Fires: Stop blaming others, just start acting!

Luca Tacconi, Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Bogor

Each year, from February to March and August to October, the haze that disrupts social and economic activities in Indonesia also brings with it conflicting accusations of blame. The game of allocating blame for the fires that cause haze repeats itself as regularly as the fires themselves.

But it's time to stop blaming and start acting. Existing technology makes the identification of the hot spots easy. The Bogor-based CIFOR has compared satellite information from the U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency with Indonesian land-use maps. CIFOR's research clearly shows that more than three-quarters of the hot-spots recorded in West and Central Kalimantan in during August occurred in oil palm plantations, timber plantations and forest concessions.

So, what action is needed to address the fire problems?

First, we need to recognize there are different types of fires and that not all fires are problematic. There are fires that generate significant amounts of haze and those that generate much less.

There are land-clearing fires lit on purpose for the establishment of plantations, which do not create significant haze if they are not on peat land. And there are fires burning out of control in areas that are supposed to be maintained as forests, such as those that occurred in East Kalimantan in 1997/1998.

These critical differences are not recognized in the Indonesian legislation (Regulation 4/2001) that forbids all forest and land fires. The legislation should be reviewed so that only harmful and unwanted fires are banned. In this way, the limited resources available to prevent and suppress fires could be used to for the really problematic fires. Certainly, this is not a revolutionary recommendation. Malaysia and other countries allow prescribed fires.

Burning peat land contributed up to 90 percent of the smoke haze experienced during the catastrophic fires in 1997-1998. We are seeing the same thing happening again in 2002. Over 75 percent of the hot spots identified on peat land in West and Central Kalimantan in August were on oil palm plantations, timber plantations and forest concessions.

Media reports have regularly cited how the smoke haze is particularly affecting Pontianak. This is hardly surprising as Pontianak is almost surrounded by peat lands and oil palm and timber plantations. Just as the government has already legislated against the development of lands with peat deeper than three meters, so should it legislate against the use of fires for land- clearing on peat lands .

But just changing the laws won't blow away the haze. The laws need to be enforced, and this is not occurring. This is not because fires are difficult to monitor and police. The fires now occurring in Indonesia are usually described as "forest fires", giving the impression they are burning in remote and inaccessible areas. But this is not true. The fact that over 75 percent of the hot spots identified on peat land in West and Central Kalimantan were on oil palm plantations, timber plantations and forest concessions means that there are roads to access the areas. Inspections by government officials and the collection of evidence to prosecute those using fire illegally are viable.

Once the law is revised, the government must take firm action against companies that use fire illegally. This would show the government is serious in enforcing the legislation and in implementing the recently signed ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. The government also needs to get tough with officials who seek to gain by turning a blind eye to illegal burning activities.

While at the moment it is clear that large companies are mostly responsible for the fires and haze currently affecting the region, this does not necessarily mean large companies will always be the only ones responsible. The 1997-1998 experience shows that at least in some areas such as South Sumatra and East Kalimantan, small-scale livelihood activities by villagers in peat swamp areas were responsible for some of the haze-generating fires.

Dealing with these sources of ignition will be even more complex than with those involving large companies. Small-scale livelihood activities by farmers and squatters are more disperse than those of companies, more difficult to monitor, and legislated changes to burning practices are virtually impossible to enforce. In these cases, only community-based initiatives have any likelihood of succeeding.

So, what are the costs of inaction?

According to a new CIFOR report funded by the European Commission, smoke haze in 1997-1998 affected millions of people and cost Indonesia and its neighbors around US $800 million.

In addition to economic and social costs from smoke haze in 1997-1998, fires cost $2.5 billion to Indonesia, arising from burnt timber and other losses. Of this, East Kalimantan suffered losses totaling $2 billion. The figure for this season is not likely to be as high. Nevertheless, the question remains, how high must it be before the Indonesian government, industry, NGOs and community groups begin working together to halt this environmental, economic and social disaster?