Focusing on leadership change
By Ikrar Nusa Bhakti
JAKARTA (JP): In his article, "VP's role to increase in the future" (The Jakarta Post, Dec. 19, 1997) Hermawan Sulistyo provided two scenarios about the role of the president and the vice president for the 1998/2003 term.
The first and the most conventional scenario, according to Hermawan, is that in the next five years, Soeharto would run his administration as he has during his previous terms.
Therefore, all significant changes would occur only at the end of the next five-year term in 2003.
After 2003, Soeharto would start to act as the nation's moral guardian. He would not be involved in the everyday political decision making process, but all significant political decisions would be passed on to him for his consent.
The scenario also implies that the vice president would undergo a more intense "internship" than before. If he successfully passes the "internship", he would likely be the unchallenged contender for the next presidential election in 2003.
A second scenario, Hermawan said, is that President Soeharto would increasingly reduce his role in the next term. Day-to-day administrative duties, particularly those concerning political affairs, would be slowly handed over to the vice president and secretary of state affairs.
Hermawan's political analysis on the role of the president and the vice president was actually adopted from a realist and pragmatic perspective.
Both scenarios, however, have their strengths and weaknesses. The scenarios are quite convincing since the 76-year-old Soeharto is widely expected to be reelected next March for his seventh consecutive term.
The election will once again be a one-horse race as Soeharto has the support of at least 850 of the 1,000 People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) members. The 850 are legislators from Golkar and their traditional allies from the regional representatives faction and the Armed Forces (ABRI) factions. It is highly likely that the two small parties, the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) will follow Golkar and its allies.
But from the idealist perspective, (Hermawan might call it an unrealistic, utopia or unpragmatic perspective), the scenarios are still questionable.
It is true that many supporters of the status quo, including Golkar chairman Harmoko, Minister of Information R. Hartono and State Minister of Research and Technology B.J. Habibie, believe Soeharto is the most capable and qualified person in this country to lead the nation for another term.
According to Hartono, for example, "A younger person (to succeed Soeharto) may not be capable, or his quality far below Pak Harto's. What's important is capability and quality." (The Jakarta Post, Dec. 26, 1997).
This statement excludes the fact that in a country with a population of 200 million people, there are many capable and qualified people to lead the nation, including those three political elite. It also implied that after more than three decades in power, the New Order government cannot produce capable and qualified leaders to lead this country. The New Order government has failed to develop a political system where succession can take place peacefully.
One reason behind Minister Hartono's statement is that the younger generation of political elite are still very conservative. They still look to Soeharto in great awe and treat him a cult figure, which means their political and economic supporters are not courageous enough to nominate them as presidential candidates in the next March MPR session.
There is no agreement among the political elite on who will be Soeharto's successor. To avoid power struggles among the political elite, it is therefore better for them to maintain a status quo, namely to renominate Soeharto for his seventh consecutive term.
In addition, Golkar and its traditional allies have never announced the name of the vice presidential candidate because the political elite, particularly Golkar and ABRI, wish to be named by the MPR, with Soeharto's blessing.
Many other people belonging to the political elite also do not want to be appointed by Soeharto in the next cabinet. It means that their personal, family and group interests are still above national interests.
In the first scenario, Hermawan analyzed that although Soeharto would not be involved in the everyday political decision making process, all significant political decisions would be passed to him for his consent.
In this regard, it is difficult for the next vice president to adopt brilliant political and economic reforms if the president does not agree with him. And if the vice president has the courage to do so, it means that Indonesia has two leaders with two different political and economic directions. This situation may create a constitutional crisis in Indonesia.
The second scenario is only slightly different from the first. It is impossible that Soeharto would assume a similar position as a senior minister, much the same way as Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore did, particularly as his official status is still that of a president.
Similar to the first scenario, it will be difficult for the vice president to undertake the day-to-day decision making process when the much older President is still keeping his eyes on him.
The Javanese culture of ewuh pakewuh (an uneasy attitude), will create a lot of problems for him in promoting better political or economic decisions different from those of Soeharto. It means that Soeharto will still be very dominant in the decision making process and the vice president has very little room to maneuver.
Why should Indonesians be so afraid about presidential succession?
We have to learn from the 1960s' experience. The renomination of Soeharto for the seventh consecutive term is not that different from what the then Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) did when it appointed president Sukarno as the lifetime president.
The culture of ewuh pakewuh and the idea of the political elite maintaining the status quo at that time resulted in a political and economic crisis in Indonesia.
And when Sukarno was rumored to be seriously ill, there was a political struggle between the two powerful groups, namely the army and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) which prompted the communist coup of G30S/PKI.
During that period, who would have guessed that Soeharto, the young commander of the Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) was not only able to put down a communist rebellion and save the country from political crisis, but also able to reconstruct the Indonesian economy which had stagnated since the middle of the 1950s?
It seems that the renomination of Soeharto will prolong our economic and political uncertainties. Any news about Soeharto's deteriorating health, for example, will have a negative impact on the Indonesian monetary system and the economy as a whole.
From a political point of view, it will also cause political struggles among powerful political and economic elites. If such a situation happens, it will result in a political and economic setback. It will be difficult to recover our political and economic situation.
Political succession in Indonesia, particularly the position of the president, will certainly be followed by political uncertainty.
However, this kind of leadership change in 1998 is likely to be manageable. The new younger president will follow the steps of what Soeharto did in 1967, and cooperate with economic pundits and managers to reconstruct the Indonesian economy.
The Armed Forces, particularly the army's commanders, will cooperate with political scientists to manage Indonesian political reforms. It is highly likely that the political and economic crisis can be managed in the short-term, since the fundamentals of our political and economic system have already been established.
Peaceful presidential succession will probably also erase the possibility of a "desoehartoisation" (the purge of all pro- Soeharto elements) and will not endanger Soeharto and his family.
A presidential succession in 1998 will also recover the trust of the international community, such as foreign governments, investors and multinational corporations to reinvest into Indonesia.
It will also strengthen Indonesia's position in ASEAN as a country which adopts "the first among equals" status. In other words, presidential succession, which will be followed by manageable political, economic and law reforms -- including policy preferences, national policy, and the policy institutions -- will recover the trust of domestic, regional and international political and economic actors in Indonesia.
Soeharto's eldest daughter and a Golkar leader, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, recently made a statement that she would prefer her father not be reelected so he can spend more time with his family.
It is in the interest of Soeharto's family and our nation that the MPR nominate other names for presidential and vice presidential candidates.
Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Ph.D, is chief editor of the scientific journal Studia Politica and a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences' Center for Political and Regional Studies.