Fear of authoritarianism legitimate

Aboeprijadi Santoso, Amsterdam

They opted for ballots and promised changes; yet, the rise of former generals in the presidential election raises questions as to ex-militaries' potentials to lead the nation and strengthen Indonesia's incipient democracy. At issue are their associations with the New Order's methods, institutions and networks.

Initiating a debate on ex-military politicians, Muslim intellectual Nurcholish Madjid recently said we should make a distinction between "military" and "being militaristic". He pointed out that a general like Dwight D. Eisenhower became a good and democratic president, but a civilian like Adolf Hitler became an infamous dictator.

The problem is, having won World War II and the election, Eisenhower built a military industrial complex and started the Cold War by occupying Korea and the Vietnam War by sending military advisors. A racist like Hitler seized state power through the Nazi party amid the 1930s crisis in a historically hurt society.

Since his argument rests on individuals and behavior rather than on institutions and societies, Nurcholish' proposition seems inapt: Hundreds of Eisenhowers would not guarantee a stronger democracy for Indonesia any more than hundreds of Hitlers would make Indonesian rulers fascists.

However, given the country's history -- with almost two-thirds of its post-independence period under authoritarian rule -- other factors could have created a fascist Indonesia. Had Soeharto's rule been charismatic, populist and consistently totalitarian, it would have made his New Order regime closer to Hitler's Third Reich. It was not an individual, however, but an institutional legacy, that made the difference.

The New Order legacy has made dubious the post-Soeharto civilian-military dichotomy. At issue is whether the politicians -- be they of civilian or military origin -- will adopt the old methods if they get hold of state power. On the other hand, obviously, it is the ex-militaries who can make the most of the New Order's institutional legacy, since they have inherited and could rely upon and use old networks and military institutions.

If they command powerful apparatuses and self-righteously believe in repressive measures, with a dose of chauvinism and xenophobia -- incidentally, not unlike Hitler -- they could fall easily into authoritarian methods and suppress civil rights. This has actually happened in Aceh, but has apparently also occurred recently when a closed meeting between some legislators and intelligence head Gen. (ret) A.M. Hendropriyono resulted in a decision to expel foreign researcher Sidney Jones, blacklist another and threaten 19 other foreign and local NGOs.

For the military, what matters is results, not methods.

In an election, everyone knows the method, but is uncertain about the result. However, some militaries are used to applying various -- including arbitrary -- methods, with or without the threat of violence. The military is more likely to do so than civilians, as they hold the privilege of a legitimate monopoly in a Weberian sense -- of violence as a means to serve the state. It logically follows that the military must remain politically neutral.

In Indonesia, however, the military has always been a political force, even though it has never been monolithic. It claims an "extra" legitimacy based on its inception during the independence movement and invokes the doctrine of People's Defense, or Hankamrata, which, 58 years on, still justifies its powerful structure of territorial command -- all the way down to remote hamlets across the archipelago.

While a "normal" democracy takes a neutral military for granted, the Indonesian Military (TNI) commander has to repeatedly urge its members to remain politically neutral in the national elections -- as Gen. Endriartono Sutarto did in April.

Since these anomalous institutions became rooted firmly during the New Order, they will not simply fade away. Likewise, even if they are retired, this does not mean ex-generals are divorced from their corps. Once immersed in their doctrines, they are likely to carry the social capital they may need for material and ideological resources, which may include key political, corporate and financial connections, in addition to comradeships formed at war or military academies and personal networks within and outside security apparatuses. Territorial connections also serve as infrastructure to mobilize support, militia or other forces.

All these are assets the ex-generals may or may not use -- but against which no civilian politician can possibly compete.

One observer, Indro Tjahjono, noted that Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has a great advantage over Gen. (ret) Wiranto, since his last job as the top security minister enabled him to expand his network internationally and, more importantly, throughout various sectors and regions at home. These early "campaigns" made him popular in Washington, Aceh and Poso, and also explains his rapidly rising star.

Wiranto, obviously, will challenge this by using the wide network of Golkar Party interests -- another legacy left by the New Order -- which Susilo also did via Golkar running mate Jusuf Kalla. Meanwhile, both will also use personal friends and friends of friends among retired and active officers. Clearly, the former generals are able to attract and reach the greater public by relying upon considerable support from institutions and mechanisms of both Golkar and the military.

As a consequence, a serious row recently occurred within the TNI over whom the PEPABRI, or Veterans Association, a grouping of retired generals highly respected as sesepuh -- wise elders -- and known to be staunch supporters of military supremacy, should direct its support. It finally urged TNI members and their families to vote only for presidential candidates of TNI origin despite Endriartono's calls for neutrality.

For all its claims of reform and professionalism, the TNI, with all its tentacles, has created a political discrepancy vis-a-vis political parties and civil society. No legitimacy exists for this to perpetuate under a "normal" democracy -- something Indonesians have hoped for and aspired to since the downfall of Soeharto.

The writer is a journalist of Radio Netherlands. This article is personal views.