Factionalism in Iranian politics

LONDON: For a regime usually characterized as repressive and authoritarian, Iran has a high degree of political competition within its elite. The basic parameters of the Islamic Republic remain strictly guarded. But within the state, a three-way contest has been waged and entrenched since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei's death in 1989. Two rounds of legislative elections in 1992 and 1996 have consolidated the position of President Hojjatoleslam Rafsanjani's pragmatists over the conservatives of Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei (Supreme Leader and functional chief of state) and Khomeneite radicals.

With Rafsanjani constitutionally barred from seeking a third term in the June 1997 executive election, the path is clear for Iran's post-Khomenei leaders to make their bids for power. In order to prevail, presidential contenders must create new coalitions, consolidate their grip on the forces under their control or merely remove potential challengers in the elite or from within their own ranks before they can emerge as rivals. The outcome of this contest will determine the fate of Rafsanjani's reformist agenda, and whether Iran is capable of capitalizing on any reassessment by the U.S. of its dual containment policy.

Iran has no formal political parties. Instead, a number of coalitions or factions operate. Often fluid and intersecting, these groups are drawn from, and organized around, clerical associations, civic groups and newspapers. For the past decade, three major groupings -- radicals, conservatives and pragmatists -- have competed for dominance. Iran's constitutional and political structure encourages this contest. The formal division of power generates rivalries between key institutions. In the absence of a powerful revolutionary leader, such as Ayatollah Khomeini, factionalist tendencies have been even more pronounced in recent years. Such competition has limited the ability of the regime to formulate and implement coherent policies. As a result, Rafsanjani's reformist agenda has already been compromised.

The radicals are the group most closely associated with the strident ideology and extreme economic and foreign policies of Ayatollah Khomenei. Dominant for most of the 1980s, the radicals remain advocates of a strong supreme leader and a heavily subsidized economy favoring the poor. Although still vocal, they have been sidelined since 1989 by a coalition of conservatives and pragmatists brought together by their desire to pursue the free-market policies promoted more forcefully in the wake of Khomeini's death by Rafsanjani.

The conservatives were originally a looser coalition in broad agreement with those that aimed to prioritize economic growth. At the same time, they sought to avoid abandoning the religious and social legacy which they saw as being at the heart of the original Iranian revolution. Recent disputes with the pragmatists have centered on private ownership of satellite dishes and other sources of Western influence. Open advocates of the Iranian merchant class, they are today organized around the powerful Association of Combatant Clerics. Many senior or middle-ranking clerics work closely or sympathize with them. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and Parliamentary Speaker Nateq Nouri are leading figures.

By contrast, the pragmatists favor market-oriented reforms, privatization, an open-door investment policy, acceptance of foreign assistance and greater ties with the West. They draw their support from the private sector, middle classes and technocrat circles. Although economic reforms have also hurt these groups, they have largely remained loyal. Pragmatists congregate around several key ministries and institutions, including foreign affairs, economics and defense, as well as the central bank and National Security Council. They have contributed to Iran's move towards formal party politics, by announcing the establishment of the 'Servants of the Construction' in the lead- up to the June 1997 elections with President Rafsanjani as its head.

Throughout the early 1990s, the conservatives and pragmatists worked together to marginalise the radicals. During the last two parliamentary elections, however, they have come into increasingly direct conflict. From 1993 onwards, there has been a steadily growing rift between the conservative-dominated Majlis and the executive - with conservatives targeting the executive branch as well as the judiciary.

The conservatives clashed with Rafsanjani's established policy of greater social pluralism and industrial-based development. That conflict has been heightened by their opposition to Rafsanjani's social policies and his administration's support for deeper integration with the rest of the non-Moslem world and cooperation with the United States' European partners. Three issues cause particular concern for the conservatives: the perceived steady de-Islamisation of society; the penetration of Iranian society by Western ideas and practices; and the slowly declining segregation of the sexes as the presence of women in public life increases.

The contest was illustrated during the March 1996 election for legislative seats in Tehran, with the two leading contenders being conservative Speaker Nateq Nouri and Fazeh Hashemi - President Rafsanjani's daughter and head of Iran's women's union. The election resulted in a partial victory for Rafsanjani's pragmatists. The conservatives lost their legislative majority, but not so badly as to end factional influence. Instead, their rivalry has spilled over into the forthcoming presidential elections. With Iran's economy still stagnant and voter dissatisfaction high, competition between potential presidential candidates is considerable.

With the election less than a year away, the key players are using their current positions as launching pads for their bid for the presidency. Again, the conservative and pragmatist groupings are the most likely winners. Conservative front-runner Nateq Nouri hopes to emulate Rafsanjani's earlier elevation from Speaker to President. But his electioneering - which has gone on for over two years already - has forced the hand of other conservatives more closely linked to the pragmatists.

A number of pragmatist candidates have also been promoted: Rafsanjani's close ally and First Vice-President Ebrahim Habibi; Tehran's energetic mayor Gholamhossein Karbschi; and Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's longest-serving and highly effective Foreign Minister are all seen as promising. Velayati was considered a front-runner earlier this year, but all three remain viable.

This contest should ensure that the basic shape of the policies adopted under Rafsanjani will remain in place. But given the fluidity of Iranian politics and the fact that neither major faction predominates, the radicals still have the potential to exert considerable leverage. Mohammed Reyshahri, the former Intelligence Minister and known for his radical Islamic views, has already tried to put himself forward as a compromise candidate. Though unlikely, his candidature makes clear that, skillfully handled, the radicals have the potential to hold the balance of power in current posturing.

Unfamiliar with this new role, however, they are once again in danger of losing out in Iran's rivalrous political system. They find it hard to forge new coalitions of their own or extract vital concessions from conservatives and pragmatists. Without a clear strategy, whose creation would require an authoritative leader -- which the radicals do not yet have -- they are unlikely to succeed in holding the balance of power for long, or be able to capitalize on the opportunities that will be presenting themselves in the coming months. Consequently, the radicals may be in danger of entering the next phase as a marginal political force.

Iran is likely to be denominated for the remainder of the 1990s by acute rivalry between the conservatives and Rafsanjani's political heirs. The result will be a continued uneven program of economic and political reform, but without a figure of even Rafsanjani's stature to push through crucial decisions. Compromise and ideological concessions to the conservatives are almost inevitable. The danger is that concessions will be made on foreign policy.

Iran's external agenda is one area where Rafsanjani's pragmatic and often Western-educated cadre of technocrats have had greater influence, but they remain vulnerable to conservative criticism. During this year's Majlis campaign, Nateq Nouri accused his rivals of seeking a dialogue with Washington and softening their position on the Middle East peace process. Active opposition to an eventual Arab-Israeli peace deal or ties with Western nations would cement Iran's isolation from the U.S. and undo much of the good done by Rafsanjani. More likely is that conservatives and pragmatists alike will avoid any closer contact with Washington or U.S. allied forces until well after June's poll. Beyond that, the new President -- provided he is one backed by Rafsanjani -- will attempt to preserve his legacy. Any complicating compromises to conservatives should result in subtle changes rather than a wholesale reorientation of Iran's foreign policy.