France resumes nuclear tests

By Harvey Stockwin

HONG KONG (JP): China and France have shielded each other as they have resumed nuclear test explosions in the immediate aftermath of the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

While there has been an upsurge of global condemnation of these Sino-French moves, the five declared nuclear powers look like hanging together, thereby letting the Chinese and French to get away unscathed with their politically cynical actions.

Beyond this, however, the resumed testing poses some hard questions not least for Indonesia.

Seen from East Asia, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, who arrived in Paris on June 11 for a two-day visit, left France not a moment too soon while a Times of India headline on June 10 ---"Rao's France Visit Not Well-Timed" --- was a masterpiece of understatement.

When French President Jacques Chirac announced that his decision to resume testing was irrevocable, Rao was already homeward bound. It would not have looked good if the Prime Minister of India was lecturing on the non-violent teachings of Mahatma Gandhi even as President Chirac was giving notice of eight very violent explosions to come under Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific.

Chirac's main concern was, of course, the reactions of the other declared nuclear powers, all of whom, barring China, he was due to meet in Halifax, Nova Scotia, this past weekend for the Group of Seven meeting and the Political Group of Eight (including Boris Yeltsin) gathering which follows.

Chirac could have delayed announcing the tests until after the G-7 and P-8 summits, but decided not to do so. But his decision was carefully crafted to make sure that the reaction of the other nuclear "haves" -- and indeed many of the nuclear "have-nots" -- was muted.

There would be only eight French tests, Chirac announced, starting in September 1995, and ending in May 1996. After that France would have the statistical data to rely upon computer simulations of nuclear tests. These eight tests were being pushed through so that France could give its whole-hearted support to whatever Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was negotiated by the end of 1996.

Given this commitment, while U.S. President Bill Clinton immediately "regretted" the French decision, he did not make an issue of it when Chirac came calling in Washington prior to going to Halifax.

Absorbed in the Chechnyan hostage-taking crisis, Russian President Boris Yeltsin likewise downplayed his reaction, though his official spokesman, Sergei Medvedev, warned that "The destruction of the present moratorium (on nuclear testing) would deal a serious blow to the disarmament agreements we have just achieved".

The nuclear powers won the unanimous agreement of the non- nuclear states, to the indefinite extension of the NPT, at the 178-nation conference, which ended in the middle of May, on the basis of a CTBT being achieved next year, plus the nuclear powers making moves towards nuclear disarmament. Obviously the Sino- French resumption of tests so soon after that bargain carries the clear implication that Beijing and Paris are pretty sure there will not be any major nuclear disarmament any time soon. After all, if disarmament is just around the corner, why bother to perfect a nuclear arsenal with further tests?

The Sino-French resumption of tests carried an additional hazard -- that the world may celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the first atomic explosions with a complete round of nuclear test explosions by all the nuclear powers.

Immediately this danger seems reduced by the cool reaction from Washington and Moscow in the last few days.

Yet it still too soon to be sure that the unpredictable pressures arising from Russian nationalism, mixed with the understandable frustrations of the Russian military, will not make it mandatory for Yeltsin to order one or two more tests. That in turn would further arouse Pentagon and Congressional hawks to demand a few more American blasts. Once the Americans gave in, the British, who will soon be the nuclear power with the least number of tests, would not expect their request, to use American tests sites for explosions of their own, to be refused.

This danger may be avoided but there can be no question that China and France have served each other's interests. It is faintly possible that Chinese intelligence in France is so good that Beijing knew in advance that France was about to start testing again --and so felt free to do so itself.

Much more likely, once the Chinese resumed their Lop Nor blasts, Chirac had a much easier time deciding to renew French testing. If China had not gone ahead, it would have been that much more difficult for Chirac to flout world opinion on his own. As it was, Chirac was careful to stress that his decision to resume was "irrevocable" -- an insistence that politicians generally make when they are nervous that they will not be able to sustain their convictions.

Where Chirac has done a favor for the Chinese, however, is that his decision helps lessen pressure on Beijing arising from its secretive resumption of tests. Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono took the trouble of phoning the new French Foreign Minister to personally convey strong Japanese feelings of "betrayal of the interests of non-nuclear states". Kono probably refrained from additionally denouncing the French for making a mockery of Japanese pressure on China over its testing.

Japan had announced that China's grant aid would be reduced as a result of Beijing's nuclear test go-ahead. Japan, of course, does not give aid to France so cannot make an identical move vis- a-vis Paris. Yet Tokyo will have to exert some sanction against Paris if it is to sustain its move against Beijing.

Since the original Japanese decision to use aid as a pressure point was a trifle tentative, it may be the last we will hear of it. Just to make sure that it was not placed on the defensive itself, on June 16 the Chinese issued a strong statement denouncing the way in which Japan was failing to face up squarely to its World War II record of aggression and atrocity.

Similarly, while it was ostensibly a move solely connected with the U.S. visit of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui, Beijing has sought to put the Americans on the defensive, too, by announcing that China's Ambassador to Washington will be recalled for consultations.

At least the Chinese belatedly did themselves a favor on June 15 when they cautiously sought to take a leaf out of the Chirac book. The Foreign Ministry issued a statement taking note of the French decision, and the French commitment to abide by future test bans, thereby implying Chinese support for any future CTBT. Had China been as forthright as France about its future test plans (said to be five tests in the next twelve months, a total which could increase now that the French have decided on eight) it is likely that it would have faced much less criticism. For the moment "transparency" is a concept whose time has not yet arrived in Beijing.

All told, then, the moratorium on nuclear testing has been ended but the commitment to the CTBT has ostensibly been strengthened.

France has faced extremely irate condemnation from the people liable to be affected if Mururoa Atoll does leak radiation. Numerous micro-states in the South Pacific have suggested that French efforts to improve relations, after President Francois Mitterrand joined the test moratorium in 1992, will now be set at nought. In addition to the protest ship Rainbow Warrior Two belonging to the environmental group Greenpeace, a New Zealand frigate will be sailing towards Mururoa.

But even the most verbally vociferous critics, New Zealand and Australia, in announcing the suspension of all military cooperation with France, have indicated that such cooperation may be resumed once a watertight CTBT is signed.

So once the initial outrage over the Sino-French resumption of tests is spent, one ironical result could be a strengthening of the CTBT, rather than, as many fear, the weakening of its prospects.

This whole episode poses some tough questions which policy planners will have to pose -- and answer.

Of particular relevance to the nuclear situation in Asia, India will have to ask itself whether there is any danger that some or any of China's secretive tests are, in fact, secretive joint ventures with Pakistan?

Second, if that is so, then does India need to conduct another "peaceful nuclear explosion" of its own, like the single one it has conducted so far, in 1974?

Given the fact that Paris and Beijing have put the interests of their nuclear arsenal before everything else, for the next twelve months at least, until a CTBT comes into view, nations can hardly object too strongly if India makes a parallel move.

But once the CTBT is signed and sealed next year, then even a non-signatory, such as India, will risk pariah status if it then conducts a nuclear test of any kind.

Much depends here on nations such as Indonesia, which undertook a significant role, especially among non-aligned nations, in securing the indefinite extension of the NPT, now using the CTBT negotiation to exact a stern price from the nuclear "haves".

The challenge now facing non-nuclear states, in the wake of Chinese and French actions, will be to insist that there are no loopholes in the CTBT, which do in fact allow any more nuclear test explosions whatsoever.