From sticks to carrots: U.S. gambles on TNI reform

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

The decision by the U.S. administration to resume arms sale and military financing to Indonesia is a foreign policy trophy for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. It was even more significant since the decision was made through a special discretionary waiver granted to the executive to override certain restrictions of a law.

Just a week earlier the U.S. Congress had agreed to maintain the restrictions when it passed the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2006. It reflected U.S. lawmakers' dissatisfaction with the pace of military reform in Indonesia and its accountability for past human rights violations.

The waiver is consistent with the Bush administration's growing empathy for Jakarta. In February, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) was resumed. During Susilo's visit to Washington in May, he and President George Bush expressed their commitment to a resumption of military relations. This opened the way for further relaxation of restrictions for the sale of non-lethal weapons.

A week before the waiver was announced, Eric G. John, the State Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, told a Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the U.S. must be a "reliable friend to Indonesia".

He added that the Bush Administration sees TNI reform "as a long-term project", adding that U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had told Susilo that while the United States had at times pulled back in its relationship with Indonesia "this is not the way it will be in the future".

So why is the U.S. giving away its best leverage in regard to the unreformed TNI? There are simple, pragmatic reasons beyond the questions of human rights and accountability.

Indonesia is an anchor of stability in the region and its waters a vital passage of international trade. It is in no one's interest to have an Indonesia incapable of maintaining security in its waters.

The embargo placed on Indonesia since 1991 has also meant that Indonesia had to readjust its arms procurement. In 2003, Indonesia began purchasing Russian-made jet fighters and assault helicopters, while the Navy has looked to South Korea and other countries for patrol boats.

More importantly, Jakarta and Beijing are also in the initial phases of establishing stronger military cooperation.

Geopolitics dictates that Washington would be amiss not to establish stronger ties with a country whose waters are traversed by a third of the world's sea-borne trade.

Another reason is Washington's global fight against terrorism.

The effectiveness of Indonesian security officers to weed out the fanatic cells here is a significant blow to the terrorist network seeking a Southeast Asian foothold.

Though Indonesia does not completely ally itself with the U.S. policies, security forces here have been increasingly cooperative with their U.S. counterparts.

Democratization and the positive assessment of Indonesia's first-ever democratically elected president was also an important consideration.

It is imperative for Washington to be seen supporting the third-largest democracy, which is also home to 14 percent of the world's Muslims -- Indonesia's Muslim population is larger than the combined number of Muslims in Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Not only can Indonesia be a poster-boy of new democracy, but one which can show the compatibility of democracy in an Islamic dominated society.

What is most interesting is that statements over the past few months coming out of the U.S. State Department justifying the need for resuming full military ties persistently focus on Susilo's reformist agenda and the growing oversight of civilian officials over the TNI.

The changes most often highlighted include the end of the military's "dual function" in politics; efforts by Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono to strengthen civilian control of the budgetary and procurement process; as well as legislation to help oversee military businesses.

However, let us not forget that all these have been civilian- oriented initiatives that have been "imposed" on the military or ones the TNI could not afford to openly reject.

There was very little mention -- and as any political pundit here knows -- limited "eagerness" by the TNI to reform its ranks. In fact, a closer look at Indonesian politics suggests that rather than be a compelling force for change, the TNI is laying low and biding its time and allowing reformasi to run its course.

Hence Washington's decision to resume arms sales to Indonesia looks very much like a token to allow Susilo, a retired Army general, to appease his former brothers in arms so they engage in further change: The stick is now replaced by a carrot, which the Indonesian president is expected to dangle in front of the TNI.

The resumption of U.S. arms sales is welcome relief for an under-equipped military tasked with securing these strategic international passageways. But the key question is whether this "gamble" is good for Indonesia's democratic evolution?

With enough political shrewdness, Susilo can use it to induce change.

Unfortunately, over the past 12 months, very little has actually been shown by Susilo to show he is still focused on his reform pledges. It is even more glaring in how the attitude of moderation has changed within the military and the difficulties faced by the civilian defense minister in initiating real change.

On the other hand, providing carrots to a TNI that remains lethargic about political reform only reinforces the belief that their quiet subversion is paying dividends.