Fallacies of nationalism-Islamism alignment
J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Jakarta
In a year-end analysis in this newspaper on Dec. 30, 2003, entitled Ideological rivalry dogs national politics, I wrote that "the post-2004 election ideological alignment of Indonesian politics is likely to remain an antagonism of nationalism versus Islam". The party coalitions forged between presidential aspirants and their running mates for the July 5 election seem an attempt to counter this kind of ideological antagonism -- which they seem to recognize, at least tacitly.
Candidates, claiming to be "nationalists", have chosen "Islamic" leaders as their running mates on a single presidential ticket; and those candidates claiming to be Islamic -- particularly leaders of Islam-based parties -- have chosen as their running mates political figures they regard as nationalists, even if they are all Muslims.
Thus incumbent President Megawati Soekarnoputri, candidate of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) has chosen as running mate Hasyim Muzadi, leader of the country's largest Muslim organization Nadhlatul Ulama (NU).
Meanwhile, incumbent Vice President Hamzah Haz of the United Development Party (PPP), an Islam-based political party, has chosen former communications minister Gen. (ret) Agum Gumelar to be his running mate. Not affiliated with any party nor hailing from an Islamic organization, the retired military general seems to be categorized as a nationalist.
Amien Rais, nominated by the Islam-based National Mandate Party (PAN), has chosen as his running mate Siswono Yudohusodo, chairman of the Indonesian Farmers Association (HKTI), whom Amien regards as nationalist.
Two other retired Army generals vying for the presidency, Wiranto of the Golkar Party and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of the Democratic Party, have chosen respectively Solahuddin Wahid, an NU executive, and Jusuf Kalla, a self-proclaimed NU member from South Sulawesi, as their running mates.
These nationalist-Islamist ideological alignments, however, incorporate certain fallacies that may be misleading for the electorate, most of whom are undereducated and politically uninitiated. It seems doubtful that the candidates themselves really comprehend the broader meaning and implications of their alignment or the antagonism between nationalism and Islam.
Either that, or they have formed this union mainly or simply to win votes, thereby exploiting the ignorance of the uneducated, poorly educated and politically naive voters.
In the first place, what is generally understood as nationalism does not seem -- at least as far as Indonesia is concerned -- to be relevant to the modern world as it was in the immediate post-World War II years. Nationalism had been nurtured for hundreds of years by the Dutch colonial experience, and so became the basis of our successful struggle for sovereignty. It is thus understandable that today, Indonesians tend to sound nationalistic mainly when bubbling with anger, frustration and even hatred over their perceived "foreign (Western) interference".
Moreover, the term nationalism is becoming increasingly vague. Different brands are now represented by numerous political parties claiming to be nationalist, all of which appear ill- defined and certainly of doubtful relevance. This includes Sukarno's nationalistic version of marhaenism -- a proletarian- esque ideology -- that even his surviving daughters, including Megawati, have failed to reach a consensus on its interpretation; each claims to be the true heir of "Sukarnoism" and so legitimize their own party ideologies.
Further, the antagonism between nationalism and Islamism also creates the impression that a Muslim leader is not and could not be a nationalist. And leaders of Islam-based parties seem very concerned, not only over the possibility of not being Islamic enough in the public eye, but also of being less or not quite nationalist.
On the other hand, it seems to be assumed that a nationalist leader, though a Muslim, is not and could not be Islamic. Thus Wiranto and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, both Muslims but considered nationalists, have both chosen an NU figure to allay their fears at not appearing Islamic enough.
Indeed, the growth of democracy depends very much on the level and quality of education not only of politicians, but also of the general public. In Indonesia, with the third largest population in the world, it is no exaggeration to say that quality education is a far cry, even among many of the political elite.
It is therefore understandable if many people are confused by the ideological phenomenon. Indeed, even the politicians may be equally confused in their thinking.
One might wonder that the essence of the nationalism-Islamism coalition is a conscious or subconscious attempt to avoid a secular versus nonsecular confrontation that has marked Indonesian politics since well before its proclamation of independence. However, it is an accepted practice here that it is un-Indonesian to call a spade, a spade. In refraining from so doing, we seem to be trying to avoid an open conflict.
In an interview at Gadjah Mada University, Susilo called the ideological basis of the Democratic Party "religious nationalism", while in the essay Bambang Yudhoyono, Sang Demokrat, this was understood to be "not secular". If his "nationalism" also embraces democratic principles, then his "religious nationalism" would be a contradiction in terms. His apparent close relationship with the Crescent Star Party (PBB), which openly strives to uphold the Islamic sharia law "by constitutional means" seems to corroborate this.
However, by never making an attempt to eliminate the seeds of conflict through self-delusion -- like an ostrich burying its head in the sand and making as though everything was in good order -- the nation is likely to continue to be beset by sporadic, local and horizontal conflicts: Conflicts that are triggered by whatever reason, but which eventually become linked to and take the form of religious conflicts -- not unlike a cancer, corroding the life of this nation.
The writer is a political analyst.