Failed generals will also be failed political leaders

Ziad Salim, Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara

After a successful legislative election, the issue of ex- military men in politics suddenly became a hot topic, prompted, no doubt, by the emergence of two ex-generals as presidential candidates and the return of Golkar as the leading party in the new Legislature.

Many see this new development not only as a return to the bad old days under another general but a potential threat to Indonesian democracy. After all, Indonesia was under the two Gs (General and Golkar) for nearly 32 years, ending with a total economic and socio-political collapse of the country.

However, worrying though it may be, there is no reason to exclude ex-militaries in politics. They are citizens and as such have the right to participate in politics. In fact, ex-militaries participate in politics regularly without any detriment to democracy (De Gaulle was a general; and so were George Washington and Eisenhower; and the next powerful man of Singapore will be a man with a nickname "B.G" or Brigadier General, Lee Hsien Loong).

In Indonesia, the military people are all around us and many Indonesians have military men (alive or dead) as members of their immediate families. The whole history of Indonesia from Independence is written in the blood of the brave military men and women. It is no coincidence that Gen. Soeharto could rule unquestioned for nearly 32 years.

Indonesians love uniforms and handsome "men" in uniforms (from school children to the ubiquitous "satpams" or private security guards). Even Sukarno, who was not a military man, understood this political culture and psychology of his people and was almost always invariably seen in military uniform and a baton with all his medals dangling from his chest.

So, the issue of ex-military men in politics, in general, is not whether they should enter politics but whether they can reform or reorient themselves to the civilian ways or rid themselves of their old habits (i.e., their authoritarian inclination and tendencies).

As shown above, some certainly can, but the records of ex- militaries in politics in the Middle East, Spain and Latin America indicate that for many the old habits die hard. The records of ex-military men unable to respect the values of democracy, civil society and human rights of their people are legend and the list is long, stretching from Franco to Pinochet to Soeharto at home.

In the case of the Indonesian ex-generals, specifically, given the Indonesian political culture (where military connection is deeply ingrained and cultural attitude towards the military is rather ambivalent), the issue against them is not (necessarily) because they are ex-generals but that they are failed generals, failed managers and failed leaders!

The distinction is not hair splitting but crucial if the issue against them is going to be objective. As has been shown above, as ex-militaries, they have the right to enter politics and the political culture of Indonesia is such that scaring off the voters with this issue will not work. Only the records of their professional failures and incompetence will betray them because they are still fresh in peoples' collective memories and can be objectified and demonstrated as a matter of public records.

Indeed, their failures have begun to be exposed recently (including in these pages) and the call for a systematic exposure of their records as part of the presidential campaigns has already been made.

The exposure will reveal where they were, what they knew and what they did (or did not do) during the times when the Indonesia suffered the worst pains and indignities (the 1998 Black May incidence and the subsequent turmoil; the national humiliation and the loss of East Timor along with the humanitarian disaster and human rights violations that followed; the resurgent separatism and inter-ethnic killings in many parts of the country; the imposition and the mismanagement of military emergencies in Aceh; and lest forgotten, the Bali and other bombings).

All these occurred "on their watch", i.e., when the same ambitious ex-military men in question were in charge either jointly or separately.

Their failures are not ordinary failures. They are what we call management failures committed by officials at high level of political power and authority (i.e., failure to anticipate, to prevent and to act). At this level, they cannot say they did not know or they were not informed or were misled or blame circumstances. At this level, it is their jobs to know, to be informed, to control and anticipate all circumstances. "Hands getting caught in the cookie jar" or having a witness are not the criteria for guilt at their levels.

When things go wrong, at this level, it is their professional responsibility to take the blame, bow down and bow out. Especially that they were also part of the governments that created the problems from the beginning (as in the case of East Timor where the military was up, front and center), who were also given a chance to solve them as ministers. That they failed (not only in their jobs and in taking responsibilities but also as ministers because one was a fired ex-minister and the other jumped before being pushed), this kind of failures are not and should not be easily overlooked.

The above should be enough to shame any man and that is why their very acts of coming around to try to seduce us to vote for them on the promise and premise of better leadership are especially galling.

If they could not handle all those sad and dangerous events and crises when they were in charge and had the power and the tools of the state in their hands, what assurances do we have that they will know what to do next?

They had their chances to govern but failed and now want a second chance. They are not motivated by pity and empathy for the sufferings of their fellow Indonesians but by big personal ambitions and dreams of redeeming themselves of their past failures and incompetence.

But they have emerged publicly through a flawed internal party politics sanctioned by the Indonesian democracy itself, exactly as feared by Fareed Zakaria (International Editor of Newsweek) in his latest book, The Future of Freedom, where it is shown that democracy itself is fully capable of producing a man not beholden to democracy. Only their own personal ethics and sense of shame can stop them from re-imposing themselves on unsuspecting Indonesians.

They themselves should have the pride and ethic to "just fade away" (to use the phrase made famous by the great American General, McArthur, who did just that and as practiced at home by the great Indonesian General, Nasution).

The sad thing about the fate of Indonesian democracy after the recent election is that it has brought out two failed ex-generals and failed ex-ministers as presidential candidates and the party once behind the collapse of Indonesia as the number one party again, at great financial, material and emotional costs to the country.

Sadder yet, the poor, struggling country, still not yet out of the lingering effects of their former mischiefs but having been seduced to believe and to have faith in democracy, will again be asked to vote for one of them under a collective grand illusion that ex-generals are tough and can reinstate the "good old days".

The writer, who formerly worked with several international development organizations, can be reached at zeeoddone@hotmail.com