From fighting press to money controlled media today

From fighting press to money controlled media today

By Christianto Wibisono

JAKARTA (JP): The growth of the business, development and
industrial press sectors has been a popular discussion topic
since the mid-1980s.

Splashy entries by several business tycoons into the usually
politicized media scene stimulated heavy debate on the role,
function and ramifications of a money-controlled press. Analysts
quickly sounded off on the risk of information bias and conflict
of interest.

This situation is not without precedent -- to a minor degree,
the history of the press in the Dutch East Indies and following
independence in the 1940s is repeating itself today.

The Colonial Era

By 1852, the Java Bode in Batavia (Jakarta) and De Locomotief
in Semarang had been established in the Dutch East Indies.

In 1866 Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, the predecessor of the
Surabaya Post, started publication in Surabaya, the largest
commercial city of the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch-language
newspapers enjoyed a special relationship with the giant MNC and
the "Big Eight" Dutch companies of three major banks and five
trading houses, which between them controlled almost 90 percent
of the Indonesian economy.

In the middle of the business pyramid, the Chinese population
acted as buffer between the giant companies and the indigenous
masses. The Chinese also had their own publications in Mandarin
and Bahasa Peranakan, a hybrid of Malay and Mandarin.

Two groups competed for the Chinese market. This started with
the leftist Sin Po Group in 1910. The rightist and anti-communist
faction established their publishing group Keng Po in 1923. The
rivalry between the two spread all over Indonesia, illustrated by
Semarang, where leftist sympathizers had Sin Min while the anti-
communists had Kuang Po.

Indigenous freedom fighters also understood the strategic role
of newspapers in mobilizing public opinion against the colonial
regime. Hence came the classic term pers perjuangan, a fighting
press, whose main function was to lead the struggle for
Indonesian independence. Among those famous pioneer journalists
were RM Djokomono Tirtoadisuryo, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, the
latter two Indonesia's first president and vice president
respectively. The indigenous press lacked the business acumen of
the Chinese or the commercial advantage of the Dutch press. They
managed to survive only through loyalty of people sympathetic to
their cause.

After the four-year war for independence ended in 1950, the
political structure and elite personalities were new, but the
economy and press reprised their roles from colonial days.

The 1950s: One Man Show Press

Nevertheless, the Indonesian strategic elite in the
government, economy and press was doing its best to create strong
indigenous business groups and a national press.

The government established state-owned enterprises to
gradually build their base in an economy still dominated by the
Dutch companies. They also embarked upon affirmative action by
granting import licenses only to indigenous merchants.
ThisBenteng Policy ultimately failed because most of the
indigenous traders resold their licenses to the Chinese. Only a
handful survived.

But, ironically, the government was the predator on the
indigenous Indonesian press. Indonesian newspaper heavyweights
like Mochtar Lubis and Rosihan Anwar successfully launched their
famous Indonesia Raya and Pedoman in the competitive market, only
to have them closed down. In the first decade after independence,
there prevailed a One Man Show type of press, with newspapers
identical to their founders, who also juggled roles as publishers
and editors.

Among the oldest newspapers still alive today is Merdeka
founded by BM Diah. Sumantoro started Berita Indonesia and Injo
Beng Goat opened Keng Po. In Medan, the Said family published
Waspada and the Idris family launched Mimbar Umum. In Padang,
Kasoema owned Haluan, and Djamal Ali started Pikiran Rakyat in
Bandung. In Semarang, Hetami was identical with Suara Merdeka,
while in Yogyakarta, Samawi and Wonohito were the duo of
Kedaulatan Rakyat.

Then came the sudden revolutionary elan of the West Irian
liberation campaign. All Dutch firms were nationalized in 1956.
A. Azis in Surabaya shrewdly took over Soerabaiasch Handelsblad
and republished it as Surabaya Post. The former De Locomotief in
Semarang was taken over by the Nainggolan family to become Tempo
and Republik, which ceased publication in the 1970s. In Jakarta,
the former printing facilities owned by Java Bode became state-
owned enterprises and were used to print party newspapers like
Bintang Timur. The era of One Man Show Press ended after the
country went into political etatism, with everything subordinated
to the political structure.

1960s: The Politically Affiliated Press

The press was required to pledge loyalty to the Manipol
(political manifesto) of the Sukarno government in 1959; those
who balked were banned or closed shop voluntarily. Abadi, owned
by Masyumi, closed down, and Indonesia Raya and Pedoman were
banned. It was a tragedy for Rosihan because he had willingly
signed the oath. Sukarno and the military still found his
publication lacking, and ordered it shut.

During this period, the press was published under collectivism
and had to declare affiliation to political parties. Suluh
Indonesia was the mouthpiece of the Indonesian Nationalist Party
(PNI), Harian Rakyat of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI),
Duta Masyarakat of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Bintang Timur of
Partindo. In addition, Kompas was a Catholic newspaper and Sinar
Harapan a Protestant one. The Chinese-language newspapers were
stripped of exclusivity and absorbed into the national press. The
government imposed strict rules to control these newspapers.

In 1965 dawned the climax and anti-climax simultaneously. In
February, the government banned the anti-communist publications
united under the BPS front. Included in this sweeping action were
Merdeka and Berita Indonesia. However, the Army was quick in
finding alternatives. They used the Merdeka facilities to publish
Angkatan Bersenjata and they launched Berita Yudha to replace the
banned Berita Indonesia. In a clever game of word mutation, BI
became BY. For the elite in Jakarta, breakfast was served with
rightist anticommunist Berita Yudha, but the communist leaning
Warta Bhakti, the largest newspaper in the country, was present
at dinner.

Everything changed when an attempted communist coup was
crushed by Major General Soeharto. Within hours, the government
banned all communist publications, and gradually restored and
enabled the republication of crusading newspapers such as
Indonesia Raya, Pedoman and Abadi. In subsequent years, the New
Order led by President Soeharto replaced the authoritarian
Manipol regime of Sukarno, who died in 1970.

The 1970s: The Honeymoon Period and After

Beginning in 1966, there was the gradual restoration of press
liberty. The so-called crusading newspapers were given a new
lease on life.

The test of the rule of law versus rule of power was best
shown by the gesture of the state not to ban Nusantara, but to
bring instead its chief editor TD Hafas to court. It was an
updating of the old colonial law on offensive remarks against the
sovereign.

Mochtar Lubis, a member of the Press Council and an admirer
and supporter of Soeharto, praised the government move as a
positive way to educate the people -- don't close or ban the
media, just bring those responsible to court.

The New Order honeymoon period for the press ended forever
with the Malari incident in 1974, the result of a complex mixture
of palace politics, intra elite high level rivalry between Ali
Murtopo and Gen. Soemitro and mass dissatisfaction.

Since then, the Indonesian press has lived with the sword of
Damocles above their heads. Loss of the publishing license (once
called SIT, now SIUPP) spelled closure without legal recourse.

There was also growing professionalism and the partnership
between young journalists and business -- Tempo was founded
jointly between investors and professional journalists.

It is important to note that in 1973, before the Malari
incident, the Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI) and the
Association of Newspaper Publishers (SPS) had decided to stop
issuing recommendations for new SIT. They had effectively put up
a barrier protecting present players from the competition of new
entries. The last SIT issued before the "effective freezing of
new SIT" was a magazine for Sumanang named Sari Pers. This was
later bought by the Tempo Group and renamed Zaman before its
present appearance as Matra. It was ironic that nearly 20 years
after the seizure of the Dutch press and the assimilation and
integration of the Chinese press into the national press, there
was a new dichotomy of stronger and weaker press, or national
press against the local regional or provincial press.

In 1978, another temporary massacre occurred when the
government banned several newspapers in the hectic days of the
People's Consultative Assembly's election of the president in
March. In 1980, Minister of Information Ali Murtopo endorsed the
Press Council Recommendation on Press Regulations. This is the
first and the only regulation which could be classified as an
antimonopolistic measure. It is ironic that while people
campaigned against business monopolies, the government did not
think it appropriate to create an antimonopoly law against
controlling business groups. But in the press sector, the
government did enforce this strict antimonopoly mechanism. First,
they ruled out new licenses, protecting the existing publishers.
Second, they limited pages and advertising space ratios in every
publication.

Upon learning of this draconian antimonopoly policy with its
heavy bias against successful publications which based their
achievements on meritocracy, the publisher of Kompas, PK Ojong,
collapsed and never fully recovered from the shock.

Due to its restrictions on the stronger press from expanding,
the government has managed to prod publishers into other fields
of business, while inviting non-press conglomerates to encroach
upon the media business with their gigantic capital. In the U.S.,
The Washington Post's Katherine Graham would never be expected to
open a hotel or do any business except that related to publishing
and media.

That is the beauty of modernization, diversification and
differentiation. The higher the social structure like the higher
the organic species, there should be differentiation and
diversification in the function of their organs. I like to call
the ambiguous policy of the government pushing the press into
fishery and the hotel business as "amoebic", making people
resemble amoeba. Dysfunction, distortion, multifunction and
chaotic --there is conflict of interest because you are a
businessmen as well as publisher and editor, trader and
journalists simultaneously. Whose interest come first, who is to
control whom? How do you act as a watchdog for your own business
and conflicting interest?

The 1980s: The Entry of Conglomerates

After the successful venture of Tempo, Ciputra put his
strength behind some other publications. This attracted the
interest of Anthony Salim to join with Ciputra in the launching
of Bisnis Indonesia in 1985. This marked the direct entry of
conglomerates into the press business and the gradual decline of
the professionals vis-a-vis the capitalist.

In 1970, Goenawan Mohamad still managed to force a fifty-fifty
deal against Ciputra, who provided the Rp 22 million fresh
capital to launch Tempo. At that time there was no "price" for
the SIT/SIUPP. However, since the restrictions and entry barrier
for the new publishers, the value of the SIUPP rose in the same
manner of banking license values.

In 1970, the government had stopped issuing banking licenses.
Bankers needed to buy these, often for billions of rupiah, from
bankrupt banks holding no assets but the license. In 1988, the
government begain issuing banking licenses again. But in the case
of press, the government continued its mysterious policy of
issuing new licenses only under special consideration. Special
could mean political or high transaction costs for publishers to
get new or take over old licenses from floundering publications.
The cost of the SIUPP takeover would make the initial capital
higher, and the possibility of emulating Goenawan Mohamad's
strategy is practically nil.

The phenomenal growth of the Jawa Pos Group under the
leadership of Dahlan Iskan shows the futility of government
restrictions against the market. No bureaucratic action can stop
the market effectively unless through a crude and arbitrary way.
A decade after the 1980 anti-monopoly measures, advertisers still
prefer to wait a month for space in Kompas rather than sink
charity into "weaker press". Advertising is meant to reach
people, not subsidize unread and unsold publications. Charity
can happen once a year, but advertisements means money, and they
needs return.

The difficulties are exacerbated by the oversupply. Even New
York and Tokyo can only support two or three newspapers, not a
dozen unhealthy opinionated press. The same is true for the
provincial cities. You cannot force the community to pay for more
than two newspapers because it has no supporting economic base
and capacity to maintain the existence of so many newspapers. The
problem is how to control the market.

As mentioned above, the so-called Wali Sanga Press, founded
during the One Man Show period, still survives and is doing well.
Some are rising with the economic condition of the country and
maintain leading position in their hometowns. Pikiran Rakyat in
Bandung, Suara Merdeka in Semarang and Kedaulatan Rakyat in
Yogyakarta. Others have been pushed to the sidelines by
newcomers; Analisa is bigger than Waspada or Mimbar Umum in
Medan. The position of Haluan in Padang is challenged by
Singgalang, Surabaya Post is pushed down by Jawa Pos, and its
affiliate in Ujungpandang, Fajar, is gradually replacing Pedoman
Rakyat as the leading daily in that city.

The 1990s: More Concentration and Oligopolist Trend

Although we have been informed that there are approximately
300 SIUPP in Indonesia, we could easily identify the existence of
a dozen groups who control two thirds of those licenses among
themselves. Two leading media superpowers are Kompas Gramedia and
Jawa Pos Group, which roughly own 60 licenses spreading from
Banda Aceh to Jayapura. Others are the Pos Kota Group, Media
Indonesia, Suara Pembaruan, Republika, Bisnis Indonesia and the
stronger provincial press such as Pikiran Rakyat and Suara
Merdeka.

If we further analyze who is behind such groups we will find
that the name should include either political heavyweights such
as Habibie or tycoons such as Aburizal Bakrie. Minister Habibie
launched Republika and sold its shares openly in public even
defying the Bapepam mechanism. Now Republika controls The
Indonesia Times and Adil. Aburizal Bakrie bought Sinar Pagi to
add to his business media of Popular and Prospek magazines, as
well as ANTeve.

Bimantara had a relationship with Surya Paloh from Media
Indonesia. Its chief executive, Peter Gontha, seems to have a
hobby of collecting TV stations and multimedia licenses; he
recently relaunched The Indonesian Observer. Bob Hasan entered
the media through Gatra, Paron after years of nurturing Sportif
magazine without significant results. Warta Ekonomi is owned by
conglomerate Fadel Muhamad and is acquiring Mobil Motor magazine.
Berita Buana, a weak successor to Berita Indonesia, has been
supported by Probosutedjo. Sukarno Wibowo who was with Buana
since Sumantoro's days had links to the only Chinese language
daily, Harian Indonesia.

It is easy to understand that the present oligarchy in
Indonesia's leadership system does not want to lose control of
this strategic business field. Only those who have close access
and connections, and are trusted by the political elite, could
get publishing licenses. There is no place for young
professionals or new entry into this sensitive and risky
business. The government took notes and learned lessons from
their past experiences of international reactions against media
bans. It now seems to be the priority of the state to ensure that
those who actually hold the licenses are trustworthy operators.

Should they fail to perform their duty to maintain the
political stability and are considered detrimental to the status
quo of the regime, the government may use legal procedures to
replace editors, transfers them to publisher with no direct
control on the contents and smoothly clean the media of its
unwanted personalities. Only those considered partners in
business and uncritical of the establishment will get licenses.

The responsibility of the independent and professional
journalist in this difficult situation is to learn the art of
survival. How to maintain vigilance and the essence of journalism
so as not to provoke the establishment with a reason to close
down the publication. He or she has to understand euphemism and
be gentle to establishment, never touching a sensitive nerve
through mention of several taboos which could never be printed,
unless you dare to face the fatal consequences.

Freedom fighters struggled for independence against the Dutch
with the slogan "Fredoom to Die". It is much easier to say and
practice that today. Just print some basic, but hard and bitter
realities and the result may be entrance into the Black Hole of
oblivion. Now the slogan for the Indonesian press is not 'Berani
Mati' (Dare to Die) but 'Berani Hidup' (Dare to Live), 'Tetap
Kritis' (Maintain a Critical Attitude) and 'Tidak Konyol' (Never
be Quixoctic).