From sticks to carrots: U.S. gambles on TNI reform

From sticks to carrots: U.S. gambles on TNI reform

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

The decision by the U.S. administration to resume arms sale and
military financing to Indonesia is a foreign policy trophy for
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. It was even more significant
since the decision was made through a special discretionary
waiver granted to the executive to override certain restrictions
of a law.

Just a week earlier the U.S. Congress had agreed to maintain
the restrictions when it passed the Foreign Operations, Export
Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2006. It
reflected U.S. lawmakers' dissatisfaction with the pace of
military reform in Indonesia and its accountability for past
human rights violations.

The waiver is consistent with the Bush administration's
growing empathy for Jakarta. In February, the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) was resumed. During
Susilo's visit to Washington in May, he and President George Bush
expressed their commitment to a resumption of military relations.
This opened the way for further relaxation of restrictions for
the sale of non-lethal weapons.

A week before the waiver was announced, Eric G. John, the
State Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, told a Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
the U.S. must be a "reliable friend to Indonesia".

He added that the Bush Administration sees TNI reform "as a
long-term project", adding that U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice had told Susilo that while the United States had
at times pulled back in its relationship with Indonesia "this is
not the way it will be in the future".

So why is the U.S. giving away its best leverage in regard to
the unreformed TNI? There are simple, pragmatic reasons beyond
the questions of human rights and accountability.

Indonesia is an anchor of stability in the region and its
waters a vital passage of international trade. It is in no one's
interest to have an Indonesia incapable of maintaining security
in its waters.

The embargo placed on Indonesia since 1991 has also meant that
Indonesia had to readjust its arms procurement. In 2003,
Indonesia began purchasing Russian-made jet fighters and assault
helicopters, while the Navy has looked to South Korea and other
countries for patrol boats.

More importantly, Jakarta and Beijing are also in the initial
phases of establishing stronger military cooperation.

Geopolitics dictates that Washington would be amiss not to
establish stronger ties with a country whose waters are traversed
by a third of the world's sea-borne trade.

Another reason is Washington's global fight against terrorism.

The effectiveness of Indonesian security officers to weed out
the fanatic cells here is a significant blow to the terrorist
network seeking a Southeast Asian foothold.

Though Indonesia does not completely ally itself with the U.S.
policies, security forces here have been increasingly cooperative
with their U.S. counterparts.

Democratization and the positive assessment of Indonesia's
first-ever democratically elected president was also an important
consideration.

It is imperative for Washington to be seen supporting the
third-largest democracy, which is also home to 14 percent of the
world's Muslims -- Indonesia's Muslim population is larger than
the combined number of Muslims in Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Saudi
Arabia.

Not only can Indonesia be a poster-boy of new democracy, but
one which can show the compatibility of democracy in an Islamic
dominated society.

What is most interesting is that statements over the past few
months coming out of the U.S. State Department justifying the
need for resuming full military ties persistently focus on
Susilo's reformist agenda and the growing oversight of civilian
officials over the TNI.

The changes most often highlighted include the end of the
military's "dual function" in politics; efforts by Minister of
Defense Juwono Sudarsono to strengthen civilian control of the
budgetary and procurement process; as well as legislation to help
oversee military businesses.

However, let us not forget that all these have been civilian-
oriented initiatives that have been "imposed" on the military or
ones the TNI could not afford to openly reject.

There was very little mention -- and as any political pundit
here knows -- limited "eagerness" by the TNI to reform its ranks.
In fact, a closer look at Indonesian politics suggests that
rather than be a compelling force for change, the TNI is laying
low and biding its time and allowing reformasi to run its course.

Hence Washington's decision to resume arms sales to Indonesia
looks very much like a token to allow Susilo, a retired Army
general, to appease his former brothers in arms so they engage in
further change: The stick is now replaced by a carrot, which the
Indonesian president is expected to dangle in front of the TNI.

The resumption of U.S. arms sales is welcome relief for an
under-equipped military tasked with securing these strategic
international passageways. But the key question is whether this
"gamble" is good for Indonesia's democratic evolution?

With enough political shrewdness, Susilo can use it to induce
change.

Unfortunately, over the past 12 months, very little has
actually been shown by Susilo to show he is still focused on his
reform pledges. It is even more glaring in how the attitude of
moderation has changed within the military and the difficulties
faced by the civilian defense minister in initiating real change.

On the other hand, providing carrots to a TNI that remains
lethargic about political reform only reinforces the belief that
their quiet subversion is paying dividends.