Futile to only cut off heads of jihadi hydro terror

B. Raman, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

The bomb explosion in Jakarta on Tuesday is a reminder that terrorist motivation remains as strong as ever, despite determined action by governments of the region. Southeast Asia has been experiencing what India has experienced for over a decade -- the carnage of the hydra-headed monster of jihadi terrorism. The more heads one cuts off, the more they grow. Captures and body counts are unreliable indicators of progress made in the action against them.

The Jakarta blast came two days before an Indonesian court was due to give its verdict on one of the accused in the October 2002 Bali bombings.

It also came two days after the telecast by the Al Arabiya TV station in the Gulf of a tape purported to be of Ayman al- Zawahiri, number 2 to Osama bin Laden in al-Qaeda, in which he warned: "All those who handed over the prisoners to America or to any of its agents will also pay. Let it be clear to those who conspire with America that America cannot defend itself, let alone defend others."

Was the timing intended? It is difficult to say.

Acts of terrorism to intimidate the judiciary are not uncommon in India, but the Jakarta blast, which was directed at the American-owned JW Marriott Hotel, does not appear to have been meant for the Indonesian judiciary. If they had wanted to convey a warning to the judiciary, they would have chosen as their target a building associated with the judiciary or at least the government.

Was it in pursuance of Ayman's warning to the United States and its collaborators? Possibly, but one cannot be certain.

Though the target was a U.S.-owned hotel, the manner in which the operation was carried out and the relatively few foreign casualties indicate that it was more of a shot-in-the-dark operation than a well-planned and well-executed one.

The prime purpose of the blast seems to have been to proclaim to the world and the region that jihadi terrorists are alive and kicking, despite the successes claimed by regional governments in their counter-terrorism operations.

One also cannot rule out an economic purpose to keep foreign tourists and businessmen away from the region. Since November last year, messages purporting to be from Osama, which have been circulating in Asia, have underlined the economic component of the jihad.

Countries in the region have stepped up counter-terrorism operations and strengthened cooperation. Many arrests have been made in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand. Successful investigations have led to quick prosecutions. Many terrorist cells have been dismantled.

However, there have been setbacks. The authorities in the Philippines and Indonesia remain unable to prevent major acts of terrorism, and to identify and neutralize terrorist hideouts in their territories.

In the 1960s and the 1970s, the governments of the region cooperated effectively against communist and communist-inspired insurgencies. Compared with the fight against jihadi terrorism, the fight against communist insurgency was easier because communism was an alien ideology that did not gel with the thinking and religious beliefs of most people in the region.

Feelings of hostility towards the West and the U.S. were not as widespread as they are today, and hence did not obstruct effective counter-insurgency operations at national and regional levels.

Jihadi terrorism is a different kettle of fish -- it is an outgrowth of the soil of the region, and more ruthless. Its pan- Islamic ideology finds ready resonance in the mindset and religious beliefs of growing numbers of people in the region. The vastly increased hostility towards the U.S. since the Gulf War of 1991 has provided this octopus with a strength it might not have otherwise had.

Countries in the region woke up to the common danger posed by jihadi terrorism only after 9/11, but jihadi terrorists have been burrowing into this region for more than a decade, setting up secret cells, networks, training camps and other infrastructure.

Initially, the leadership role in creating rear bases in the region was taken by Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with the help of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) of Pakistan, which became a founding member of Osama's International Islamic Front (IIF) in 1998.

HUM devised the strategy of helping its Filipino collaborators set up a training infrastructure in those areas of the southern Philippines which were no-go to the Filipino security forces, to avoid bringing jihadi recruits to Pakistan for training.

Where Indonesia is concerned, the virus of jihadi terrorism started spreading to the country from Pakistan and the Philippines from the mid-1990s.

The Philippines and Indonesia have become the two sides of a still incomplete jihadi triangle, and Malaysia is eyed as a possible third rear base. In this assessment, conditions there are congenial, with the presence of a large number of well- motivated cadres who have studied in the madrasahs of Pakistan.

If they succeed, the region will be confronted with a terrorism triangle similar to the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Saudi Arabian triangle, from which most of the jihadi terrorists operating against India and the U.S. presently come.

For the campaign against terrorism in Southeast Asia to be effective, it has to thwart efforts of the jihadis to set up a rear base in Malaysia, and act resolutely against the terrorist infrastructure already set up in Indonesia and the southern Philippines.

The current campaign appears to be largely personality- focused. It seeks to identify terrorist leaders and render them inoperative. Considerable intelligence has been collected about personalities, fund flows and operational methods, but one still cannot quantify with accuracy the threat that remains to be met in terms of infrastructure, recruitment flows, motivation, capabilities and future intentions.

While a personality-oriented campaign is important, equally, if not more important, is one focused on infrastructure. Unless the infrastructure across the region is identified and eliminated, the more heads one cuts, the more they will grow.

The time has come for countries in the region to set up a joint task force to focus on the identification and elimination of the terrorist infrastructure across the region.

The writer is Additional Secretary (Retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, and presently Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai.