Fear of authoritarianism legitimate

Fear of authoritarianism legitimate

Aboeprijadi Santoso, Amsterdam

They opted for ballots and promised changes; yet, the rise of
former generals in the presidential election raises questions as
to ex-militaries' potentials to lead the nation and strengthen
Indonesia's incipient democracy. At issue are their associations
with the New Order's methods, institutions and networks.

Initiating a debate on ex-military politicians, Muslim
intellectual Nurcholish Madjid recently said we should make a
distinction between "military" and "being militaristic". He
pointed out that a general like Dwight D. Eisenhower became a
good and democratic president, but a civilian like Adolf Hitler
became an infamous dictator.

The problem is, having won World War II and the election,
Eisenhower built a military industrial complex and started the
Cold War by occupying Korea and the Vietnam War by sending
military advisors. A racist like Hitler seized state power
through the Nazi party amid the 1930s crisis in a historically
hurt society.

Since his argument rests on individuals and behavior rather
than on institutions and societies, Nurcholish' proposition seems
inapt: Hundreds of Eisenhowers would not guarantee a stronger
democracy for Indonesia any more than hundreds of Hitlers would
make Indonesian rulers fascists.

However, given the country's history -- with almost two-thirds
of its post-independence period under authoritarian rule -- other
factors could have created a fascist Indonesia. Had Soeharto's
rule been charismatic, populist and consistently totalitarian, it
would have made his New Order regime closer to Hitler's Third
Reich. It was not an individual, however, but an institutional
legacy, that made the difference.

The New Order legacy has made dubious the post-Soeharto
civilian-military dichotomy. At issue is whether the politicians
-- be they of civilian or military origin -- will adopt the old
methods if they get hold of state power. On the other hand,
obviously, it is the ex-militaries who can make the most of the
New Order's institutional legacy, since they have inherited and
could rely upon and use old networks and military institutions.

If they command powerful apparatuses and self-righteously
believe in repressive measures, with a dose of chauvinism and
xenophobia -- incidentally, not unlike Hitler -- they could fall
easily into authoritarian methods and suppress civil rights. This
has actually happened in Aceh, but has apparently also occurred
recently when a closed meeting between some legislators and
intelligence head Gen. (ret) A.M. Hendropriyono resulted in a
decision to expel foreign researcher Sidney Jones, blacklist
another and threaten 19 other foreign and local NGOs.

For the military, what matters is results, not methods.

In an election, everyone knows the method, but is uncertain
about the result. However, some militaries are used to applying
various -- including arbitrary -- methods, with or without the
threat of violence. The military is more likely to do so than
civilians, as they hold the privilege of a legitimate monopoly in
a Weberian sense -- of violence as a means to serve the state. It
logically follows that the military must remain politically
neutral.

In Indonesia, however, the military has always been a
political force, even though it has never been monolithic. It
claims an "extra" legitimacy based on its inception during the
independence movement and invokes the doctrine of People's
Defense, or Hankamrata, which, 58 years on, still justifies its
powerful structure of territorial command -- all the way down to
remote hamlets across the archipelago.

While a "normal" democracy takes a neutral military for
granted, the Indonesian Military (TNI) commander has to
repeatedly urge its members to remain politically neutral in the
national elections -- as Gen. Endriartono Sutarto did in April.

Since these anomalous institutions became rooted firmly during
the New Order, they will not simply fade away. Likewise, even if
they are retired, this does not mean ex-generals are divorced
from their corps. Once immersed in their doctrines, they are
likely to carry the social capital they may need for material and
ideological resources, which may include key political, corporate
and financial connections, in addition to comradeships formed at
war or military academies and personal networks within and
outside security apparatuses. Territorial connections also serve
as infrastructure to mobilize support, militia or other forces.

All these are assets the ex-generals may or may not use -- but
against which no civilian politician can possibly compete.

One observer, Indro Tjahjono, noted that Gen. (ret) Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono has a great advantage over Gen. (ret) Wiranto,
since his last job as the top security minister enabled him to
expand his network internationally and, more importantly,
throughout various sectors and regions at home. These early
"campaigns" made him popular in Washington, Aceh and Poso, and
also explains his rapidly rising star.

Wiranto, obviously, will challenge this by using the wide
network of Golkar Party interests -- another legacy left by the
New Order -- which Susilo also did via Golkar running mate Jusuf
Kalla. Meanwhile, both will also use personal friends and friends
of friends among retired and active officers. Clearly, the former
generals are able to attract and reach the greater public by
relying upon considerable support from institutions and
mechanisms of both Golkar and the military.

As a consequence, a serious row recently occurred within the
TNI over whom the PEPABRI, or Veterans Association, a grouping of
retired generals highly respected as sesepuh -- wise elders --
and known to be staunch supporters of military supremacy, should
direct its support. It finally urged TNI members and their
families to vote only for presidential candidates of TNI origin
despite Endriartono's calls for neutrality.

For all its claims of reform and professionalism, the TNI,
with all its tentacles, has created a political discrepancy
vis-a-vis political parties and civil society. No legitimacy
exists for this to perpetuate under a "normal" democracy --
something Indonesians have hoped for and aspired to since the
downfall of Soeharto.

The writer is a journalist of Radio Netherlands. This article
is personal views.