Focusing on leadership change

Focusing on leadership change

By Ikrar Nusa Bhakti

JAKARTA (JP): In his article, "VP's role to increase in the
future" (The Jakarta Post, Dec. 19, 1997) Hermawan Sulistyo
provided two scenarios about the role of the president and the
vice president for the 1998/2003 term.

The first and the most conventional scenario, according to
Hermawan, is that in the next five years, Soeharto would run his
administration as he has during his previous terms.

Therefore, all significant changes would occur only at the end
of the next five-year term in 2003.

After 2003, Soeharto would start to act as the nation's moral
guardian. He would not be involved in the everyday political
decision making process, but all significant political decisions
would be passed on to him for his consent.

The scenario also implies that the vice president would
undergo a more intense "internship" than before. If he
successfully passes the "internship", he would likely be the
unchallenged contender for the next presidential election in
2003.

A second scenario, Hermawan said, is that President Soeharto
would increasingly reduce his role in the next term. Day-to-day
administrative duties, particularly those concerning political
affairs, would be slowly handed over to the vice president and
secretary of state affairs.

Hermawan's political analysis on the role of the president and
the vice president was actually adopted from a realist and
pragmatic perspective.

Both scenarios, however, have their strengths and weaknesses.
The scenarios are quite convincing since the 76-year-old Soeharto
is widely expected to be reelected next March for his seventh
consecutive term.

The election will once again be a one-horse race as Soeharto
has the support of at least 850 of the 1,000 People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR) members. The 850 are legislators from
Golkar and their traditional allies from the regional
representatives faction and the Armed Forces (ABRI) factions. It
is highly likely that the two small parties, the United
Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI)
will follow Golkar and its allies.

But from the idealist perspective, (Hermawan might call it an
unrealistic, utopia or unpragmatic perspective), the scenarios
are still questionable.

It is true that many supporters of the status quo, including
Golkar chairman Harmoko, Minister of Information R. Hartono and
State Minister of Research and Technology B.J. Habibie, believe
Soeharto is the most capable and qualified person in this country
to lead the nation for another term.

According to Hartono, for example, "A younger person (to
succeed Soeharto) may not be capable, or his quality far below
Pak Harto's. What's important is capability and quality." (The
Jakarta Post, Dec. 26, 1997).

This statement excludes the fact that in a country with a
population of 200 million people, there are many capable and
qualified people to lead the nation, including those three
political elite. It also implied that after more than three
decades in power, the New Order government cannot produce capable
and qualified leaders to lead this country. The New Order
government has failed to develop a political system where
succession can take place peacefully.

One reason behind Minister Hartono's statement is that the
younger generation of political elite are still very
conservative. They still look to Soeharto in great awe and treat
him a cult figure, which means their political and economic
supporters are not courageous enough to nominate them as
presidential candidates in the next March MPR session.

There is no agreement among the political elite on who will be
Soeharto's successor. To avoid power struggles among the
political elite, it is therefore better for them to maintain a
status quo, namely to renominate Soeharto for his seventh
consecutive term.

In addition, Golkar and its traditional allies have never
announced the name of the vice presidential candidate because the
political elite, particularly Golkar and ABRI, wish to be named
by the MPR, with Soeharto's blessing.

Many other people belonging to the political elite also do not
want to be appointed by Soeharto in the next cabinet. It means
that their personal, family and group interests are still above
national interests.

In the first scenario, Hermawan analyzed that although
Soeharto would not be involved in the everyday political decision
making process, all significant political decisions would be
passed to him for his consent.

In this regard, it is difficult for the next vice president to
adopt brilliant political and economic reforms if the president
does not agree with him. And if the vice president has the
courage to do so, it means that Indonesia has two leaders with
two different political and economic directions. This situation
may create a constitutional crisis in Indonesia.

The second scenario is only slightly different from the first.
It is impossible that Soeharto would assume a similar position as
a senior minister, much the same way as Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore
did, particularly as his official status is still that of a
president.

Similar to the first scenario, it will be difficult for the
vice president to undertake the day-to-day decision making
process when the much older President is still keeping his eyes
on him.

The Javanese culture of ewuh pakewuh (an uneasy attitude),
will create a lot of problems for him in promoting better
political or economic decisions different from those of Soeharto.
It means that Soeharto will still be very dominant in the
decision making process and the vice president has very little
room to maneuver.

Why should Indonesians be so afraid about presidential
succession?

We have to learn from the 1960s' experience. The renomination
of Soeharto for the seventh consecutive term is not that
different from what the then Provisional People's Consultative
Assembly (MPRS) did when it appointed president Sukarno as the
lifetime president.

The culture of ewuh pakewuh and the idea of the political
elite maintaining the status quo at that time resulted in a
political and economic crisis in Indonesia.

And when Sukarno was rumored to be seriously ill, there was a
political struggle between the two powerful groups, namely the
army and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) which prompted the
communist coup of G30S/PKI.

During that period, who would have guessed that Soeharto, the
young commander of the Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad)
was not only able to put down a communist rebellion and save the
country from political crisis, but also able to reconstruct the
Indonesian economy which had stagnated since the middle of the
1950s?

It seems that the renomination of Soeharto will prolong our
economic and political uncertainties. Any news about Soeharto's
deteriorating health, for example, will have a negative impact on
the Indonesian monetary system and the economy as a whole.

From a political point of view, it will also cause political
struggles among powerful political and economic elites. If such
a situation happens, it will result in a political and economic
setback. It will be difficult to recover our political and
economic situation.

Political succession in Indonesia, particularly the position
of the president, will certainly be followed by political
uncertainty.

However, this kind of leadership change in 1998 is likely to
be manageable. The new younger president will follow the steps of
what Soeharto did in 1967, and cooperate with economic pundits
and managers to reconstruct the Indonesian economy.

The Armed Forces, particularly the army's commanders, will
cooperate with political scientists to manage Indonesian
political reforms. It is highly likely that the political and
economic crisis can be managed in the short-term, since the
fundamentals of our political and economic system have already
been established.

Peaceful presidential succession will probably also erase the
possibility of a "desoehartoisation" (the purge of all pro-
Soeharto elements) and will not endanger Soeharto and his family.

A presidential succession in 1998 will also recover the trust
of the international community, such as foreign governments,
investors and multinational corporations to reinvest into
Indonesia.

It will also strengthen Indonesia's position in ASEAN as a
country which adopts "the first among equals" status. In other
words, presidential succession, which will be followed by
manageable political, economic and law reforms -- including
policy preferences, national policy, and the policy institutions
-- will recover the trust of domestic, regional and international
political and economic actors in Indonesia.

Soeharto's eldest daughter and a Golkar leader, Siti
Hardiyanti Rukmana, recently made a statement that she would
prefer her father not be reelected so he can spend more time with
his family.

It is in the interest of Soeharto's family and our nation that
the MPR nominate other names for presidential and vice
presidential candidates.

Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Ph.D, is chief editor of the scientific
journal Studia Politica and a researcher at the Indonesian
Institute of Sciences' Center for Political and Regional Studies.