with the help of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) of
Pakistan, which became a founding member of Osama's International
Islamic Front (IIF) in 1998.

HUM devised the strategy of helping its Filipino collaborators
set up a training infrastructure in those areas of the southern
Philippines which were no-go to the Filipino security forces, to
avoid bringing jihadi recruits to Pakistan for training.

Where Indonesia is concerned, the virus of jihadi terrorism
started spreading to the country from Pakistan and the
Philippines from the mid-1990s.

The Philippines and Indonesia have become the two sides of a
still incomplete jihadi triangle, and Malaysia is eyed as a
possible third rear base. In this assessment, conditions there
are congenial, with the presence of a large number of well-
motivated cadres who have studied in the madrasahs of Pakistan.

If they succeed, the region will be confronted with a
terrorism triangle similar to the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Saudi
Arabian triangle, from which most of the jihadi terrorists
operating against India and the U.S. presently come.

For the campaign against terrorism in Southeast Asia to be
effective, it has to thwart efforts of the jihadis to set up a
rear base in Malaysia, and act resolutely against the terrorist
infrastructure already set up in Indonesia and the southern
Philippines.

The current campaign appears to be largely personality-
focused. It seeks to identify terrorist leaders and render them
inoperative. Considerable intelligence has been collected about
personalities, fund flows and operational methods, but one still
cannot quantify with accuracy the threat that remains to be met
in terms of infrastructure, recruitment flows, motivation,
capabilities and future intentions.

While a personality-oriented campaign is important, equally,
if not more important, is one focused on infrastructure. Unless
the infrastructure across the region is identified and
eliminated, the more heads one cuts, the more they will grow.

The time has come for countries in the region to set up a
joint task force to focus on the identification and elimination
of the terrorist infrastructure across the region.

The writer is Additional Secretary (Retired), Cabinet
Secretariat, Government of India, and presently Director,
Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai.