Failed generals will also be failed political leaders

Failed generals will also be failed political leaders

Ziad Salim, Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara

After a successful legislative election, the issue of ex-
military men in politics suddenly became a hot topic, prompted,
no doubt, by the emergence of two ex-generals as presidential
candidates and the return of Golkar as the leading party in the
new Legislature.

Many see this new development not only as a
return to the bad old days under another general but a potential
threat to Indonesian democracy. After all, Indonesia was under
the two Gs (General and Golkar) for nearly 32 years, ending with
a total economic and socio-political collapse of the country.

However, worrying though it may be, there is no reason to
exclude ex-militaries in politics. They are citizens and as such
have the right to participate in politics. In fact, ex-militaries
participate in politics regularly without any detriment to
democracy (De Gaulle was a general; and so were George Washington
and Eisenhower; and the next powerful man of Singapore will be a
man with a nickname "B.G" or Brigadier General, Lee Hsien Loong).

In Indonesia, the military people are all around us and many
Indonesians have military men (alive or dead) as members of their
immediate families. The whole history of Indonesia from
Independence is written in the blood of the brave military men
and women. It is no coincidence that Gen. Soeharto could rule
unquestioned for nearly 32 years.

Indonesians love uniforms and handsome "men" in uniforms (from
school children to the ubiquitous "satpams" or private security
guards). Even Sukarno, who was not a military man, understood
this political culture and psychology of his people and was
almost always invariably seen in military uniform and a baton
with all his medals dangling from his chest.

So, the issue of ex-military men in politics, in general, is
not whether they should enter politics but whether they can
reform or reorient themselves to the civilian ways or rid
themselves of their old habits (i.e., their authoritarian
inclination and tendencies).

As shown above, some certainly can, but the records of ex-
militaries in politics in the Middle East, Spain and Latin
America indicate that for many the old habits die hard. The
records of ex-military men unable to respect the values of
democracy, civil society and human rights of their people are
legend and the list is long, stretching from Franco to Pinochet
to Soeharto at home.

In the case of the Indonesian ex-generals, specifically, given
the Indonesian political culture (where military connection is
deeply ingrained and cultural attitude towards the military is
rather ambivalent), the issue against them is not (necessarily)
because they are ex-generals but that they are failed generals,
failed managers and failed leaders!

The distinction is not hair splitting but crucial if the issue
against them is going to be objective. As has been shown above,
as ex-militaries, they have the right to enter politics and the
political culture of Indonesia is such that scaring off the
voters with this issue will not work. Only the records of their
professional failures and incompetence will betray them because
they are still fresh in peoples' collective memories and can be
objectified and demonstrated as a matter of public records.

Indeed, their failures have begun to be exposed recently
(including in these pages) and the call for a systematic exposure
of their records as part of the presidential campaigns has
already been made.

The exposure will reveal where they were, what they knew and
what they did (or did not do) during the times when the Indonesia
suffered the worst pains and indignities (the 1998 Black May
incidence and the subsequent turmoil; the national humiliation
and the loss of East Timor along with the humanitarian disaster
and human rights violations that followed; the resurgent
separatism and inter-ethnic killings in many parts of the
country; the imposition and the mismanagement of military
emergencies in Aceh; and lest forgotten, the Bali and other
bombings).

All these occurred "on their watch", i.e., when the same
ambitious ex-military men in question were in charge either
jointly or separately.

Their failures are not ordinary failures. They are what we
call management failures committed by officials at high level of
political power and authority (i.e., failure to anticipate, to
prevent and to act). At this level, they cannot say they did not
know or they were not informed or were misled or blame
circumstances. At this level, it is their jobs to know, to be
informed, to control and anticipate all circumstances. "Hands
getting caught in the cookie jar" or having a witness are not the
criteria for guilt at their levels.

When things go wrong, at this level, it is their professional
responsibility to take the blame, bow down and bow out.
Especially that they were also part of the governments that
created the problems from the beginning (as in the case of East
Timor where the military was up, front and center), who were also
given a chance to solve them as ministers. That they failed (not
only in their jobs and in taking responsibilities but also as
ministers because one was a fired ex-minister and the other
jumped before being pushed), this kind of failures are not and
should not be easily overlooked.

The above should be enough to shame any man and that is why
their very acts of coming around to try to seduce us to vote for
them on the promise and premise of better leadership are
especially galling.

If they could not handle all those sad and dangerous events
and crises when they were in charge and had the power and the
tools of the state in their hands, what assurances do we have
that they will know what to do next?

They had their chances to govern but failed and now want a
second chance. They are not motivated by pity and empathy for the
sufferings of their fellow Indonesians but by big personal
ambitions and dreams of redeeming themselves of their past
failures and incompetence.

But they have emerged publicly through a flawed internal party
politics sanctioned by the Indonesian democracy itself, exactly
as feared by Fareed Zakaria (International Editor of Newsweek) in
his latest book, The Future of Freedom, where it is shown that
democracy itself is fully capable of producing a man not beholden
to democracy. Only their own personal ethics and sense of shame
can stop them from re-imposing themselves on unsuspecting
Indonesians.

They themselves should have the pride and ethic to "just fade
away" (to use the phrase made famous by the great American
General, McArthur, who did just that and as practiced at home by
the great Indonesian General, Nasution).

The sad thing about the fate of Indonesian democracy after the
recent election is that it has brought out two failed ex-generals
and failed ex-ministers as presidential candidates and the party
once behind the collapse of Indonesia as the number one party
again, at great financial, material and emotional costs to the
country.

Sadder yet, the poor, struggling country, still not yet out of
the lingering effects of their former mischiefs but having been
seduced to believe and to have faith in democracy, will again be
asked to vote for one of them under a collective grand illusion
that ex-generals are tough and can reinstate the "good old days".

The writer, who formerly worked with several international
development organizations, can be reached at
zeeoddone@hotmail.com