Fires: Stop blaming others, just start acting!
Fires: Stop blaming others, just start acting!
Luca Tacconi, Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR),
Bogor
Each year, from February to March and August to October, the
haze that disrupts social and economic activities in Indonesia
also brings with it conflicting accusations of blame. The game of
allocating blame for the fires that cause haze repeats itself as
regularly as the fires themselves.
But it's time to stop blaming and start acting. Existing
technology makes the identification of the hot spots easy. The
Bogor-based CIFOR has compared satellite information from the
U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency with
Indonesian land-use maps. CIFOR's research clearly shows that
more than three-quarters of the hot-spots recorded in West and
Central Kalimantan in during August occurred in oil palm
plantations, timber plantations and forest concessions.
So, what action is needed to address the fire problems?
First, we need to recognize there are different types of fires
and that not all fires are problematic. There are fires that
generate significant amounts of haze and those that generate much
less.
There are land-clearing fires lit on purpose for the
establishment of plantations, which do not create significant
haze if they are not on peat land. And there are fires burning
out of control in areas that are supposed to be maintained as
forests, such as those that occurred in East Kalimantan in
1997/1998.
These critical differences are not recognized in the
Indonesian legislation (Regulation 4/2001) that forbids all
forest and land fires. The legislation should be reviewed so that
only harmful and unwanted fires are banned. In this way, the
limited resources available to prevent and suppress fires could
be used to for the really problematic fires. Certainly, this is
not a revolutionary recommendation. Malaysia and other countries
allow prescribed fires.
Burning peat land contributed up to 90 percent of the smoke
haze experienced during the catastrophic fires in 1997-1998. We
are seeing the same thing happening again in 2002. Over 75
percent of the hot spots identified on peat land in West and
Central Kalimantan in August were on oil palm plantations,
timber plantations and forest concessions.
Media reports have regularly cited how the smoke haze is
particularly affecting Pontianak. This is hardly surprising as
Pontianak is almost surrounded by peat lands and oil palm and
timber plantations. Just as the government has already legislated
against the development of lands with peat deeper than three
meters, so should it legislate against the use of fires for land-
clearing on peat lands .
But just changing the laws won't blow away the haze. The laws
need to be enforced, and this is not occurring. This is not
because fires are difficult to monitor and police. The fires now
occurring in Indonesia are usually described as "forest fires",
giving the impression they are burning in remote and inaccessible
areas. But this is not true. The fact that over 75 percent of the
hot spots identified on peat land in West and Central Kalimantan
were on oil palm plantations, timber plantations and forest
concessions means that there are roads to access the areas.
Inspections by government officials and the collection of
evidence to prosecute those using fire illegally are viable.
Once the law is revised, the government must take firm action
against companies that use fire illegally. This would show the
government is serious in enforcing the legislation and in
implementing the recently signed ASEAN (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations) Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. The
government also needs to get tough with officials who seek to
gain by turning a blind eye to illegal burning activities.
While at the moment it is clear that large companies are
mostly responsible for the fires and haze currently affecting the
region, this does not necessarily mean large companies will
always be the only ones responsible. The 1997-1998 experience
shows that at least in some areas such as South Sumatra and East
Kalimantan, small-scale livelihood activities by villagers in
peat swamp areas were responsible for some of the haze-generating
fires.
Dealing with these sources of ignition will be even more
complex than with those involving large companies. Small-scale
livelihood activities by farmers and squatters are more disperse
than those of companies, more difficult to monitor, and
legislated changes to burning practices are virtually impossible
to enforce. In these cases, only community-based initiatives have
any likelihood of succeeding.
So, what are the costs of inaction?
According to a new CIFOR report funded by the European
Commission, smoke haze in 1997-1998 affected millions of people
and cost Indonesia and its neighbors around US $800 million.
In addition to economic and social costs from smoke haze in
1997-1998, fires cost $2.5 billion to Indonesia, arising from
burnt timber and other losses. Of this, East Kalimantan suffered
losses totaling $2 billion. The figure for this season is not
likely to be as high. Nevertheless, the question remains, how
high must it be before the Indonesian government, industry, NGOs
and community groups begin working together to halt this
environmental, economic and social disaster?